Proposition One


Section 3


According to a Greenpeace International report, 1994:

"The contradictions inherent to the NPT can be summarized as follows: The Treaty has the primary objective of preventing nuclear proliferation, yet it legitimizes the nuclear weapons possessed by the official nuclear weapons states; the Treaty promotes the development and trade in nuclear technology and materials that are directly useable in nuclear weapons; the Treaty promises the benefits of 'peaceful' nuclear explosions (PNEs).

"The main weaknesses in the Treaty are: the Treaty is widely perceived as discriminatory by the majority of its parties. This has several components. It argues that the obligations on the non-nuclear weapons states, NNWS, are far greater than the nuclear weapons states, NWS; and NNWS are prohibited from developing nuclear weapons, yet the NWS are permitted to expand and qualitatively develop their own nuclear weapons arsenal.

"The Treaty discriminates in one of the key areas of nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear safeguards. The official NWS are not obliged to have any of their nuclear facilities - civil or military - under international safeguards; whereas the NNWS have full-scope safeguards applied to them.

"NPT safeguards as implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are unable to detect and deter diversion of nuclear materials into nuclear weapons programmes, and with no prospect for substantial improvement; the only obligation for the NWS is to negotiate at an 'early date' effective measures to stop the nuclear arms race, and move to general nuclear disarmament. The Treaty was deliberately framed to permit continued collaboration between the official nuclear weapon states on the development of nuclear weapons.

"Specifically, the NPT has failed because: it promotes the trade in nuclear weapon-usable technology and materials; it continues to defend ineffective IAEA safeguards; it continues to advocate nuclear energy, threatening economic indebtedness, and environmental disaster; it has inhibited the development of safe, economic, and environmentally benign energy sources by all nations, but in particular the countries of the South; it continues to promote peaceful nuclear explosions; it has allowed the NWS's to develop, deploy and target ever more lethal nuclear weapons."


A July 20, 1994, Washington Post official editorial (author unknown), "The Key to the Nuclear Lock":

"The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is the basic law by which the nations of the world broker and enforce nuclear restraint. It's up for renewal in 1995, and few things could do more to undercut the American interest in a safer world than to have this treaty vitiated or delayed. But something like that could yet happen, and it could be partly on the American account. Not that the United States lacks enthusiasm for extending the treaty. But the United States has the chief responsibility for the particular development--a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTB)--that enables the nuclear have countries to look the have- nots in the eye and insist they sign on the non-nuclear line, and that effort is not going so well.

"The problem is that, among the five acknowledged nuclear powers, America and Russia have forsworn testing, but China, France and Britain have not. The non-nuclear countries have some justification in saying that they cannot really be expected to abandon their nuclear option altogether when nuclear countries do not accept concrete limits on their own existing capabilities. Testing, which facilitates and symbolizes nuclear development and nuclear pride, is the most conspicuous of these limits. It's the key to the nuclear lock...."


The September 10, 1994, Washington Times, The U.N. Report column, "New NPT text readied," reported:

"The U.N. disarmament conference ended its deliberations for 1994 in Geneva this week after drafting a revised text for the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

"During the past several weeks, the 37 member states have hammered out a working text to replace the current treaty, which expires next year.... Verification remains a contentious issue.

"Talks on the NPT ran into difficulties after some of the 165 signatories demanded that the treaty include a ban on nuclear testing.

"Several states have also demanded a separate treaty in which nuclear powers pledge not to threaten states with atomic weapons, but sources said agreement was unlikely to be reached soon."


A September 16, 1994, London Financial Times article by Frances Williams in Geneva, reported, "Opposition to nuclear treaty grows":

"...Mr. Isaac Ayewah of Nigeria, chairman of a meeting in Geneva to prepare for the NPT extension conference next spring said yesterday that a majority of states appeared to favour only a limited extension of the treaty, accompanied by clear moves by the five declared nuclear-weapons states towards nuclear disarmament.

"This was later refuted by Mr Thomas Graham, head of the US delegation, who said about 60 countries were committed to making the NPT permanent while the remainder of the treaty-s 164 members had yet to make up their minds....

"A decision to extend the NPT requires a simple majority of treaty members and can be taken only once....

"Critics single out what they see as the failure of the nuclear powers to abide by their NPT obligations to enter 'good faith' negotiations to end the nuclear arms race and work for eventual elimination of nuclear weapons...." [Article VI]


The January/February 1995 Interfaith Council for Peace and Justice, Ann Arbor, Michigan newsletter published "The U.S. Role in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (excerpts from Dr. Natalie Goldring's talk on the NPT on November 11, 1994)":

"...[T]here are a large number of countries that we consider friendly but that have the technical capability to build nuclear weapons on a very, very short notice - countries like Germany, Italy, Japan....

"There are lots of threats to the NPT. One is the continued modernization of the nuclear powers' weapons, particularly the United States, France and the United Kingdom these days... The more these countries treat nuclear weapons as a sign of status and importance in the international community, the more other countries are going to want these weapons...

"U.S. policy has been weak. We claim to have a significant interest in non-proliferation, but we tend to work in two directions at the same time. We say we are trying to amend the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, to provide for the opportunity to deploy theater short range missile defenses. We say we're doing that to protect against all of these proliferating countries who are developing ballistic missile capability. The defenses ... highlight the nuclear powers' continued commitment to their nuclear weapons.

"...Third piece of bad news is this general failure of the nuclear weapons states to meet their commitments under the treaty... article six.... The general and complete disarmament is conventional, nukes, biological, chemical, everything. That's what these countries committed themselves to when they signed the treaty...."


A report in the January 11, 1995, Wall Street Journal by Peter Waldman (reporter) advised, "Egypt Confronts Israel on Nuclear Arms; Pressure to Sign Non-Proliferation Pact Strains Ties":

"...In recent weeks, Egypt has launched a campaign aimed at pressuring Israel into signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty when it comes up for renewal this spring. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak has declared that, unless Israel signs the treaty, Egypt won't sign either, a stand that several other Arab states probably will follow.... Egyptian officials say they don't want to spark a crisis with Israel over the nuclear issue. At the same time, Egypt wants to hear from Israel, at least in private, how and when Israel plans to open up its suspected nuclear program, officials say. One reason for their increased concern is Iran. The Egyptians ask how Arab states can help rally opposition to Iran's alleged nuclear program, which some Arabs fear more than Israel's, as long as Israel remains in the nuclear closet....

"Israeli President Ezer Weizman recently said Israel will end its nuclear ambiguity once it achieves genuine peace with all its enemies, including Iran... [called by Egypt] 'a delaying tactic.'"


The January 19, 1995 Washington Post published an article by John Lancaster and Barton Gellman, "Dispute Over Nuclear Weapons Strains Egyptian-Israeli Ties":

"...The dispute over the Non-Proliferation Treaty has intensified in recent weeks. Although Israel has never acknowledged having a nuclear weapons program, it is widely believed to possess about 200 nuclear devices...

"Arab diplomats warn that if Israel fails to join their countries in renouncing nuclear weapons, it could set off a new arms race in the region, as Arab governments embark on nuclear programs of their own.

"'Israel has to understand that countries cannot but seek a means of defending themselves if one of them possesses the means of destruction,' said Adnan Omran, a Syrian who is deputy secretary general of the Arab League. 'You cannot think that peace will prevail in the Middle East, even with Egypt, if the Israelis persist in being the only nuclear country in the region.'

"Libya, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iraq have all pledged to join Egypt in withholding their signatures from the treaty if Israel does not sign...."


A January 28, 1995, New York Times editorial suggested, in "Extend the Nuclear Firewall," that "The 1968 Nonproliferation Treaty... has helped keep nuclear power programs from being used to make arms and was a factor in persuading South Africa, Brazil, Argentina and Ukraine to give up their nuclear arms or arms-making...."


January 31, 1995, New York Times, by Douglas Jehl: "U.S. in new pledge on atom test ban; seeks to persuade 3d World to Halt Weapons' Spread":

"...Under the plan, Mr. Clinton directed that a moratorium on nuclear testing by the US be extended through at least September 1996, when the nuclear powers are expected to sign a treaty imposing a comprehensive ban on such tests. At the same time, he ordered negotiators in Geneva to abandon what has been his Administration's insistence that the accord be fully binding for only 10 years....

"Until today, the Pentagon had argued that the US should leave itself room to withdraw from a CTB so it could conduct any tests needed to insure that its arsenal remained safe.... Mr. Lake announced the reversal in an address today after the President gave it his endorsement.... If a CTB proved hostile to American interests, Mr.Lake said in his speech, the US could still withdraw from the accord even if it did not contain the specific escape clause the Administration has sought.

"The US last conducted an underground nuclear explosion on Sept. 23, 1992. While the law passed by Congress would have permitted 15 more such nuclear tests after Mr Clinton took office, the President announced in July 1993 that he had decided instead to impose a temporary moratorium, which he renewed last year and again today.... [W]hile China has conducted three nuclear tests since the American moratorium began, the White House has chosen each time merely to condemn them, and Administration officials said today that they could not imagine that more tests by the Chinese would persuade Mr. Clinton to resume American testing.... France, Russia and China have all pressed for a test ban that would allow the powers to conduct large explosions to maintain the safety of their arsenals, and Administration officials said today that the US would now be more flexible about its previous insistence that any tests permitted under the accord involve no more than four pounds of nuclear material."

[Sounds contradictory, somehow, doesn't it?]