White House Vigil for ERA v. Clark
746 F.2d 1518
[12. Continued. The Court reaffirmed the proposition in Members of
the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, ---
U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984). There it
upheld a municipal ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs on
public property. Justice Stevens wrote for the majority that
[t]he problem addressed by this ordinance--the visual assault on
the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs
posted on public property--constitutes a significant substantive
evil within the City's power to prohibit. "[T]he city's interest
in attempting to preserve [or improve] the quality of urban life
is one that must be accorded high respect." 104 S.Ct. at 2130
(quoting Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71,
96 S.Ct. 2440, 2452, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976)). Appellees attempt to
distinguish Taxpayers for Vincent on the ground that it concerned
the long-term display of unattended signs, rather than
face-to-face communicative activity of the type involved here.
It is true that Justice Stevens, in his majority opinion, used
words to that effect in the course of distinguishing Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939); see
Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S.Ct. at 2131. The Court in Schneider
struck down an ordinance that prohibited handbilling on the
streets; it held that the municipality's aesthetic interest in
avoiding litter could have been protected through an ordinance
which penalized persons who actually litter. We believe,
however, that the basis of Justice Stevens's discussion of
Schneider is not the distinction urged by appellees, but rather
the distinction explicitly adopted by the Justice in another
passage of his opinion: With respect to signs posted by appellees
... it is the tangible medium of expressing the message that has
the adverse impact on the appearance of the landscape. In
Schneider, an anti-littering statute could have addressed the
substantive evil without prohibiting expressive activity, whereas
application of the prophylactic rule actually employed
gratuitously infringed upon the right of an individual to
communicate directly with a willing listener. Here, the
substantive evil--visual blight--is not merely a possible
by-product of the activity, but is created by the medium of
expression itself. In contrast to Schneider, therefore, the
application of ordinance in this case responds precisely to the
substantive problem which legitimately concerns the City. The
ordinance curtails no more speech than is necessary to accomplish
its purpose. 104 S.Ct. at 2132. The visual blight in the present
case is "created by the medium of expression itself"--stationary
protests within the center zone, which obstruct the view of the
White House and its grounds. The conduct addressed by the Park
Service regulations is therefore more like that proscribed by the
municipal ordinance in Taxpayers for Vincent than that proscribed
by the ordinance in Schneider.]
1536
Because the interests at stake are inherently subjective, however, they must
be "carefully scrutinized to determine if they are only a public
rationalization of an impermissible purpose." [113]
We are convinced that the restriction challenged here does not
mask constitutionally improper motives. Three factors are
relevant to our analysis.
First, the government has regulated for the benefit of the public
rather than for the promotion of its own aesthetic preferences.
It is the view of the White House, not from it, which is being
preserved. Whatever would be our ruling in the latter case, the
purpose of the regulation here is clearly proper.
In order to establish the constitutionality of an aesthetic
regulation of speech, the government must show that the
regulation was enacted for purposes other than the effectuation
of its drafters' personal tastes. Some resort must be had to
societal preferences. To be sure, the preference ultimately
embraced need not be that held by a majority of the populace.
The government is entitled to rely on the expert judgment of
artists, architects, urban planners, design consultants,
historians, and other professionals; it is not limited to the
prevailing style, but may embrace the innovative and the
avantgarde. The aesthetic judgment it makes need not sit well
with all citizens, for the debate sparked by an unconventional
choice often leads to a richer and more complex appreciation of
what is aesthetically pleasing. [114] In short, the government
need not endorse that which is popular or prevalent, but it must
always act on society's behalf rather than its own. [115]
Arbitrariness or capriciousness in the selection of aesthetic
goals may indicate the presence of an impermissible motive either
to enact the preferences of individual government officials or to
burden unreasonably the exercise of free speech. [116] A
requirement that all signs carried on the White House sidewalk be
of a certain color, for example, would be suspect because it
appears to serve no legitimate social interest in aesthetics.
For similar reasons the center zone restriction would be suspect
were it shown that the public regards the presence of stationary
signs directly in front of the White House as aesthetically
pleasing. This in essence is what appellees argue; they contend
that for many tourists the "White House experience" includes the
presence of stationary demonstrations in
[113 Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 510, 101 S.Ct. at 2894.]
[114 One notable example outside the first amendment context is
the adoption of Maya Lin's design for the Vietnam Veterans'
Memorial in Washington, D.C. Compare Wolfe, Art Disputes War:
The Battle of the Vietnam Memorial, Wash.Post, 13 Oct. 1982, at
B1, col. 4 (criticizing design), with Goldberger, Vietnam
Memorial: Questions of Architecture, N.Y. Times, 7 Oct. 1982, at
C25, col. 1 (praising design).]
[115 Judge Wald's opinion questions the utility of our
distinction between aesthetic regulations which enact societal
preferences and those which enact the preferences of individual
government officials. Such a distinction, Judge Wald suggests,
may run afoul of the principle that the first amendment protects
unpopular minorities from the prejudices of hostile majorities.
Op. at 1551. The approach we adopt today, however, is not blind
to the fact that majority tastes sometimes mask disapproval of
the substantive content of expressive activities. Our analysis
does nothing to alter the familiar proscription of content-based
restrictions. See supra pp. 1549-1550. That element of the
constitutional test applies with unqualified force to government
regulations which derive their ostensible legitimacy from the
aesthetic preferences of popular majorities.]
[116 See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 510, 101 S.Ct. at 2894 (one
consideration is whether the aesthetic judgment is so unusual as
to raise suspicions in itself).]
1537
the center
portion of the sidewalk. This may be true, although why signs in
the center zone as well as for more than a hundred yards on
either side are essential for some visitors' "White House
experience" has not been explained. As the public comments
reveal, however, many other tourists believe that the
proliferation of stationary signs within the center zone
substantially detracts from their ability to view the White House
and its grounds. The Park Service was therefore required to
choose between two conflicting views of what is aesthetically
pleasing. [117] Its decision to preserve twenty yards of the
White House sidewalk was not unreasonable; the Service could
conclude that most Americans share the latter aesthetic
preference, and that stationary protests block more of the White
House view than do mobile ones. [118] Far from being
arbitrary, the Service's decision represented an exercise of
informed discretion based upon what a sizable portion of society
regarded as aesthetically significant.
The second factor we must consider in assessing the center zone
restriction is the extent to which it burdens speech. The more
restrictive an aesthetic regulation, the closer a court must look
to determine if it is based on constitutionally improper motives.
The center zone restriction burdens speech only in an indirect
and insubstantial way. Protestors are free to engage in a wide
variety of expressive activities within the center zone; they
are only precluded while there from engaging in stationary
protest. The center zone occupies no more than seven percent of
the total length of the sidewalk; protestors may remain
stationary along any portion of the remainder.
Appellees contend, however, that the regulation makes it more
difficult for them to attract media attention to their cause.
They assert that the center zone of the sidewalk is a
particularly evocative site for symbolic protest, and that
stationary demonstrations there are given preferential coverage
by the news media. To deny
[117 "Aesthetically pleasing" in this context refers not so
much to that which is considered visually beautiful as to that
which promotes or enhances the cultural identity of an area. The
debate over the "White House experience" is essentially a debate
over cultural identity; as such, it is more susceptible to
objective resolution than a disagreement over which of two views
is more "pleasant" or "beautiful." See Costonis, supra note 110.
It is not at all clear why appellees and intervenors regard
stationary protest within the center zone as essential to the
White House experience. Surely the additional cultural
significance of stationary protest over mobile protest is, at
most, insignificant. The government's decision to allow only
mobile protest within the zone enhances the White House
experience for many (and perhaps most) tourists, while it
diminishes that experience for other tourists in only an
insubstantial and indirect fashion.]
[118 The concurrence-dissent contends that the center zone
restriction is unnecessary to further the government's aesthetic
interests; in doing so, however, the opinion seriously
underestimates the degree to which stationary demonstrations
within the center zone have the potential to obscure the view of
the White House. While the size restrictions and the prohibition
on unattended signs reduce that potential to some extent, a
proliferation of hand-held signs of legal dimensions may well
obscure a significant portion of the White House view. For
example, the height limitation applies only to signs themselves
and not to their supports; some signs may therefore be
considerably higher than others. Because different signs can
obscure different levels of view, the cumulative effect may be to
block vision for a significant range of height above the
sidewalk. Such problems are far less pronounced when
demonstrators are required to remain moving within the center
zone: stationary signs have the potential of blocking
considerably more of the White House view than do mobile signs.
Nor is it any mystery why the Park Service decided to allow
non-stationary protests within the center zone, even though such
protests will admittedly obscure some of the White House view.
Assuming arguendo that a ban on non- stationary protests would
have been constitutional, the effect of instituting such a ban
would be to demarcate a "no man's land" in the middle of the
sidewalk. Protestors on either side of the zone would have
considerable difficulty communicating with one another, for they
would be prohibited from carrying their signs across the
demarcated area. The regulation the Park Service adopted
represents a reasonable effort to accommodate the needs of such
protestors.]
1538
them the opportunity to
engage in such protest, they argue, is to deny them effective
access to the media.
We find appellees' contentions unpersuasive for two reasons.
First, the government introduced into evidence several
photographs which show that the Mansion can clearly be seen from
non-central locations on the sidewalk. Second, and more
importantly, our caselaw does not recognize a constitutional
right to attract media attention to one's cause. As this court
stated in Vietnam Veterans Against the War v. Morton, [119]
"What the litigant's press agent seeks and what the public
interest requires differ widely. Although every man is entitled
to make his remonstrance, no man is entitled to make such a
remonstrance that it will be carried on all three television
networks." [120]
The final consideration relevant to our analysis is that the
center zone restriction is not an isolated attempt to regulate
the aesthetics of the White House view. If it were we might
engage in a more searching inquiry to ensure that the agency has
regulated for genuinely aesthetic reasons and not for the purpose
of curtailing protected expression. The regulation here,
however, is but one element of a continuing effort by the Park
Service to preserve and enhance the view of the White House for
tourists and passersby. The White House and its grounds are
maintained year-round in a scrupulously manicured condition;
indeed, only this summer the north facade of the Mansion
underwent extensive restoration. The White House lawn is
designed and maintained such that tourists on the sidewalk are
afforded an excellent view of the Mansion. The fence which
separates the sidewalk from the White House grounds is designed
to facilitate rather than obstruct that view. It is obvious that
the Park Service has promoted, in a number of ways, the ability
of Americans to enjoy the beauty of the White House and its
grounds. The center zone restriction is only one example of the
Service's commitment to aesthetic values and their effective
implementation. [121]
[6] We find no evidence that the center zone restriction was
enacted for any purpose other than the preservation and
enhancement of the White House view for tourists and passersby.
Because the Park Service based its aesthetic judgment on societal
preferences rather than the preferences of individual officials,
because the regulation it adopted is not unduly restrictive of
free expression, and because the regulation constitutes part of a
comprehensive effort to preserve the aesthetics of the White
House view, we conclude that the provision is constitutional.
C. The Parcels Restriction
The regulations provide that
[119 506 F.2d 53 (D.C.Cir.1974) (per curiam).]
[120 Id. at 58; see also Heffron v. International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647, 101 S.Ct. 2559,
2563, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981) (first amendment does not guarantee
right to communicate one's views at all times and places or in
any manner that may be desired); Community for Creative
Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 618-19 (D.C.Cir.1983) (en
banc) (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (first amendment does not
guarantee right to deliver message in the most effective manner
possible, nor does it guarantee media attention), rev'd, --- U.S.
----, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984); Concerned Jewish
Youth v. McGuire, 621 F.2d 471, 474 (2d Cir.1980) (first
amendment does not guarantee news publicity), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1352, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1981); United States
v. Kiger, 297 F.Supp. 339, 343-44 (S.D.N.Y.1969) (first amendment
does not protect violation of a criminal statute in order to get
one's views carried in the press and on the air), aff'd per
curiam, 421 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 904, 90
S.Ct. 1693, 26 L.Ed.2d 63 (1970).]
[121 The fact that the regulations permit stationary protest
outside the center zone does not suggest that the center zone
restriction is a regulatory aberration. The decision to set
aside only the central twenty yards of the sidewalk represents a
healthy compromise between the interests of those who wish to
view the White House and those who wish to demonstrate on the
sidewalk.]
1539
No parcel, container, package,
bundle or other property shall be placed or stored on the
White House sidewalk ... Provided, however, that such property,
except structures, may be momentarily placed or set down in the
immediate presence of the owner on those sidewalks. [122]
The district court found this prohibition "clearly overbroad and
unreasonable." [123] It rewrote the rule to provide that
"parcels or other property be in the immediate presence of the
owner, where 'immediate presence' shall be defined as within 5
feet of the owner." [124] Appellees urge this court to affirm
the modifications. [125] They argue that the original
provision makes it more difficult for protestors such as the
elderly and handicapped, or mothers with small children, to take
part in prolonged demonstrations. These protestors, they
contend, must have available to them such items as medical
supplies and infant necessities to be able to remain on the
sidewalk for any extended period of time. The government, by
contrast, seeks reinstatement of the original language. [126]
We are not entirely convinced that the first amendment protects
the conduct proscribed by the parcels restriction. [127] That
amendment only protects activity which may be fairly
characterized as speech. Courts have correctly recognized that
some forms of conduct are sufficiently expressive to warrant
constitutional protection, [128] but by no means all conduct
which is intended by the actor to express an idea is speech.
[129] Intent is but one half the calculus; [130] a court
must also consider whether "in the surrounding circumstances the
likelihood was great that the message would be understood by
those who viewed it." [131] Those types of conduct which the
Supreme Court has held are within the ambit of the first
amendment--most notably, demonstrating, [132] marching, [133]
picketing, [134] wearing
[122 36 C.F.R. ss 50.7(h)(2), 50.19(e)(10) (1983).]
[123 White House Vigil for the ERA Comm. v. Clark, No. 83-1243,
slip op. at 26 (D.D.C. 26 Apr. 1984).]
[124 White House Vigil for the ERA Comm. v. Clark, No. 83-1243
(D.D.C. 26 Apr. 1984) (order).]
[125 Brief of Appellees at 54. Appellees do not suggest that
we invalidate the parcels restriction in its entirety; indeed,
such an argument would run counter to their consistent reliance
on Rule 52(a).]
[126 Brief for Appellants at 42-43.]
[127 Appellees concede that the first amendment is not directly
implicated by the parcels restriction. See Brief of Appellees at
50 ("the mere carrying or setting down of parcels on the White
House sidewalk may not itself be squarely within the protection
of [the] First Amendment"). So, too, does the district court.
See White House Vigil for the ERA Comm. v. Clark, No. 83-1243,
slip op. at 26 (D.D.C. 26 Apr. 1984) ("the placing of such
containers on the sidewalk near a demonstrator cannot be
characterized as a first amendment activity per se").]
[128 See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-11, 94
S.Ct. 2727, 2729-30, 41 L.Ed.2d 842 (1974) (per curiam). A
number of constitutional scholars have questioned the utility of
a rigid distinction between speech and conduct. See, e.g.,
Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25
U.C.L.A. L.REV. 964, 1010 (1978); Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case
Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV.L.REV. 1482, 1495 (1975); Henkin,
The Supreme Court, 1967 Term--Foreward: On Drawing Lines, 82
HARV.L.REV. 63, 79 (1968).]
[129 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct.
1673, 1678, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968).]
[130 Moreover, the intent must be that of conveying a
"particularized message." Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. at
410-11, 94 S.Ct. at 2730.]
[131 Id. at 411, 94 S.Ct. at 2730.]
[132 See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 83
S.Ct. 680, 9 L.Ed.2d 697 (1963).]
[133 See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S.
147, 89 S.Ct. 935, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969).]
[134 See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct.
736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940).]
1540
armbands, [135]
leafletting, [136] and affixing a peace symbol to the American
flag [137]--clearly satisfy both the subjective and objective
requirements of the constitutional test. [138]
By contrast, the activity at issue here--placing parcels on the
sidewalk-- appears to satisfy neither. Appellees have made no
credible claim that such activity is "inten[ded] to convey a
particularized message"; [139] nor have they shown that
onlookers would regard their conduct as communicative. [140]
Parcels are, of course, inherently less expressive than signs;
while the requirement that demonstrators maintain physical
contact with their signs directly implicates expressive activity,
the parcels restriction does not. [141]
At most, the activity proscribed by the parcels restriction
facilitates expression. [142] The first amendment protects
facilitative activity only insofar as its restriction imposes
burdens on expression itself. [143] Neither the Supreme Court
nor the lower federal courts, however, have enunciated a test for
determining how substantial a burden on expression is necessary
before the first amendment is implicated. [144] While it is
obvious that not just any minimal effect will do, this court is
left without
[135 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969).]
[136 See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146,
84 L.Ed. 155 (1939).]
[137 See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 94 S.Ct.
2727, 41 L.Ed.2d 842 (1974) (per curiam).]
[138 In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d
586 (D.C.Cir.1983) (en banc) (per curiam), rev'd, --- U.S. ----,
104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984), this court held that
sleeping can, in certain circumstances, be "speech" within the
meaning of the first amendment. The Supreme Court reversed on
the grounds that the challenged regulation was a reasonable time,
place and manner restriction. In doing so, the Court assumed,
but did not decide, that sleeping may be expressive conduct. 104
S.Ct. at 3068-69. Because the Court was able to resolve the case
on other grounds, the constitutional status of sleep remains
uncertain. No matter how the issue is finally resolved, however,
it is clear that the overnight sleeping at issue in CCNV lies
much nearer the scope of constitutional protection than the
placing of parcels on the White House sidewalk.]
[139 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. at 410-11, 94 S.Ct. at
2730.]
[140 Id. at 411, 94 S.Ct. at 2730. Onlookers would, of course,
regard many other elements of the typical White House vigil as
communicative. But the fact that demonstrating, chanting, or
carrying signs is inherently expressive does not mean that the
depositing of parcels on the sidewalks is as well. Because the
regulations deal with segregable activities, so, too, must our
analysis.]
[141 It is clear that the Park Service did not intend for the
parcels restriction to apply to signs or banners. See White
House Vigil for the ERA Comm. v. Watt, No. 83-1243, slip op. at 6
n. 5 (D.D.C. 19 July 1983); 48 Fed.Reg. 28058, 28059 (1983).
Demonstrators may place signs on the sidewalk so long as they
maintain physical contact with them. See 36 C.F.R. s 50.19(e)(9)
(1983) (physical contact requirement). Our decision should not be
read as holding that activity of the type engaged in here is
inherently non-expressive. In other circumstances the placing of
items on the ground may be considered expression; we hold only
that the demonstrators here have failed to establish the
expressive content of their activity. See Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 104 S.Ct. at 3069 n. 5.]
[142 Cf. id. at 3070 ("[A]lthough we have assumed for present
purposes that the sleeping banned in this case would have an
expressive element, it is evident that its major value to this
demonstration would be facilitative.").]
[143 This is a corollary of the principle that the first
amendment protects expression rather than all human activities.]
[144 Justice Marshall proposed a test in his dissenting opinion
in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence: "[F]acilitative
conduct that is closely related to expressive activity is itself
protected by First Amendment considerations." 104 S.Ct. at 3077
n. 7 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Besides the
fact that Justice Marshall's test was proposed in dissent and
therefore carries no precedential weight, a "close relationship"
standard would be too amorphous for objective application.
Moreover, Justice Marshall would apparently apply the first
amendment to some restrictions of facilitative activity that have
no effect on expression itself; this result runs counter to the
fundamental principle that expression is what is protected by the
first amendment.]
1541
guidance for determining whether the
alleged burden in this case is sufficient to trigger
constitutional protection.
Next Section
Case Listing --- Proposition One ---- Peace Park