That respondents and the courts should be required to address this discrete issue is
evidenced by the fact that it was the federal officials, not District of Columbia officials,
who were responsible for abuse of process, petitioners' baseless arrests and the
suppression of petitioners' protected exercise under color of D.C. Code Title 22 Section
1121(3). App. ps. 241 & 242, Information and Dismissal Order, United States v.
Thomas, USDC Cr. No. 91-232, see also, supra, p. 25-27.
i) THE LOWER COURTS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS
FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
In its opinion the District Court held that petitioners failed to state a claim under
Title 42 USC Section 1983 because, "Section 1983 provides no relief against persons
acting under color of federal law." Huddle Memo, pg. 15.
However, that opinion also fails to consider the different occasions respondents
disrupted petitioners' constitutionally protected activities under color of the D.C.
disorderly conduct statute. Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, , 737 F.2d 17, n. 49. 
"(A) police officer forcibly took a poster from a young woman peacefully
standing on a public sidewalk and destroyed it. Although not every
encounter between a citizen and a policeman warrants extended judicial
scrutiny and review, the implications of this apparently inconsequential
incident raise important questions about the constitutional guaranty of
freedom of expression, and require us to determine the circumstances in
which police officers may be required to respond in damages in an action
brought (under) 42 USC Sections 1983 and 1985(3)..." Glasson v.
Louisville, 518 F.2d at 901, cert denied, 423 U.S. 930.
Perhaps the District Court, relying on Thomas I at 67, now holds that
conspiracies to subvert constitutional provisions are permissible provided they occur
[21 For the Court's convenience, n. 49 tells us that, "(f)ollowing the Supreme Court's decision in (District of Columbia v.) Carter, (409 U.S. 418), Congress amended (42 USC Section 1983) to include the District of Columbia. See, Pub.L. No. 96-170, Section 1, 93 Stat. 1284 (1979)." Hobson, 17.]
"'under color of' federal regulations." Petitioners hope this opinion is incorrect. In any
case, the court apparently overlooked the fact that this action was also brought under
the principles articulated in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388:
"An agent acting - albeit unconstitutionally - in the name of the United
States possess a far greater capacity for harm than an individual
trespasser.... (cites omitted) '(W)here federally protected rights have been
invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to
adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief.' Bell v. Hood, 327
U.S. at 684." Id. 302.
e) THE LOWER COURTS ERRED IN FAILING TO ADDRESS
PETITIONERS' ALLEGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO RESPONDENTS'
FALSE TESTIMONY AND PUBLICATIONS
Another of petitioners' key allegations, unmentioned in the disposition of this
case, is that respondents have
"organized and participated in a complex and far-reaching plan -- which
included false testimony in federal courts and fabricated documentation in
federal publications -- to falsely portray plaintiffs' exercise of constitutional
rights as criminal behavior, under color of the regulations, in violation of
the constitutional safeguards provided for in the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 USC 552 et. seq., and plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment rights." Record,
e.g., S. COMPLT, Count 26, see also Counts 27, 33, and Docket # 1, para.
Petitioners clarified this point in oral argument.
"In this case, we are alleging that two of the specific regulations were
pushed through the regulatory process with the assistance of false
testimony and evidence on the part of some of these defendants." App. p.
266, Transcript, December 5, 1988, p. 24.
While the lower courts have apparently overlooked some of the Government's
"incredible" testimony (App. p. 161, J. Bryant), there is ample evidence to support a
claim that respondents and their agents have not told the truth, and nothing but the
truth, when they went to court. E.g.:
"The testimony offered by way of explaining the police conduct is
absolutely unworthy of belief" (Id. p. 12),Nor did dubious testimony by Government agents end with White House Vigil.
"Officer Haynes, the Government's ... primary witness ... (who) spoke with
precision and exactitude and painstaking care, had selective memory ...
(was) unable to remember even testimony that he had clearly specifically
given in court hours earlier, failed to remember making, on some
occasions, earlier arrests of the (petitioners, and) contradicted
representations of the manner in which he inventoried the property...."
United States v. Thomas, Thomas, Thomas, supra; App. ps. 145, 146
(parentheses added), compare, CoC, paras. 90-109.
It was further alleged that respondents made "false statements to the press for
the purpose of maligning" petitioners, and justifying their unnecessary regulations. E.g.
Record Docket # 1, para. 86. Well-documented (e.g., Record, Docket # 45, e.g., Exhibits
64-A thru D), and briefed (e.g., CoC paras. 64, 79, 80, 110).
Nothing in either the courts' or respondents' papers refutes these allegations.
and "(the Deputy Chief of the Park Police and Director of the Secret
Service, Executive Protection Branch) testimony that a large sign had been
used by an individual to scale the White House fence fell apart at the trial.
There was no evidence that any sign belonging to the plaintiffs or anybody
else had ever been used to scale the fence." Id. p. 22 (added)./P>
f) THE LOWER COURTS ERRED IN FAILING TO ADDRESS PETITIONERS' CLAIMS UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
From the onset of this litigation petitioners contended that several incidents of
intentional delay in presenting plaintiffs to a magistrate after arrest, thus resulting in
several days of incarceration violated petitioners' rights under the Fifth Amendment.
Complaint (Docket # 1), para. 54, Amended Complaint (Docket # 11), para. 50,
Clarification of Complaint (Docket # 45) paras. 90, 92, 108.
Instead of explaining why respondents have not targeted petitioners with a
pattern and practice of surveillance, threats, seizures, arrests, unnecessary force, and
violence, directly resulting in deprivation of petitioners' Fifth Amendment right to
remain in a public park unmolested by police abuse, the court reasoned,
"Plaintiffs may have documented ... instances of seeming
misconduct." Huddle Memo, p. 13.
"(Therefore) plaintiffs are surely free to challenge their arrests in
the proceedings in which they are defendants." Id. p. 21, ftn. 17
There are two problems with this reasoning. First, as mentioned above,
petitioners do not enjoy litigation. Second, as a general rule we have seen respondents
drop their baseless criminal charges (supra, e.g., ps. 15 and 24-26; App. ps. 179, 180,
240-242); thus their authoritarian abuses usually evade any judicial review.
g) THE LOWER COURTS ERRED IN FAILING TO ADDRESS PETITIONERS'
CLAIMS UNDER THE NINTH AMENDMENT
In Buckley v. Veleo, 424 U.S. 1, the Court discussed "quantity and quality," and
required "exacting scrutiny" to balance equality of speech for wealthy and poor. Here
the "quality" of petitioners' expressive "continuous presence" depends on the "quantity"
of petitioners' "continuity" in the "public forum."
"(U)se of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part
of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of citizens." Hague v.
CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-516.
Although the right to remain in a public park without being harassed,
intimidated, arrested and assaulted by law enforcement personnel may not specifically be
enumerated in the Constitution, for the sake of civilized society, it must be recognized as
a right inherently "retained" by the people.
4. THE LOWER COURTS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS
FAILED TO ALLEGE DISCRIMINATORY ANIMUS
The District Court erroneously held, "plaintiffs have ... failed to demonstrate
federal defendants' discriminatory animus" Huddle Memo pg. 11), yet correctly
observed that petitioners,
"(c)ompelled by their religious and political convictions ... have sought to
urge the general public ... and the President himself ... to strive towards ...
'Peace Through Understanding,' 'Peace Through Reason,' and 'Peace
Through Love'." Id. ps. 3 & 4.
There is little question that "Section 1985(3) extended to purely political animus
to reach conspiracies formed because a person 'was a Democrat, if you please, or
because he was a Catholic, or because he was a Methodist or because he was a
Vermonter (quoting Cong-Globe, 42d Cong. 1st Sess. 567 (1871))..' Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners v. Scott, 103 S. Ct. 3360." Hobson, supra, at 16, n. 44.
"(S)everal circuits have ruled that politics and religion define such [class-
based discriminatory animus that section 1985(3) requires]. See, e.g.,
Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d 377, 386-88 (discrimination on basis of political
affiliation constitutes class-based discriminatory animus); Ward v. Connor,
657 F.2d 45, 47-48 (discrimination against members of Unification
Church), cert denied, 455 U.S. 907; Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600,
623 & n. 20 (discrimination based on political affiliation with racial
overtones) modified on other grounds, 446 U.S. 754; Means v. Wilson, 522
F.2d 833, 839-40 (discrimination against supporters of insurgent candidate
for tribal council presidency), cert denied, 424 U.S. 958; Glasson v. City of
Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 911-12 (discrimination against critics of the
President), cert denied, 423 U.S. 930; Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d
1057, 1064-65 (discrimination against Jews); Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d
1227, 1232 en banc (worshippers at predominantly White parish disrupted
by Black civil rights workers); see also comment, Private Conspiracies to
Violate Civil Rights, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 1721, 1728 (1977) ('[T]he legislative
history behind section 1985(3) unmistakably LEADS to the conclusion that
discrimination [on the basis of political affiliations or beliefs] was intended
to be actionable.')." Hobson at 21 (paretheses in original).
It is undisputed that, as President and commander-in-chief of the police/armed
forces respondent Bush, following the lead of his predecessor Ronald Reagan (Huddle
Memo, p. 2, ftn. 1), promoted the concept of "Peace through Strength," in diametric
opposition to the concept of "Peace through Reason" promoted by petitioners. S.
CMPLT para. 71. This plain fact would make it easy for a jury to infer that
respondents were animated by a desire to suppress public opposition to the Chief's
policy of "Peace through Strength."
The District Court correctly apprehended petitioners' purpose for being in
Lafayette Park. Ipso facto, respondents acted to disrupt petitioners'
"religious and political convictions ... to strive towards ... 'Peace Through
Understanding,' 'Peace Through Reason,' and 'Peace Through Love'."
Huddle Memo, ps. 3 & 4.
That respondents posed a disingenuous challenge to petitioners' factual
representations on this point merely indicates another disputed issue.
Petition for Certiorari - Continued
Return to Huddle Docket
Code of Federal Regulations
Return to Legal Cases
1601 Pennsylvania Avenue