THE CANBERRA COMMISSION ON THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Components of a Verification Regime
For any verification system the basic requirement is to
establish what is to be prohibited or controlled. The
verification regime for a nuclear weapon free world would need
to bring under safeguards fissile material currently contained
in weapons and military stockpiles, and to provide the most
credible assurance that all such material has been accounted
for; to provide a very high level of assurance that no weapons
or stocks of fissile material have been concealed during the
disarmament process; to ensure that all nuclear weapons
facilities have been dismantled or converted to peaceful use;
and to verify destruction of strategic delivery vehicles
developed primarily for nuclear purposes.
Current, prospective and future treaties could provide the
legal authority for application of the verification regime.
The IAEA has wide experience in application of safeguards to
provide high assurance that nuclear material remains in
peaceful non-explosive use. Subject to strengthening of its
safeguards system the IAEA would seem the logical body to
verify non-proliferation undertakings in a nuclear weapon free
world. The development of concepts for CTBT verification is
well advanced. Bilateral US/Russian agreements such as START
and INF are a model for a verification regime for elimination
of nuclear delivery vehicles. The other main elements of the
verification regime, especially verification of the
elimination of nuclear warheads, are less well developed and
should be afforded greater priority to ensure that progress
toward elimination of nuclear weapons is not held up by delays
in developing and proving the verification system necessary.
Non-Proliferation Undertakings
Verification of non-proliferation undertakings en route to a
nuclear weapon free world and after this is achieved will
require a highly developed capacity to detect undeclared
nuclear activities at both declared and undeclared sites.
Iraq demonstrated that a state with sufficient determination
and resources may be able to establish a self-contained
clandestine military nuclear program. This prompted a
reappraisal of IAEA safeguards as it was clear there was a
need to improve the safeguards system's capacity to detect
undeclared nuclear activity. As a result the IAEA and its
member states have worked to strengthen the effectiveness and
improve the efficiency of the safeguards system. Since 1993
this effort has focused on a comprehensive program known as
'93+2'. The 93+2 program is aimed at enhancing the legal and
technical capability of the IAEA safeguards system with
respect to its ability to detect undeclared nuclear
activities. The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference also
gave strong political support to strengthening IAEA safeguards
including explicit support for the 93+2 objectives. And at the
Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit in April 1996 the
participating countries (US, Russia, UK, France, Germany,
Japan, Canada and Italy) agreed as well to work vigorously to
strengthen IAEA safeguards.
The elements of the 93+2 program of most obvious application
to verification of a nuclear weapon free world are increased
IAEA access to information, expanded access for IAEA
inspectors and use of environmental sampling. Regarding the
first of the 93+2 elements, the need for maximum transparency
about a state's nuclear program is fundamental. In a nuclear
weapon free world transparency will be essential, especially
for those states which formerly had a nuclear weapons
capacity. As nuclear disarmament proceeds, doubts are bound to
arise about some states' commitment to a nuclear weapon free
world including whether full declarations of fissile material
production have been made, whether nuclear weapons have been
hidden or are being developed clandestinely and so on.
Information provided by a state about its nuclear program,
such as its plans for future nuclear fuel cycle activities or
its fuel cycle research and development activities, together
with other safeguards information such as fissile material
production records, can contribute to determining whether such
doubts have foundation. The state's declarations would be
systematically evaluated in the light of all the other
information available to the IAEA about a state's nuclear
activities, and any questions or inconsistencies would be
followed up.
To provide the levels of non-proliferation assurance needed in
a nuclear weapon free world IAEA inspectors will need to have
access to any location in a state, at very short notice or no
notice and with no right of refusal. The expanded managed
access arrangements being negotiated as part of the 93+2
program are a starting point in the development of access
arrangements which will be needed in a nuclear weapon free
world. The application of a program such as 93+2 would be
central not only to effective non-proliferation arrangements
but also to the ultimate development of effective verification
arrangements for a nuclear weapon free world. Acceptance of
the more demanding access rights will be facilitated by the
universality of the nuclear weapon free world verification
regime.
New technologies proposed as part of the 93+2 program have the
potential to contribute significantly in this area. Of
particular promise is use of environmental sampling which
through air, water and soil sampling can detect characteristic
radionuclide and chemical emissions from a broad array of
nuclear and other industrial activities. Environmental
sampling is thereby able to provide important information
about the presence or absence of specific nuclear activities.
Such information will be vital for verification of a nuclear
weapon free world. To maximise the contribution of
environmental sampling the IAEA must have the right of access
to any location.
As the world moves toward a nuclear weapon free world the
differences in application of safeguards in the nuclear weapon
states and non- nuclear weapon states will have to diminish
with the end point being universal application of the same
safeguards in all countries. Verifying all nuclear weapon
state facilities, including former nuclear test sites, will
cause the costs of the safeguards system to rise sharply
because most of the nuclear weapon states have extensive civil
nuclear power programs of which only a few facilities are
currently safeguarded. Improvements in safeguards procedures
which have been demonstrated in the earlier phases of nuclear
disarmament may allow development of alternative and more
cost-effective safeguards approaches. Such approaches may
moderate the increase in resources needed, for example
improvements in the IAEA's capacity to detect undeclared
nuclear activity may allow reduction or elimination of routine
inspections at reactors.
Sharing of information between the IAEA, the chemical weapons
verification regime, the prospective Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty Organisation and the biological weapons verification
regime (when developed) should be explored as a means of
strengthening the weapons of mass destruction
non-proliferation regime. For similar reasons the weapons of
mass destruction verification regimes need a flow of
information on international trade in relevant sensitive
items. States and individuals should also do all they can to
maximise the information base of the international bodies
about possible clandestine nuclear activity, including the
provision of information obtained from national export
licensing systems and other national technical means. Care
would be needed in sharing proliferation relevant information
not to breach the conditions of confidentiality under which
states supply information on their own activities to
verification agencies.
Verifying a Production Cut-Off
The process of developing verification for elimination of
nuclear weapons will be aided by progressive controls on
nuclear activity in the nuclear weapon states, the undeclared
weapon states and threshold states. A cut-off convention would
be the first step toward extending the safeguards applied in
non-nuclear weapon states to these states, including
establishing a legal basis for IAEA inspections to verify
compliance with the convention. Because it would effectively
cap the amount of nuclear weapon raw material, a cut-off
agreement is essential to ensure the irreversibility of
nuclear reductions. As with the CTBT, a cut-off convention
would be open to universal adherence by all states so that
these agreements can draw the states presumed to have a
nuclear weapons capacity into the nuclear disarmament process.
The extent of verification required by a cut-off convention
will be determined largely by its scope, which is not yet
resolved. The main options are a wide scope agreement which
would apply to all nuclear facilities involved in fissile
material production, processing or use as well as existing
stocks of fissile material and future production, or an
agreement concentrating on the sensitive fissile material
production facilities, i.e enrichment and reprocessing plants,
and the product from these plants.
Cut-off verification will require at least application of IAEA
safeguards at all enrichment plants capable of producing
highly enriched uranium, all plutonium separation
(reprocessing) plants, all highly enriched uranium and mixed
oxide fuel fabrication plants and research reactors and
critical assemblies using large quantities of highly enriched
uranium or plutonium in the states joining the treaty. There
might also be safeguarding of reactors and other nuclear
facilities, but the elements noted above are generally
accepted as the most effective and efficient ways of ensuring
any fissile material produced is under safeguards that would
bar its use in weapons.
The unilateral nuclear weapon states' action to end production
of fissile material for weapons suggests that a cut-off
agreement limited to production can be achieved within a
reasonable timeframe. This approach would also moderate the
increase in the IAEA's resources needed to enable it, as
appropriate, to verify a cut-off convention as a verification
regime concentrated on production facilities and their
products would suffice. In contrast a wide scope agreement
covering all facilities and all fissile material would require
application of fullscope type safeguards similar to those
currently applied in the non-nuclear weapon states.
Acceptance of a commitment to cease production of fissile
material should not imply that existing stockpiles are to
exist in perpetuity. Arrangements should be found to have
stocks verified and safeguarded as early as possible in the
disarmament process.
This limited verification, confined to safeguarding of
enrichment and reprocessing facilities, highly enriched
uranium and separated plutonium, is technically adequate,
assuming that there are no clandestine, undeclared enrichment
or reprocessing plants. Such an assumption will be supported
by the increased capabilities of the IAEA safeguards regime
for the detection of clandestine facilities.
Measures to build confidence that all activity has been
declared should be developed concurrently with negotiation of
a cut-off convention and might include declarations by all
states of all their nuclear activities, military as well as
civil, possibly with ongoing reporting on all activities,
monitoring for environmental signatures indicating possible
undeclared activities, application of remote surveillance
techniques and access arrangements to enable the IAEA to
investigate possible undeclared enrichment or reprocessing
activity.
Safeguarding of enrichment and reprocessing facilities is
complex, and considerable time will be needed to develop IAEA
safeguards. To prepare the ground for verification of a
cut-off convention the NWS should begin cooperative work with
the IAEA on developing safeguards approaches for their
facilities to be covered under cut-off.
Verifying Nuclear Warheads Dismantlement and Elimination
Existing nuclear arms reduction treaties provide for
destruction of missiles and other delivery systems but do not
address elimination and destruction of nuclear warheads. This
situation is reflected in the state of nuclear arms control
verification. Methods for monitoring the destruction of
strategic and shorter range missiles and strategic bombers are
well established and have been used to verify destruction of
heavy missile launchers (silos and submarine launch tubes) and
heavy bombers under the SALT and START treaties, and
intermediate-range missiles under the INF treaty. In the case
of nuclear warheads, methods for verifying their dismantlement
have been worked out on a general level but no comprehensive
verification regime is in place.
The United States and Russia have taken some preliminary steps
to ensure warheads are dismantled and the process made
irreversible but these two states are yet to agree on specific
technologies and procedures which could be employed. Higher
priority should be given to bilateral and multilateral
development of the techniques needed to verify nuclear warhead
elimination. Bilateral procedures should in due course be
shared with the other three nuclear weapon states, perhaps
with agreed modifications, as they prepare to join the
disarmament process.
The first step toward a verification system for the
elimination of nuclear weapons will be for the nuclear weapon
states to declare their holdings of nuclear warheads and
weapons grade material. In the first instance this could
involve a US/Russian exchange as part of preparations for
further bilateral reductions.
A possible model is the nuclear stockpile data exchange under
discussion between the United States and Russia. A data
exchange of this type could initially provide information on
numbers of nuclear stockpile weapons added, retired,
dismantled and remaining in service, broken down by
categories. Information on total masses of military plutonium
and highly enriched uranium again broken down by categories
should also be provided. Subsequent to a US/Russian exchange
of stockpile data, whether public or not, the other nuclear
weapon states could make similar declarations as preparation
for joining the nuclear disarmament process. As reductions
proceed the initial data exchange should be expanded to
provide a comprehensive picture of a state's military nuclear
activity. The undeclared nuclear weapon states and threshold
states will also have to end their nuclear ambiguity and to
provide data on their programs to establish a basis for their
involvement in nuclear disarmament.
Confidence building would be served by openness about weapons
stockpiles. It is essential that states move promptly toward
full disclosure of production and stocks of nuclear warheads
and unsafeguarded fissile material.
One problem that must be addressed is the poor quality of
accounting procedures applied during the early years of
fissile material production. For example the United States
recently admitted to a measurement error problem resulting in
an inventory difference or material unaccounted for of 2.8
tonnes of weapons grade plutonium. A difference of this
magnitude in the civil plutonium cycle would be cause for
great concern. In the military cycle measurement uncertainties
could be used to disguise retention of stocks of nuclear
weapons material.
The United States and Russia are already cooperating on
measures to improve accountancy and control of weapons
material. All states producing unsafeguarded fissile material
must ensure they are in a position to establish the most
credible baseline data possible for their fissile material
production. Techniques such as study of enrichment plant
records and tails assays should be employed to reduce to the
minimum any uncertainties about past production of fissile
material.
The more information that can be exchanged regarding the
specific locations, amounts, and forms of materials, the
greater the potential synergistic benefit in terms of
developing a full picture of fissile material production. This
process should be applied to each phase of the life cycle of
military fissile materials: production and separation of the
materials; fabrication of fissile material weapons components;
assembly, deployment, retirement, and disassembly of nuclear
weapons; and storage and eventual disposition of fissile
materials. These measures would be mutually reinforcing,
building confidence that the information exchanged was
accurate and that the goals of the regime were being met.
A sufficiently inclusive approach would make it difficult to
falsify the broad range of information exchanged in a
consistent way. Nevertheless, because of the large amounts of
fissile material involved, a small measurement uncertainty
would represent sufficient material for many nuclear weapons.
Resulting doubts that some nuclear material and/or nuclear
bombs may have been hidden may delay final elimination of
nuclear weapons but should not prevent movement toward this
objective.
When information on warhead numbers and types has been
established a next step would be to seal warhead containers
and indelibly tag them using suitable verification techniques
such as bar codes, tamper indicating seals, metal surface
'fingerprints', measurement of mass, dimensions and chemical
composition of warheads and active and passive radiation
detectors. With some of these techniques there is a danger
that warhead design information could be revealed. Approaches
in their application are available, however, which should
preserve the security of design information, for example
through lowering the resolution of radiation detectors.
Inventoried warheads awaiting dismantlement should be
inspected periodically to ensure that warhead disposition
corresponds with information in the stockpile data exchange
and to identify weapons entering a dismantlement facility. Use
of tagging techniques should ensure that fake warheads cannot
be substituted for weapons awaiting dismantlement and the real
warheads diverted.
It would be inadvisable to attempt to apply IAEA inspections
at the dismantlement process unless verification techniques
are available which protect sensitive information.
Alternatives which would allow monitoring of dismantlement
without revealing design information are available, such as
application to the dismantlement facility of the containment
principle whereby a boundary would be established around the
dismantlement facility. Actual dismantlement would be carried
out by citizens of the state owning the weapons. All portals
with access through this boundary would be monitored visually
and using techniques outlined above to ensure there was no
passage of unauthorised items into or out of the facility. The
main inputs would be the tagged warheads. The main outputs
would be accurately measured quantities of highly enriched
uranium and plutonium in forms which do not reveal design
information and which can be made subject to IAEA safeguards.
Non-nuclear components would be destroyed within the
containment boundary by the state owning the weapons.
Another option for protecting sensitive information could be
to ensure that inspectors monitoring the dismantlement process
come from countries with a similar level of weapons program to
the weapons being dismantled.
The two main fissile materials, highly enriched uranium and
plutonium, are at the heart of every weapon. In any phased
elimination arrangement, both should be safeguarded downstream
from the point where weapons are dismantled to their eventual
disposal. In the interests of speed, monitoring of storage
could initially be conducted by the nuclear weapon states but
the IAEA should be brought into the process rapidly. In the
case of plutonium stored as 'pits' the US National Academy of
Sciences (NAS) on management and disposition of excess weapons
plutonium concluded that adequate safeguards could be provided
without compromising sensitive weapons design information by
declassifying the mass of plutonium in the pits, and allowing
IAEA monitors to assay the sealed containers holding the pits
without observing the components' dimensions. While this
procedure needs to be scrutinised in the light of reasonable
assumptions about what a state might do to attempt to defeat
such verifications, as a concept it is worthy of further
investigation.
Although intermediate storage is an inevitable step preceding
all longer- term disposition options, such storage should be
minimised. Maintaining vast stocks of excess material in a
readily weapons usable form over the long term would send
negative political signals for non-proliferation and for the
elimination of nuclear weapons. It should also be noted that
the security against the risks of diversion and theft is
entirely dependent on the durability of the political
arrangements under which storage is conducted. One of the key
criteria by which disposition options should be judged is the
speed with which they can be accomplished, and thus how
rapidly they curtail these risks of storage.
Canberra Commission Report Continued
Proposition One