THE CANBERRA COMMISSION ON THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Ballistic Missiles
Aside from warheads, missile delivery systems are of the
greatest concern in seeking to ensure that a meaningful
nuclear force cannot be reconstituted quickly. Reductions in
strategic nuclear missile numbers should therefore track
reductions in warhead numbers closely. The START agreement
provisions for verified destruction of launchers and platforms
are a possible model for strategic nuclear ballistic missile
reductions involving the nuclear weapon states. Missile
capabilities in the Middle East, South Asia and on the Korean
peninsula also need to be addressed.
The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty concluded in 1972 by the
United States and the Soviet Union recognised the potential
for strategic missile defence systems to fuel the offensive
arms race as both sides sought to counter the other's
defensive systems. By limiting strategic missile defence sites
to one per side the ABM Treaty removed a strong incentive to
increase offensive forces and paved the way for the START I
and II reductions.
Proliferation of missiles and their use in conflicts such as
the Gulf War have intensified interest, particularly in the
United States, in missile defence systems. While Cold War
missile defence proposals centred on strategic ballistic
missiles, the present focus is on defences against shorter
range theatre missiles. In practice it is likely to become
increasingly difficult to draw a clear line between systems to
defend against strategic ballistic missiles and those which
defend against sub- strategic and particularly theatre
ballistic missiles. The deployment of some ballistic missile
defence systems during the transition to a nuclear weapon free
world could threaten seriously the continuation of the
process, particularly as technology capabilities in this field
vary significantly.
It will be extremely important for the pursuit of the
elimination of nuclear weapons to protect fully the integrity
of the ABM Treaty. A global treaty controlling longer range
ballistic missiles would provide a universal means of
addressing the dangers to international security posed by
ballistic missiles; it would also avoid the potential
destabilising effect of ballistic missile defence systems. It
would increase the confidence of nuclear weapon states that
nuclear disarmament will not damage their security, and it
would improve the security environment in a number of regions
by eliminating destabilising missile arms races. Pending
development of such a regime, confidence building measures
such as a multilateral ballistic missile launch notification
agreement and a ballistic missile flight test ban could be
explored.
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
Nuclear weapon free zones are part of the architecture that
can usefully encourage and support a nuclear weapon free
world. The spread of such zones around the globe, with
specific mechanisms to answer the security concerns of each
region, can progressively codify the transition to a world
free of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear weapon free zones are an effective means of addressing
regional nuclear tensions in a cooperative way and provide
ongoing assurance that nuclear activity in a region is
confined to peaceful purposes. Their potential contribution to
global and regional peace and security was reaffirmed at
NPTREC which encouraged development of nuclear weapon free
zones, especially in regions of tension such as the Middle
East, as a matter of priority. There are also proposals for
the establishment of such zones in South Asia, in Central
Europe and from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea.
The cooperation of the nuclear weapon states is necessary for
the maximum effectiveness of nuclear weapon free zones. To
increase the likelihood that nuclear weapon states will become
party to nuclear weapon free zones they should be consulted
early in the negotiation process. Equally, because of the
contribution nuclear weapon free zones can make to disarmament
and non-proliferation, the nuclear weapon states should
support them including through signing nuclear weapon state
protocols.
About half of the earth's surface is already covered by
nuclear weapon free zones, comprising the Latin American and
the Caribbean countries (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South
Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga), the ASEAN countries (Southeast
Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone) and African countries (the
Treaty of Pelindaba). Once the ASEAN and African agreements
come into force, most of the southern hemisphere (and some
parts of the northern hemisphere) will be covered by nuclear
weapon free zones. The Canberra Commission encourages
development of linkages between all existing and prospective
southern hemisphere nuclear weapon free zones to create a
southern hemisphere free of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear Trade and Export Controls
All states have an obligation to ensure that their nuclear
trade does not contribute, wittingly or unwittingly, to
nuclear weapons proliferation by either states or sub-state
groups. Meeting this obligation is assisted by a common
understanding of what items are sensitive in the nuclear
proliferation process and has resulted in development of
internationally agreed standards for nuclear exports. Such
standards support the non- proliferation regime and foster
legitimate trade and cooperation in the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy by contributing to the climate of confidence
essential for international nuclear cooperation.
The importance of nuclear export controls is acknowledged in
the NPTREC 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament'. These state that new
supply arrangements should require acceptance of fullscope
safeguards 'as a necessary precondition', thereby clearly
specifying the fullscope safeguards supply standard as the
accepted global norm for nuclear supply.
States looking to develop nuclear weapons also need delivery
systems, and a close correlation exists between nuclear
weapons proliferation and missile proliferation. More broadly,
states seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction may try
to develop several categories of weapons simultaneously.
Effective export controls on items that could contribute to
development of non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction are
therefore important to establishing and sustaining an
international climate favourable to the elimination of nuclear
weapons.
It is essential that export control regimes are transparent in
their operation and do not impede legitimate trade and
technology transfer.
Eliminating Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
The Commission does not accept the view that nuclear weapons
need to be retained to serve as a deterrent against other
types of weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical
and biological weapons. Implementation of effective measures
to eliminate both types of weapons would significantly enhance
global security and provide more conducive circumstances for
the elimination of nuclear weapons. While there have been
longstanding efforts to prohibit both chemical and biological
weapons, these efforts have not yet reached the stage where
the international community can be confident that the menace
of such weapons has been finally removed.
One hundred and sixty countries have signed the Chemical
Weapons Convention since it was opened for signature in Paris
in January 1993. The CWC will enter into force 180 days after
the 65th country has ratified the convention. The CWC promises
to be an effective instrument for controlling chemical weapons
but will face a variety of challenges when it becomes
operational. A key issue will be universality - a number
of important countries in the Middle East and in other regions
of tension have not yet signed the convention. The two largest
possessors of chemical weapons, the US and Russia, have yet to
ratify. It will be vital that the CWC achieve comprehensive
participation if its promise is to be realised. Signatories
which have not yet ratified the CWC should give high priority
to ratification, and non-signatories, particularly in regions
of tension, should join this new regime as soon as possible.
The 1925 Geneva Protocol sought to ban use of biological
weapons, but a more comprehensive ban was established in the
Biological Weapons Convention, which came into operation in
1975. The BWC has been hampered by the lack of formal
provisions and machinery to verify compliance, a major
deficiency which has been underlined by suggestions that a
number of countries have maintained programs to develop such
weapons despite the convention's provisions. Negotiations to
develop a legally binding instrument to reinforce the BWC,
which is expected to contain verification provisions, were
commenced only in 1995. These negotiations will need to come
to an early conclusion to preserve the BWC's value in
maintaining a global norm against biological weapons. Assisted
by the rapid advance in biotechnology, these weapons, more so
than chemical weapons, have the potential to cause damage on
a widespread, strategic scale and could become the new scourge
for the next century if current arms control efforts are not
successful.
Timing Considerations
The Commission considered carefully the merits of setting out
a precise timeframe for the elimination of nuclear weapons,
but elected not to do so. However, this does not imply that it
accepts the extended timelines imposed by such current
constraints as limited warhead dismantlement facilities. Those
constraints could obviously be relieved by political decisions
and the allocation of resources required to advance
dismantlement. Another limiting factor may prove to be
establishing the necessary confidence in the verification
regime which would be required to take the final step to
complete elimination. In this context the Canberra Commission
remains convinced of the basic importance of agreed targets
and guidelines which would drive the process inexorably toward
the ultimate objective of final elimination, at the earliest
possible time.
Annex A: Verification
The elimination of nuclear weapons will not be possible
without the development of adequate verification. A political
judgement will be needed on whether the levels of assurance
possible from the verification regime are sufficient. All
existing arms control and disarmament agreements have required
political judgements of this nature because no verification
system provides absolute certainty. This situation has not
prevented the international community acting in the area of
nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction first with the
Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, then the
Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty. Nor has it prevented negotiation and implementation of
bilateral nuclear arms control agreements including the
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty which eliminated an
entire class of nuclear weapons.
The nature of nuclear weapons, the secrecy that has surrounded
their development and uncertainties about total amounts of
nuclear material produced for weapons will make it very
difficult, or in the view of some impossible, to be confident
that states which have operated large scale military nuclear
programs have made full declarations of their holdings of
nuclear weapons and fissile material.
This potential uncertainty should not deter reductions to
small residual arsenals. At that point the verification system
can be re-evaluated and the benefits and risks of further
reductions compared. Development and implementation of the
verification arrangements needed for each step toward
elimination will provide immediate benefit through reducing
the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear
proliferation including nuclear terrorism. And a world of
small residual arsenals would still be a safer place than the
present world although the dangers of nuclear proliferation
and a renewed arms race would remain.
Because no verification system can be perfect it is inevitable
that some risk will have to be accepted if the wider benefits
of a nuclear weapon free world are to be realised. The
international community will need to determine the level of
risk acceptable. This decision will be influenced by a range
of factors, particularly the global circumstances applying
when the elimination stage is reached. That the verification
system for a nuclear weapon free world will involve a small
probability that attempted breakout might go undetected does
not alter the fact a nuclear weapon free world would be,
fundamentally, a safer place, as Part One of this report makes
clear. Furthermore, in an era in which the accuracy,
penetrating power, and destructive force of conventional
weapons are increasing rapidly, and economic interdependence
is growing, the development of an illegal nuclear force would,
in all probability, be self-defeating. It is nevertheless
essential that there be a wide and politically acceptable
level of confidence in the verification system. For this to be
achieved the results of verification activities will need to
be transparent to the international community both at the
level of states and at the public level.
It should be recognised that a verification regime is composed
of both its material and technical features, which should be
of the highest order attainable, and the common political and
legal commitments which support it. This creates the climate
of confidence essential to any successful verification regime.
Further, an inclusive approach to verification can increase
levels of assurance. In the case of verification for a nuclear
weapon free world, technical verification can be supplemented
by measures such as transparency in nuclear activity, relevant
national intelligence information passed to verification
bodies, an enhanced role for individuals in verification and
application of effective export controls.
A number of factors will assist development of adequate
verification arrangements for a nuclear weapon free world.
First, the nuclear weapon scientific/industrial complex is a
tightly regulated governmental enterprise, so extensive
records of nuclear weapons and weapons fissile material
production should be available. Second, nearly 30 years of
experience has been accumulated in verifying compliance with
the NPT, and IAEA safeguards offer a proven and evolving
system for delivering a high degree of assurance that
safeguarded nuclear material remains in peaceful use. And,
third, there is the experience of the SALT, START, INF, CFE
and CWC agreements which individually and collectively
demonstrate the powerful influence that political will can
exert over what is desirable and possible in terms of
verification.
The nuclear disarmament process will be progressive with new
verification arrangements required at various stages. Because
of the importance of adequate verification it is likely that
progress with verification will dictate the timetable for the
last stages of disarmament. Verification is likely to involve
bilateral US/Russian measures, the nuclear weapon states and
the IAEA at various stages of the dismantlement and
elimination of nuclear weapons. The undeclared nuclear weapon
states and threshold states will have to be involved in
nuclear disarmament. Verification measures appropriate to
these states' nuclear status at that time will have to be
applied. Bilateral or regional involvement could be employed
as a means of providing additional assurance and confidence
building above and beyond international inspections.
This annex concentrates on measures which may make up a
verification regime to provide assurance that states are
complying with nuclear disarmament obligations. In addition,
it is of crucial importance that there be very high physical
security against diversion or theft of nuclear weapons,
fissile material (whether of military or civil origin) and
nuclear weapon non-nuclear components and materials. A
breakdown in physical security could result in nuclear
weapons, nuclear material or components coming into the
possession of would-be proliferator states or sub-state
groups, including terrorists which would jeopardise the
disarmament process. Nuclear disarmament will at various
stages of the process involve monitored storage of weapons and
weapons components including fissile material. It is
imperative that the highest standards of physical security be
applied to such items and material. Consideration of how this
can best be achieved should form part of the nuclear
disarmament process.
Developmental work on verification arrangements should begin
soon to ensure that movement toward a nuclear weapon free
world is not delayed by lack of adequate verification.
The political commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons must be
matched by a willingness to make available the resources
needed for nuclear disarmament, including for effective
verification. The amounts involved are likely to be
considerable, especially for the dismantlement of weapons and
disposition of their fissile material content, but very much
less than developing, maintaining and upgrading nuclear
arsenals.
This annex does not seek to be a definitive plan for the
verification arrangements for a nuclear weapon free world. Its
purpose is to identify some of the issues which will need to
be addressed and to offer some comments on these issues.
Questions of the mechanisms for applying the verification
arrangements are mostly left open as it will be for the
countries concerned and the international community as a whole
to define these as the process unfolds.
Verification Tasks
The disarmament process will be progressive with new
verification arrangements required at various stages. Few
facilities in the nuclear weapon states are safeguarded at
present and a number of other states operate unsafeguarded
fissile material production facilities. The first stage of
extending safeguards in these states is likely to be
verification of facilities and material covered by a
convention to end fissile material production for weapons.
Systems will be needed to verify that nuclear warheads are
dismantled and destroyed and that their fissile material
content cannot be reintroduced to weapons use. To ensure that
a nuclear force of strategic significance cannot be
reconstituted quickly, a staged process for verified
destruction of the nuclear weapons infrastructure is likely to
be considered necessary. An intrusive inspection regime and
new techniques will be needed to ensure a high probability
that significant undeclared nuclear activity would be
detected. Development of verification arrangements for each
step toward a nuclear weapon free world will, in addition, be
of immediate benefit to the existing non-proliferation regime.
Verifying the 'completeness' of declared stocks of warheads
and fissile material will be a crucial and difficult
operation. The IAEA has expertise in verifying declarations of
previously unsafeguarded nuclear programs including its work
in Iraq, the DPRK and South Africa after that country
renounced nuclear weapons. The extent to which this is
transferable to the very large military programs of the
nuclear weapon states is to be established.
Another problem for a verification regime lies in the physical
characteristics of current nuclear weapons and the fissile
materials that are used in the core of the weapon. Many
weapons are small, readily transported and readily concealed.
The fissile material cores are smaller and thus even more
easily concealed. While radiation emitted from these cores can
be detected at close range, it is not clear that they would
always be detected if in properly shielded storage facilities,
even through environmental sampling. However, nuclear weapons
in storage deteriorate with time and the ongoing maintenance
needed for a secret cache of weapons would carry a risk of
exposure or detection.
If a nuclear weapon free world is to be credible and stable,
it clearly will have to place prohibitions on much more than
just weapons. Irreversibility of nuclear disarmament will also
require verified elimination or conversion to exclusively
civil use of the facilities used to develop and construct
nuclear weapons and dedicated nuclear delivery vehicles. In
the transitional period some of the facilities used to develop
and construct weapons are likely to be needed to dismantle
them, so the nuclear weapon states will need to keep a part of
their plant operational until the very last items in the
residual stockpiles are disassembled.
Confidence to move to the final elimination phase would be
enhanced if by that time all delivery vehicles built primarilyfor
nuclear weapons are eliminated,
leaving only the residual
arsenals of bombs or warheads in monitored storage. It is
therefore important that verified elimination of such delivery
vehicles occurs in tandem with elimination of nuclear
warheads. Means could be devised to make the removal of any
weapons from monitored storage and their installation on
improvised delivery vehicles as difficult and time-consuming
as possible.
Other components which play an important role in nuclear
weapons such as tritium should also be subject to a
verification regime. Non- nuclear components of a weapon may
also need to be taken into account. These are a collection of
diverse materials: plastics, metals, chemical high-explosives
and also extremely sophisticated electronics and various other
items all organised inside the weapon to produce the optimum
explosive output from the fissile material. These non-nuclear
parts are in some cases made in or near the final assembly
facility, but others come from far away, from specialised
workshops or enterprises most of whose output may be civilian.
Measures must be taken to preclude leakage of sensitive
information during the dismantlement process. Practical
options for doing this include requiring states which own
nuclear weapons to dismantle them within a containment
boundary with monitored inputs and outputs. It may also be
possible for international inspectors to estimate, with
sufficient accuracy, the fissile material content of the
stored fissile material 'pits' from dismantled nuclear
warheads without revealing sensitive information. This will
depend on a judgement of what constitutes sufficient accuracy
and what would be reasonable assumptions about the measures
that might be used to defeat such verification.
In the transition to a nuclear weapon free world it will be
important to find the right balance between bilateral
(US/Russia), plurilateral (nuclear weapon states) and
appropriate international inspection of nuclear material made
excess to military requirements. Bilateral and plurilateral
inspections may be less transparent in the assurance they
offer to the non-nuclear weapon states than international
inspections. But bilateral or plurilateral inspections may be
considered preferable for the verification of material in
sensitive forms. The transparency issue could be addressed by
the nuclear weapon states perhaps as part of increased
accountability at NPT meetings. In areas of regional nuclear
tension, bilateral or regional involvement in inspections on
nuclear facilities and in monitoring the dismantlement of any
nuclear weapons could be employed as a means of providing
additional assurance and confidence building above and beyond
international inspections.
Canberra Commission Report Continued
Proposition One