Background research on new weapons generally, though not on the B61-11, has been partially supported by Tri-Valley CAREs of Livermore, California.
For further information contact: Greg Mello 505-982-7747
Concerns
- The B61-11's unique earth-penetrating characteristics, not to
mention its wide range of yields, allow it to threaten otherwise
indestructible targets from the air and are its raison d'etre. The
new weapon is uniquely useful from a military perspective--and
hence provocative from an arms control and nonproliferation
perspective.
- A central and expressed purpose of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) has always been to stop the further evolution of the
world's nuclear arsenals. This modified weapon--certified without
nuclear testing and deployed after signing the CTBT--undercuts that
treaty and could provide political cover to countries who have
their own unsatisfied nuclear ambitions.
- Earth-penetrating weapons, deployed by Clinton in the post-Cold-
War era, were rejected for deployment by Carter, Reagan, and Bush.
What is the new reason to deploy these weapons? What are the new
targets? What is known about the B61-11 strongly suggests that its
rushed development has been motivated by a desire to target one or
more non-nuclear-weapon states.
On July 8, 1996, the International Court of Justice ruled that
any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, other than possibly in
the case where the very survival of a nation was threatened, was
against international law. After this landmark decision, it is
difficult to legally support the deployment, let alone the new
development, of any tactical nuclear weapon--especially one whose
development appears to have been motivated by a desire to target
non-nuclear weapon states.
In order to gain support for indefinite extension of the NPT, the
United States repeatedly assured the world in April and May of 1995
that it would not continue "vertical proliferation." During these
same months the Department of Energy was seeking, and obtaining,
approval for a weapon modification with significant new military
utility.
Development of this weapon was approved outside the regular
budget process and without congressional debate, by means of secret
letters to key committee chairmen, raising constitutional
questions.
In their efforts to gain acceptance for the advanced surrogate
testing of the "science-based stockpile stewardship" program,
Clinton Administration officials and laboratory spokespersons have
for years assured a skeptical public that no new nuclear weapons
would be developed or built. At the very same time, secret
development of this provocative weapon was being requested by the
Pentagon and carried out by the DOE in complete secrecy.
The DOE claims that this weapon, with its unique new military
characteristics, is not a new weapon but rather a minor
modification of an existing weapon. Lab spokespersons admit that
other "modifications" are now in the works or planed for the
future. What are these?
The current B61 modification allegedly involves only the
nonnuclear components of the bomb (notwithstanding months of effort
at Los Alamos). Yet the labs maintain that in the future,
modifications to the nuclear components will definitely be made and
certified as well, using computer simulations and surrogate tests.
Since none of the modifications can be explosively proof-tested,
why won't "confidence" in the reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons
decrease under these plans? Unfortunately, allowing such changes
to be made will likely result, over time, in calls for the
resumption of nuclear testing.
Continued modification of the U.S. stockpile is expensive. While
this particular project may or may not be expensive in itself, the
DOE's $3 billion construction plans to build new nuclear test
simulators, plus its planned Cold-War-level nuclear weapons program
funding, is largely driven by the proclaimed "need" to maintain the
capability to develop new warheads and bombs. These DOE expenses,
it must be said, are just a fraction of the $34 billion spent
annually by the U.S. to field and maintain its nuclear arsenal.
For these reasons and others, new or "modified" nuclear weapons
like the B61-11 are not in the security interests of the United
States. On the contrary, it is in our manifest interest to get rid
of such weapons as fast as possible and to quit their further
legitimization, as former STRATCOM commander Lee Butler and others
have recently said.[Footnote: See, for example, R. Jeffrey Smith,
"Retired Nuclear Warrior Sounds Alarm on Weapons," Washington Post,
December 4, 1996.]
Development, Testing, and Deployment
The B61-11 story came to light in slow installments.
In early September 1995, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
and its three nuclear weapons labs released a revised version of a
report about their nuclear stockpile surveillance program. This
report contained a footnote on page 11:
A modification of the B61 is expected to replace the B53
by the year 2000. Since this modification of the B61 is
not currently in the stockpile, there is no Stockpile
Evaluation data for it. The B61-7 data can be used to
represent this weapon.[Footnote: Kent Johnson et. al.,
1995, "Stockpile Surveillance: Past and Future," DOE
Defense Programs. This is the text of the report given
to Hisham Zerriffi of the Institute for Energy and
Environmental Research on September 13, 1995 at Los
Alamos. The footnote was abridged in subsequent editions
of the report.]
Dr. Don Wolkerstorfer, Above-Ground Experiments I (AGEX I)
Program Manager, Nuclear Weapons Technology Program, Los Alamos
National Laboratory (LANL), had shed light on this modification in
a broadcast debate:
The services are looking at redeploying an existing
weapon in such an earth penetrating warhead to address
hardened targets, that's exactly right. The hope is to
replace the high yield B53, which has some safety
problems...[Footnote: Broadcast by radio station KSFR in
Santa Fe, NM on July 18, 1995]
For reference, the B53 is a 9-megaton gravity bomb first
placed in service in 1960. Retirement of early versions began in
1967, but later versions of this bomb remained in the arsenal until
1987, when retirements were halted and retired (but still
assembled) bombs were brought back into the active stockpile. The
B53 can be a surface-burst but not an earth-penetrating
weapon.[Footnote: History from Chuck Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons:
The Secret History, Orion Books, 1988.] It lacks complete
electrical safety. There are thought to be 50 of these weapons in
the stockpile.[Footnote: Robert Norris and William Arkin, "Nuclear
Notebook," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1996, p.
61-63.]
The B61-7 is a more recent strategic bomb in the stockpile.
It has a selectable yield of 10 to about 340 kilotons. The
original B61-1 first entered the stockpile in 1968; the "mod 7" was
first placed in service in 1985. The B61-7 can be fuzed for air or
surface burst and has "a hardened ground-penetrator nose" with a
retarded contact burst fuzing option. It can be dropped with or
without a parachute. There are thought to be 750 of these bombs in
the active stockpile, along with about 600 B61-3, -4, and -10
tactical bombs.[Footnote: Quote and descriptive information in this
paragraph are from Hansen, op. cit.; stockpile numbers are from
Norris and Arkin, op. cit.] The B61 family of weapons can be
configured with a wide variety of yields, including 0.3, 1.5, 5,
10, 45, 60, 60, 80, 170, and 340 kilotons.[Footnote: Norris and
Arkin, op. cit.; the largest yield is from Arkin, personal
communication, 1/14/97.}
In recent years, many military strategists have advocated the
deployment and use of very small tactical nuclear weapons against
Third-World adversaries, especially in earth-penetrating
roles.[Footnote: For example, see the following Strategic Review
articles: Thomas Dowler and Joseph Howard, "Countering the Threat
of the Well-Armed Tyrant: A Modest Proposal for Small Nuclear
Weapons," (Fall 1991) and, by the same authors, "Stability in a
Proliferated World" (Spring 1995); also Philip Ritcheson,
"Proliferation and the Challenge to Deterrence" (Spring 1995).
Dowler and Howard work at Los Alamos.
Important reviews of the post-Cold-War shift in U.S. nuclear
targeting plans can be found in Hans Kristensen and Joshua Handler,
"Changing Targets: Nuclear Doctrine from the Cold War to the Third
World," Greenpeace International, January 1995; and William Arkin,
"Nuclear Agnosticism When Real Values Are Needed: Nuclear Policy in
the Clinton Administration," Federation of American Scientists
Public Interest Report, September/October 1994.] The two lowest
yields of the B61 family lie well within this so-called "mininuke"
range.
The percent of blast energy converted into shock waves in the
earth is extremely sensitive to the depth of the blast. Thus even
a small increase in earth penetrating capability can greatly affect
the military utility of a nuclear weapon to hold deeply buried and
hardened targets at risk. Hardening of the B61 to allow very high
altitude release, with consequent high velocity ground impact,
apparently provides such an increase in capability.
In September 1995, when the B61-11 story broke, Lab
spokespersons said the development of the modified warhead would
take two years, and would be done primarily at Sandia.
Development, but allegedly not deployment, had been approved at
that time.[Footnote: "Old nuclear warheads get new life," Jonathan
Weisman, Tri-Valley Herald (Livermore, CA), 9/21/95.] DOE's
classified request to reprogram $3.3 million in funds within its
Atomic Energy Defense Weapons Activities account was dated April
18, 1995 and was sent to the following committees:
House Energy and Water Development Appropriations
Subcommittee (approval from Tom Bevill and John Myers,
5/15/95);
House National Security Committee (approval from Floyd
Spence and Ronald Dellums, 6/29/95);
Senate Armed Services Committee (approval from Strom
Thurmond, 7/19/95); and
Senate Energy and Water Development Appropriations
Subcommittee (approval from Pete Domenici,
6/12/95).[Footnote: Approval letters are on file at DOE
Defense Programs.]
Not long after the existence of the weapon became public, Dr.
Harold Smith, then Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic
Energy, requested at the Nuclear Weapons Council Standing Safety
Committee meeting of November 15, 1995, that the above schedule be
accelerated, with the First Production Unit (FPU) of the B61-11 be
delivered "as soon as possible, with a goal of December 31,
1996."[Footnote: Memorandum from Thomas Seitz, Acting Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Military Application (DASMA) and Stockpile
Support to weapons program administrators at Sandia and Los Alamos
national laboratories, November 17, 1995, requesting response as to
feasibility of earlier FPU delivery date. Dr. Smith followed up
his request at the November 15 meeting with a letter to Mr. Seitz
on November 21.]
The response from the nuclear labs, here from Los Alamos, was
positive:
The B61-11 modification project...was originally
scheduled for completion by August 1997; however, DoD
requested that we advance the completion date to December
1996. NWT [the Nuclear Weapons Technology program] is
committed to meeting the aggressive schedule, and a
significant reprogramming of resources has allowed us to
accelerate our progress...Full-scale testing, led by
Manny Martinez, is in progress, and three successful test
drops took place in Alaska on February 28...[Footnote:
Los Alamos National Laboratory, Weapons Insider, April
1996, pp. 1-2.]
In August 1996, LANL provided an update on the project, along
with some additional details.
The essence of the modification is a field changeout of
the weapon's case to provide an earth-penetration
capability. The B61's inherent ability to perform this
mission was demonstrated in Nevada almost a decade
ago...The engineering and nuclear certification
activities are in high gear. Hydrotest Shot 3574 in
September [at LANL's newly-upgraded PHERMEX surrogate
testing facility] will be the basis for assuring that the
underground environment does not adversely affect nuclear
performance. Full-scale penetration tests of real and
high-fidelity mock hardware are being conducted at the
Tonopah Test Range in Nevada...We are committed to
delivering the First Production Unit kits by the end of
the calendar year. [emphasis added][Footnote: Los Alamos
National Laboratory, Weapons Insider, August 1996, pp. 2-
3.]
Note that the "nuclear certification" mentioned is being done on
the basis of hydrodynamic testing and computer modeling, without
underground nuclear testing. The reference to earlier B61 earth-
penetration tests is discussed below.
Two months later, Steven Younger, Program Director of NWT,
encouraged his troops with this message:
As I see it, our highest priority over the next several
months is the B61 Mod 11, and the Air Force is anxiously
awaiting this system....The project is proceeding at a
very fast pace, and almost every division associated with
our Program is contributing to this important
work.[Footnote: Los Alamos National Laboratory, Weapons
Insider, October 1996, p. 1.]
These goals have now been achieved.
The last in a series of B61-11 full-scale drop tests,
prior to the Major Assembly Release (MAR), was conducted
at the Tonopah Test Range on November 20, 1996. More
than 60 people from throughout the complex were on hand
to observe the early morning drops. Three units were
dropped from a B2-A aircraft, two units from about 6900
feet above ground level (AGL) and a third from about
25,700 feet AGL. Prior to November's tests, we had
demonstrated compatibility with the F-16 and the B-1A
aircraft...All objectives with the exception of recording
the strain measurements were met...Another attempt to
record strain measurements will be made in the upcoming
test, now scheduled for early April [1997] in Alaska.
[emphasis added][Footnote: Los Alamos National
Laboratory, Weapons Insider, January/February 1997, pp.
1-2.]
Note that the new weapon has been tested for delivery with a
variety of aircraft, including the F-16, a tactical delivery
system, marking a considerable shift in application from the B53.
Inquiries with DOE have confirmed that deployment is indeed
now underway. The "front" components of the new weapon are being
or were made at the Y-12 Plant on the Oak Ridge Reservation in
Tennessee, with "tail" (read: arming and fuzing?) components made
at the Kansas City Plant in Missouri. The decision to retire the
B53 is now "pending." The location(s) where the modifications are
being done is classified, as well as the number of weapons being
converted.[Footnote: John Ventura, DOE Defense Programs, telephone
conversation, January 29, 1997.]
Even before Deployment, the B61-11 Caused Collateral
Damage
Why did Harold Smith insist that the deployment of the B61-11
be rushed? Isn't the purpose of the new bomb just what DOE has
said, namely to replace the aging and "unsafe" 9-megaton B53 in its
role of excavating deeply-buried Russian command bunkers in the
event of a global nuclear apocalypse? If so, why the rush?
The reason for the November 1996 schedule change became clear
the following April, when a series of Pentagon spokespersons,
including Dr. Smith, used the imminent deployment of the B61-11 to
threaten Libya.
At a press conference on April 23, Dr. Smith outlined U.S.
conventional and nuclear capability for destroying a suspected
Libyan chemical weapons factory, under construction underground at
Tarhunah, 40 miles southeast of Tripoli.
Dr. Smith explained that, at present, the United States has no
conventional weapon capable of destroying the plant from the air,
and such a weapon could not be ready in less than two years. Smith
went on to tell reporters that an earth-penetrating B61 nuclear
bomb, now under preparation, could take out the plant. The new bomb
would be ready for possible use by the end of this year, Smith
said, before the expected completion date of the factory.
Since 1978, the United States has assured the world that it
would never use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear countries who
signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), unless a country
were allied in aggression with a nuclear weapon state. On April 5,
1995, President Clinton reaffirmed this policy, which has been a
cornerstone of U.S. nonproliferation efforts, and an important part
of the offer the U.S. made to skittish nonnuclear states to induce
them to vote for the indefinite renewal of the NPT.
On April 11, just 12 days before Dr. Smith's announcement, and
after an interagency struggle that pitted the Pentagon against the
State Department, the U.S. signed the African Nuclear Weapons Free
Zone Treaty in Cairo. In this treaty the U.S. pledged not to use
or threaten to use a nuclear weapon in Africa against any of the
nearly 50 signatory states, including Libya.
U.S. negative assurance pledges (pledges of "no first use"
except under the circumstances mentioned) were thus clearly
devalued by the Pentagon's threat, which marked a shift in explicit
U.S. nuclear policy. That shift was to openly include the
possibility of preemptive strikes against weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) capabilities, in addition to the possibility of
a nuclear response to WMD use. Such a posture, if allowed to
stand, would have been unprecedented in nuclear history.
The announcement by Dr. Smith, which had been joined by
statements from Secretary of Defense William Perry and others, sent
shock waves through diplomatic circles. A retraction was given by
Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon at a press conference on May
7.[Footnote: Charles Aldinger (Reuters), 5/7/96, "U.S. rules out
nuclear arms against Libya plant."] B61-11 development continued
on the previously-accelerated schedule, however.
Finally, and probably coincidentally, the cover photograph of
the December 1996 issue of Air Force Magazine shows an F-16 parked
in front of what is clearly a nuclear weapons storage facility at
Aviano Air Force Base, Italy, about 900 miles from Libya.[Footnote:
Personal communication, Stan Norris.]
More Earth Penetrators, Nuclear and Otherwise, to Come
From the DOE perspective, the B61-11 is a "modification" to
the B61-7 strategic gravity bomb. As military capability, however,
the B61-11 provides something new--else why deploy it? That
deployment appears to be at odds with the statement of U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Director John Holum in Geneva
three months before, where, in the context of comprehensive test
ban treaty (CTBT) negotiations, Holum said that the United States
would not develop new nuclear weapons.
That being said, the B61-11 is not the only new nuclear
weapon, and not even the only new earth-penetrating nuclear weapon,
planned for the stockpile. In Kenneth Bacon's DoD press briefing
in the afternoon of April 23, the following colloquy occurred:
KB:...We are now working on a series of weapons--both
nuclear and conventional--to deal with deeply buried
targets, working on improving weapons we already had...
Q:...Are we working on new--you said nuclear and non-
nuclear--and I want it to be very clear. Are we working
new nuclear weapons or modifying and improving existing
nuclear weapons?
KB: Yes.
Q: Which is that? New or improved?
KB: We are modifying existing ones [note plural]. As I
said, this is not a new threat.
Q:...why is the Secretary not considering, or is he
considering, anything specific to deal with these targets
which are much, much deeper than anything we've ever
addressed in the last 20 years?
KB: We are.
Q: You're doing what?
KB: We are looking at ways to deal with ever deeper
targets. [emphasis added]
In order to address deeper targets at a given yield, deeper earth
penetration and hence higher speed are needed. Such weapons have
been under development for many years. A prototype W86 warhead was
developed by LANL for the Pershing II missile but was canceled in
1980 in favor of a Livermore design.[Footnote: See photograph and
caption in Cochran, et. al., Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. II,
U.S. Nuclear Warhead Production, Natural Resources Defense Council,
p. 37.] There were underground nuclear tests of earth penetrator
warheads in 1988 and 1989 of both "interim" and "strategic"
designs;" the former was in fact based on the B61 and was called
the W61.[Footnote: Source anonymous.]
To pick one nuclear command, it can only be assumed that the
U.S. Navy has not changed its previous advocacy of "a wider range
of targeting options for maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent
in the new world order," in which low-yield earth-penetrating
warheads are an explicit part of efforts to expand Trident D-5
options.[Footnote: Kristensen and Handler, op. cit., p. 9, quoting
"STRATPLAN 2010," June 1992, U.S. Navy.]
The Los Alamos Study Group is compiling what is known about
other new proposed new and "modified" nuclear weapons. This work
has been supported by Tri-Valley CAREs of Livermore, California.
Los Alamos Study Group
212 E. Marcy St. Suite 7
Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501
505-982-7747 voice
505-982-8502 fax
lasg@igc.apc.org
More information --
Physicians for Social Responsibility, February 2, 1997: "Issue Brief: Unresolved New Nuclear Weapons Development Issues"
Albuquerque Journal, February 11, 1997: "CRITICS CHALLENGE N-BOMB ADDITION" (forwarded by Greenpeace)
Sandia Labs, March 6, 1997: "More Penetrating developments" (forwarded by Greenpeace)
Proposition One
Cassini Space Probe
Nuclear Update