Dear friends,
To provide some further context for the information sent by Los Alamos
Study Group and Greenpeace on the B-61 Mod. 11, here is an update of an
earlier version of PSR's "Issue Brief: Unresolved New Nuclear Weapons
Development Issues," which analyzes the relationship between warhead
modifications the CTBT and necessary changes in U.S. policy.
D. Kimball
************************
ISSUE BRIEF: URESOLVED NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT ISSUES
February 2, 1997
(e-mail version)
Daryl Kimball, Director of Security Programs, Physicians for
Social Responsibility*
* Thanks to Greg Mello from the Los Alamos Study group for
extensive comments and suggestions and to Tom Collina of the
Union of Concerned Scientists for his input.
OVERVIEW
The end of the Cold War has vastly reduced the impetus for
qualitative improvements in the nuclear weapons arsenals of the
declared nuclear weapons states. However, legal and political
barriers to the development and deployment of nuclear weapons of
new design or the development and deployment of modified versions
of existing nuclear weapons are not yet well established. These
barriers to new weapons development are vulnerable to an
ambiguous and often contradictory set of government policies,
public statements, and long-range programs.
While the recently signed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
will create a considerable technical and political barrier to the
development and deployment of new and advanced nuclear weapons,
it will not permanently guarantee that new or modified nuclear
weapons cannot or will not be developed and deployed. In
addition, it is important that the nuclear weapons laboratories
do not pursue stockpile maintenance programs that modify existing
warhead designs, an action which could degrade confidence in
expected performance of modified warheads and could therefore
create pressure to resume nuclear testing.
United States and international security would be strengthened if
President Clinton and his advisors would "no new nuclear weapons
policy" that clearly establishes that:
1) the U.S. will not pursue the development of new types of
nuclear weapons or new military capabilities for existing
warheads;
2) that all activities of the "science-based stockpile
stewardship" program related to U.S. nuclear weapons shall
be conducted to assure the continuing safety and reliability
of existing weapons, and not for the development of new
types of nuclear weapons or new military capabilities for
existing warheads; and
3) the U.S. shall not make design changes to the nuclear
components -- the "physics packages" -- of weapons in the
U.S. stockpile.
A clear, "no new nuclear weapons" policy would positively affect
at least three areas of nuclear weapons and military policy. It
would: a) facilitate the early entry-into-force of the
Comprehensive Test Ban; b) end the qualitative nuclear arms race
between and among the declared nuclear weapons states and the
proliferation of nuclear weapons in the nuclear weapons capable
states; and c) reinforce the benefits of numerical reductions in
nuclear weapons arsenals; d) lead to a curtailment of the Energy
Department's expensive "stockpile stewardship" program.
A U.S. declaration of a clear "no new nuclear weapons" policy can
and should lead to a multilateral moratorium on the development
and deployment of new types of nuclear weapons or new military
capabilities for existing warheads (through modifications of
existing designs) among the declared and undeclared nuclear
weapon states. For example, France's representative to the
Conference on Disarmament when announcing France's support for a
zero-threshold test ban treaty on August 10, 1995 stated that:
"France does not intend to design new types of weapons, nor
to increase the number and power of existing weapons, no to
develop miniaturized weapons, no to modify the role of
nuclear weapons in our defense policy."
No existing U.S. policy clearly addresses this point.
Current U.S. Policies, Statements on Nuclear Weapons
Modernization
According to briefing materials released by the Department of
Defense in September 1994 on its Nuclear Posture Review, there is
to be "no new design warhead production" by the Energy Department
and the nuclear weapons laboratories.
More recently, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)
Director John Holum has addressed the issue of the United States'
view of the impact of the recently signed Comprehensive Test Ban
on nuclear weapons development. In his January 23, 1996 address
to the Conference on Disarmament, he stated that:
"...the safe maintenance of existing weapons design is a far
cry from the confident development of new ones. The latter
requires nuclear explosive tests, which the CTBT would
preclude .... [The] quest for efficiency and flexibility is
the most basic reason why countries might test. It is also a
most potent catalyst for arms races. To avert it is the test
ban's core value and a profound one.... So let there be no
mistake -- the CTBT will help impede the spread of nuclear
weapons. But its great practical impact will also be for
arms control -- to end the development of advanced new
weapons and keep new military applications from emerging."
Holum commented at a Geneva press conference on the same day
that:
"That is what we believe a comprehensive test ban will and
should accomplish: that there should be no further
development of new nuclear weapon designs."
Similarly, President Clinton urged in his 1996 State of the Union
Address that:
"We must end the race to create new nuclear weapons by
signing a truly comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty this
year."
The Preamble of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, signed on
September 23 by the President, states that:
"... Recognizing that the cessation of all nuclear weapon
test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by
constraining the development and qualitative improvement of
nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new
types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure
of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its
aspects ..."
NUCLEAR WEAPONS MODERNIZATION CAPABILITIES
However, at the same time the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review
specifies "no new design warhead production," it also instructs
the Department of Energy and the nuclear weapons laboratories to
"maintain the capability to design, fabricate, and certify new
[nuclear] warheads." The DOE's response to this mandate is its
"stockpile stewardship and management" (SS&M) program -- a
collection of expensive new nuclear bomb facilities and upgrades
which the DOE claims are needed to maintain a "safe" and
"reliable" nuclear arsenal in the absence of underground nuclear
testing. It is currently estimated to cost $40 billion over the
next 10 years.(1)
Although statements by U.S. officials (such as Holum's January
23, 1996 statement) suggest that the stockpile stewardship
program is not capable of certifying (and deploying) new nuclear
weapons without nuclear explosive testing, according to the DOE,
"it would be unreasonable to say that these stewardship
capabilities could not be applied to the design of new weapons,
albeit with less confidence than if new weapons could be nuclear
tested."(2) The nuclear weapons laboratories and DOE officials
have suggested privately that the capability to fabricate and
certify new warheads would only be exercised if nuclear testing
were resumed. However, this crucial caveat is missing from the
summary of the Nuclear Posture Review.
Unfortunately, the DOE has NOT demonstrated that its proposed
stockpile stewardship program is necessary to maintain stockpile
reliability nor has the DOE evaluated other reasonable, less-
costly, and less new nuclear weapons development/deployment
capable methods. Further, the DOE has not thoroughly evaluated
the program's nuclear arms control and non-proliferation impacts.
As a result of these factors, this well-funded and high profile
program has created considerable concern about the United States'
commitment to the CTBT and the purpose of ending the qualitative
arms race. In addition, it has led to considerable concern about
the effectiveness of the CTBT in limiting the ability of the
advanced nuclear weapon states to improve their arsenals. This
has become a central basis of opposition to the Treaty by India,
one of the 44 named states that must ratify the CTBT before it
formally enters into force.
SUBCRITICAL EXPERIMENTS AND THE STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM
An initial part of the SS&M program is the series of six proposed
"subcritical" nuclear weapons experiments to be conducted
underground at the Nevada Test Site. The subcriticals were
originally scheduled to take place prior to the conclusion of the
CTBT negotiations but were postponed in June 1996 due to protests
from foreign governments and U.S. non-governmental groups. The
reaction to these proposed experiments over the last several
months provides a clear example of the negative impact of a
robust SS&M program on U.S. non-proliferation and disarmament
goals.(3)
The "subcriticals" would not technically violate the terms of the
CTBT, but they would contribute to the weapons laboratories'
knowledge about nuclear weapons design. Like most of the rest of
the SS&M program, the Energy Department has not demonstrated that
the proposed subcritical experiments are necessary to maintain a
"safe" and "reliable" nuclear stockpile. In addition, the
subcriticals create difficult, new verification challenges
because they would take place underground at the Nevada Test and
will produce seismic and isotopic signatures that are virtually
indistinguishable from low-yield critical nuclear explosions.
Consequently, the subcriticals have fortified concerns among some
states that the United States and the other declared nuclear
powers are still interested in developing new nuclear weapons. In
the absence of the verification and on-site inspection (OSI)
mechanisms available under the CTBT after it enters into force,
the U.S. will have to demonstrate to the international community
that the subcriticals do not violate the terms of the CTBT. The
subcriticals' non-proliferation costs far outweigh their dubious
technical benefits and should therefore be cancelled.
Unless the purpose of the stockpile stewardship program is
redirected and its scope is greatly reduced, it will become a
severe impediment to the ratification of the CTBT by several of
the 44 nuclear-capable nations that must ratify before the Treaty
enters into force, thus jeopardizing formal implementation.
Consequently, the United States' "no new nuclear weapons
development" policy should also make it clear that the "stockpile
stewardship" program shall be conducted to assure the continuing
safety and reliability of existing weapons, and not for the
development of new types of nuclear weapons or new military
capabilities for existing warheads.
Approaches to stockpile maintenance that do not require the
construction of an elaborate and provocative new generation of
nuclear weapons research and development facilities can and
should be pursued as an alternative to the current
Administration's stockpile stewardship plan. At the technical
level of stewardship, such approaches would focus either on
warhead component remanufacture as needed, which would involve
rebuilding today's warhead parts to the same technical
specifications and with the same materials used in their original
production, or on a more "passive" form of stewardship involving
the ongoing maintenance of the stockpile without rebuilding or
replacement of existing warheads. In such alternative approaches,
improvements to (or other modifications of) the warheads'
performance would would be unecessary and would not be
pursued.(4)
"MODIFICATIONS" OF EXISTING WEAPONS
Regardless of whether the stockpile stewardship program can now -
- or at some future time -- develop, fabricate, and certify new
nuclear weapons without underground nuclear testing, the weapons
laboratories are now capable of and are engaged in modifying
existing nuclear warheads with the result -- in some cases -- of
creating nuclear weapons with new military capabilities.
Such activities blur the meaning and undermine the value of the
current "no new design warhead production" policy that is part of
the Nuclear Posture Review. It further underscores the need for a
"no new nuclear weapons" policy statement declaring that the
United States will not pursue the development of new types of
nuclear weapons, including modifications leading to new military
capabilities for existing warheads.
In addition, because modification of existing warhead designs
(for whatever purpose) could also degrade confidence in expected
performance of modified warheads and could therefore create
pressure to resume nuclear testing, the United States' "no new
nuclear weapons" policy should also prohibit design changes to
the nuclear components -- the "physics packages" -- of weapons in
the U.S. stockpile.
* Modifications and New Military capabilities: Since 1995,
the U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories have been developing and
producing a modification (Mod. 11) of the B-61 nuclear bomb -- a
gravity bomb capable of producing a range of nuclear yields.(5)
The B-61 Mod. 11, which will reportedly became operational in
January 1997, provides the United States military with a weapon
with unique military capabilities -- limited earth penetration
with a low-yield nuclear warhead that produces less collateral
damage than other U.S. nuclear weapon systems. The impetus for
the B-61 Mod. 11 is the desire to have the capability to destroy
hardened underground targets without "widespread" radioactive
contamination -- such as Libya's alleged underground chemical
weapons manufacturing plant.(6)
Development and production of the B-61 Mod. 11 was approved
outside the regular budget process and without Congressional
debate, by means of a classified reprogramming request approved
by selected Congressional committee chairmen. It is not clear
whether deployment of the B-61 Mod. 11 has been approved. The
cost of these activities is not known. In addition, the nuclear
weapons laboratories have also been commissioned to pursue
modifications of the Trident D-5 missile warheads, the W76 and
W88.
Modifications of existing nuclear weapons designs are considered
by the nuclear weapons laboratories not to be "new" weapons, but
minor modifications of existing weapons, because, they
purportedly do not involve modifications of the weapons primary,
or "physics package," but modifications of the non-nuclear
components of the bomb. However, Department of Defense officials
are reported to consider the B-61 Mod.11 to be the equivalent of
a new weapon because it will have increased military
effectiveness compared to earlier B-61 variants. The difference
of opinion highlights the fact that, as a Los Alamos National
Laboratory official recently said, "nobody's defined what a new
weapon is."(7)
* Modifications and Confidence in Expected Warhead
Performance: In addition to the modifications of the B-61, W76,
and W88 nuclear warheads, dozens of other warhead modifications
are being studied by nuclear weapons laboratory scientists. In
addition to the fact that such modifications can lead to warheads
with new military capabilities, modifications of the the warhead
primaries ("physics packages"), for the sake of increased
robustness, safety, or any other purpose, may degrade confidence
in the warheads expected performance. Inadequately tested designs
have been thre principle cause of historic problems in the
stockpile and should be scrupulously avoided. This would preclude
repackaging nuclear explosives into new warhead or bomb
configurations, the development of new, but untested designs, as
well as the modification of existing physics packages for any
purpose.
As a result, the U.S. "no new nuclear weapons" policy should also
prohibit design changes to the nuclear components -- the "physics
packages" -- of weapons in the U.S. stockpile and to retain and
deploy nuclear weapons which have been fully tested in in their
actual military configuration.
The August 1995 JASON report support these points and presents
the technical case for not modifying the nuclear stockpile.(8)
The body of the report is still classified, but pertinent
language can be found in the unclassified summary. The JASONs
examined the entire U.S. nuclear testing record and their first
conclusion was:
"The United States can, today, have high confidence in the
safety, reliability, and performance margins of the nuclear
weapons that are designated to remain in the enduring
nuclear stockpile. This confidence is based on understanding
gained from 50 years of experience and analysis of more than
1000 nuclear tests, including the results of approximately
150 nuclear tests of modern weapon types in the past 20
years." (9)
Recommendation 3 addresses the issue of warhead modifications:
"The individual weapon types in the enduring stockpile have
a range of performance margins, all of which we judge to be
adequate at this time. In each case wea have identified
opportunities for further enhancing their performance
margins by means that are straightforward and can be
incorporated with deliberate speed during scheduled
maintenance or remanufacturing activities. However, greatest
care in the form of self-discipline wil be required to avoid
system modifications, even if aimed at "improvements," which
may compromise reliability."
A "no new nuclear weapons" policy prohibiting design changes to
the nuclear components of U.S. nuclear weapons -- for whatever
purpose -- would be consistent with the approach to stockpile
stewardship described on page 4.
ENDNOTES:
1. Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for
Stockpile Stewardship and Management, U.S. Department of
Energy, September 1996.
2. Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for
Stockpile Stewardship and Management, U.S. Department of
Energy, September 1996, p. S-46.
3. Stephanie Nebehay, "Pakistan Criticises West on Nuclear Test
Ban," Reuters Ltd., May 23, 1996.
4. See Chapter V: "Change Nuclear Doctrine and Focus A Core
Stewardship Program on One Design Laboratory and Sandia," in
CBO Papers: The Bomb's Custodians, Congressional Budget
Office, Washington, DC, July 1994.
5. Jonathan Weisman, "Burrowing nuclear warhead will take out
the atomic trash," The Oakland Tribune, September 22, 1995.
6. Terry Atlas, "Clinton weighs action on Libya: Plant may pose
threat of chemical weapons," The Chicago Tribune, April 24,
1996.
7. "Scientists Say Policy Barring New Nuclear Weapon Designs Is
Unclear: Mods shouldn't offer increased capability," Inside
the Pentagon, August 15, 1996.
8. "Nuclear Testing (Unclassified Summary and Conclusions),"
Sidney Drell et. al., JASON, The MITRE Corporation, McLean,
VA. Report commissioned by DOE Office of Defense Programs.
9. In arriving at these and other conclusions, the JASONs
relied on three key assumptions: 1) The U.S. intends to
maintain a credible nuclear deterrent; 2) The U.S. remains
committed to the support of world-wide nonproliferation
efforts [including a "zero-yield" CTBT]; and 3) The U.S.
will not encounter new military of political circumstances
in the future that cause it to abandon the current policy --
first announced by President Bush in 1992 -- of not
producing new nuclear weapon designs.
*****************************************************************
Daryl Kimball
Physicians for Social Responsibility
Fourteenth Street, N.W., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20005
Telephone (202) 898-0150 Fax (202) 898-0172
dkimball@igc.apc.org