METHODOLOGY

The Investigation

Because the Review constituted the most complete inquiry ever conduced into the protective methodology of the Secret Service by non Treasury personnel, the documents reflecting this information were uniformly handled according to security protocols established by the Secret Service. In addition, background checks were conduced on all non-Secret Service Review personnel. All participants, including Advisory Committee members, Review members, officials from other federal agencies and congressional staff members, signed nondisclosure agreements before they were given access to any information. The non-disclosure agreements did not, however, prevent any Review member from sharing relevant information with appropriate Congressional Oversight Committees.

18

During the Secret Service’s internal review, former Secret Service personnel were interviewed on a variety of topics. At the direction of the Under Secretary, the Secret Service reserved interviews of non-Secret Service witnesses for the Main Treasury Review, to reduce my appearance of partiality.[4] The Secret Service located and collected documents relevant to the Review from the files and archives of the Secret Service. At the conclusion of this internal investigation, the Secret Service presented a Report of its findings, conclusions, and recommendations to the Review for further analysis.

The documents and interview reports compiled by the Secret Service served as the starting point for the Review's evaluation. After evaluating the Secret Service report, the Review interviewed Secret Service personnel, obtained additional documents, and interviewed individuals from other agencies. When the Review required definitive statement of official Secret Service policy, it submitted written questions to the Secret Service.

The Review also consulted extensively with numerous other government agencies. At the request of the Review, the Department of

[4 In the aftermath of the September 12 crash, and before the Review began, Secret Service and FBI Agents interviewed the air traffic controllers on duty the night of the plane crash. These individual were interviewed again by the Review in the course of its investigation.]

19

Defense convened working groups of technical experts in air and ground intrusion detection and response to evaluate the surveillance systems presently deployed at the White House Complex. The Review so consulted the Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on air trlffic control and radar detection issues. The Review consulted the CIA and the FBI concerning terrorist activity and how those agencies share intelligence information with the Secret Service. The Department of the Treasury’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and firearms (ATF) provided detailed analyses to the Review on the availability and effectiveness of various types of weapons and explosives, as well as information reguarding the wepons seized pursuant to the October 29, 1994 shooting. The Stare Department provided information concerning its protection of United States embassies overseas. The Review consulted the United States Capitol Police regarding the challenges they face, and the policies and methods they use to meet those challenges to provide security at the Capitol building. The Park Police provided information regarding specific incidents and their role in patrolling areas contiguous to the White House Complex.

In addition, the Review examined Secret Service facilities and systems, examined the scenes of the underlying incidents, and observed air traffic control tower operations at Washington National Airport. Members of the

20

Review and its consultants observed tests and demonstrations of systems proposed or being evaluated for use by the Secret Service.

The Review consulted official representatives of the protective security agencies for the heads of sate of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Germany, Israel, and Korea, as well Is the Security Agency for the Vatican City. These consultations provided n opportunity to discuss and compare the challenges and constraints faced by the Secret Service's foreign counterparts as they endeavor to achieve an appropriate level of security in their respective societies. The Review learned that, without exception, there is significantly greater public Access to the White House than to the residences of the chief executives broad. For instance, the White House is the only executive residence Where public tours are permitted while the Chief Executive is in residence. [5] Moreover, the foreign protective agency representatives uniformly praised the Secret Service 25 being one of the most elite protective agencies in the world. In fact, several of the foreign protective agencies interviewed stated that they model their protective operations after those of the Secret Service.

[5 Buckingham Palace is the only other executive residence where public tours are permitted ;and then only when the Queen is not in residence.]

21

The Review also interviewed former Presidents Ford, Carter, and Bush to obtain their perspectives as long-time protectees of the Secret Service. [6] These interviews illuminated the unique relationship between the Secret Service and Presidents and former Presidents. The Review so sought the former Presidents' views as residents of the Executive Residence concerning the appropriate balance between security and public access to the White House Complex. -The Presidential interviews highlighted, among other issues, the many special choices and compromises that must be made to balance the Secret Service's protective responsibilities against a President's desire to remain accessible to the public.

All totaled, the Review interviewed and received briefings from over 250 individuals from various agencies and organizations including, but not limited to, the Secret Service, the FBI, the CIA, the FAA, ATF, the Metropolitan Police Department LPD), the Park Police, the Capitol Police, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense. In addition, the Review examined over 1,000 documents from the agencies listed above.

[6 In light of recent public announcements regarding the health of former President Regan, the Review did not request to interview him.]

The Review also met with representatives from groups concerned with public access, including Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton; Fred Thomas, Chief of the MPD; members of the Bloomingdale Civic Association; Laurence Reuter, General Manager of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority; Dr. Daniel Boorstin, former Librarian of Congress; Dr. William Seale, the former White House Historian; George White, the Architect of the Capitol; Harvey Gantt, Chairman and Reginald Griffith, Executive Director of the National Capital Planning Commission; engineering representatives of Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority and the District of Columbia Public Works Department; and members of the Executive Committee for the Comprehensive Design Plan for the White House. Furthermore, the Review examined over 200 letters from private citizens concerned with security and public access to the White House.

In addition, the Review consulted with noted architects and urban planners regarding a pedestrian mall concept and public accessibility to the White House. These architects and urban planners included Harold Adams; Max Bond; Mark Bunnell; Maxine Griffith; Nicholas Quennell; William H. Whyte; and John Warnecke, designer of the Lafayette Square project for former First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis and early proponent and designer of a pedestrian mall in front of the White House. Furthermore, the

22

The Review also met with representatives from groups concerned with public access, including Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton; Fred Thomas, Chief of the MPD; members of the Bloomingdale Civic Association; Laurence Reuter, General Manager of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority; Dr. Daniel Boorsin, former Librarian of Congress; Dr. William Seale, the former White House Historian; George White, the Architect of the Capitol; Harvey Gantt, Chairman and Reginald Griffith, Executive Director of the National Capital Planning Commission; engineering representatives of Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority and the District of Columbia Public Works Department; and members of the Executive Committee for the Comprehensive Design Plan for the White House. Furthermore, the Review examined over 200 letters from private citizens concerned with security and public access to the White House.

In addition, the Review consulted with noted architects and urban planners regarding a pedestrian mall concept and public accessibility to the White House. These architects and urban planners included Harold Adams; Max Bond; Mark Bunnell; Maxine Griffith; Nicholas Quennell; William H. Whyte; and John Warnecke, designer of the Lafayette Square project for former First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis and early proponent and designer of a pedestrian n in front of the White House. Furthermore, the

23

Review met with noted transportation planner and traffic engineer, Georges Jacquemart.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

The Review studied information that varied in sensitivity, including publicly available information, law enforcement sensitive but unclassified information, and classified information. The classified information covers the spectrum from confidential through Top Secret, and in very limited instances, codeword classified information.

The Classified Report

The Classified Report is classified in its entirety at the Top Secret level. It contains the complete and detailed analysis of the findings and recommendations of the Review. The Classified Report itself is over 500 pages long. The Appendix to the Report, which includes the Reports of all of the consultants and experts, as well as other documents, is over 260 pgs. The Classified Report includes a detailed discussion, analysis, and critique of the Secret Service's response to each of the incidents reviewed; broad and detailed discussion of air security and found security at the White House; and a discussion and analysis of the Secret Service’s Intelligence Operation. In

24

addition, to the conclusion of each chapter of the Classified Report, the Review . made numerous specific recommendations pertaining to the Corder incident, the Duran incident, air security, ground security, and intelligence. Furthermore, the Review made eleven major recommendations at the conclusion of the Classified Report. The majority of the Review's recommendations are not being disclosed to the public for security reasons.

The extreme sensitivity of some of the material contained in the Classified Report necessitates a strict limit on the number of copies in existence. Only two copies of the Classified Report exists. Finally, some information that the Review gathered was deemed so sensitive that it is not contained in the Classified Report and will be Reported to the Secretary, the President, and the Congress in oral briefings only.

In addition to these precautions taken regarding the information included in the Classified Report, steps have also been taken to ensure the continued security of the Classified Report and the information contained therein, after the completion of the Review. The Department of the Treasury and the Congressional Oversight Committees have agreed that the Report will be reviewed only in the Specially Compartmented Intelligence Facility (SCIF) of the United Stares Congress. The Department of the Treasury and Congress

25

have taken these steps to ensure the continued security of the sensitive information learned during the Review.

The Review acknowledges that it cannot publicly answer many of the questions raised by the September 12, 1994 plane crash, the October 29, 1994 shooting incident, and security at the White House Complex. The interests of national security, the security of the President and the First Family, future Presidents, and the White House Complex demand that this information be strictly safeguarded. while the Review cannot reveal publicly the details of many of its findings, the Department of the Treasury has made every effort to assure the thoroughness and objectivity of the Review. The guidance of the Advisory Committee and the oversight provided by the Inspector General’s Office ensure the Review's impartiality. In addition, the Review retained outside experts and consultants for their expertise in technology and operational protocol, as well as for their objectivity. Lastly, the Review has consulted and briefed the appropriate Congressional Oversight Committees throughout this investigation.

26

LIMITATIONS

There were several significant limitations to this Review. First, the Review was concerned almost exclusively with the performance of the Secret Service rather than the performance of non-Treasury Agencies. Although the responses and official policies of other agencies are noted where relevant, the Review generally did not evaluate the adequacy of those responses and policies. The Review was formed by the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury to examine the Secret Service, one of Treasury’s bureaus. There was nothing to be gained by pointing fingers at others when the Secret Service bears the ultimate responsibility for protecting the President.

Second, some of the incidents covered by the Review were the subject of criminal investigations. Accordingly, the Review was conducted so as not to interfere with either the investigations and pending prosecutions or the rights of the accused. Thus, no interviews concerning the October 29 hooting incident were conducted without prior notification of the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, and interviews were limited to Secret Service and other law enforcement personnel, Similarly, the Review relied on existing statements of Secret Service personnel in its limited review of the

27

shooting of Marcelino Corniel - the knife-wielding person who was shot in front of the white House on December 20, 1994.

Third the Review focused on the practices, policies, and procedures of the Secret Service as an institution. The performance of individuals was not the focus of this effort. 'When a question of integrity arose, it was referred to the Secret Service Office of Inspection and to the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia.

Fourth, as set out in its Mission Charter, the Review focused on the protective mission of the Secret Service a the White House Complex and did not address Secret Service protective activities t other locations. In addition, the Review did not investigate certain aspects of White House security. The specific aspects nor examined by the Review are set forth in detail in the Classified Report.

Finally, the Review was never envisioned as an open-ended study of White House security. It was established to provide a limited assessment of specific incidents and the level of protection presently afforded at the White House. Although events occurring subsequent to the formation of the Review expanded its scope and duration, it nonetheless remained finite project.

28

Interim measures were adopted where necessary; permanent solutions were implemented where possible. Where solutions could nor be identified or immediately implemented, the Review established a process to address and resolve the outstanding issues. Nonetheless, because the Under Secretary for Enforcement has direct line authority over the Director of the Secret Service, the Under Secretary can ensure that the lessons of this Review become integrated into the practices and procedures of the Secret Service.

Pennsylvania Ave. Closure || Peace Park