THE CANBERRA COMMISSION ON THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Reinforcing Steps

The recommended nuclear weapon states' political statement of commitment and other 'Immediate Steps' would firmly orient the defence and bureaucratic establishments of all nuclear weapon states to the goal of elimination and to the development of a practical program of nuclear disarmament. The following steps would build on the solid foundation of commitment, accomplishment and goodwill established through implementation of the steps recommended for immediate action:

* Action to prevent further horizontal proliferation
* Developing verification arrangements for a nuclear weapon free world
* Cessation of the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes.

Action to Prevent Further Horizontal Proliferation

The problem of nuclear proliferation is inextricably linked to the continued possession of nuclear weapons by a handful of states. As long as any state has nuclear weapons, there will be others, state or sub-state actors, who will seek to acquire them. Other national security reasons also motivate states to acquire nuclear weapons. The task of preventing further proliferation becomes even more urgent as existing nuclear arsenals are being eliminated. A world environment where proliferation is under control will facilitate the disarmament process and movement toward final elimination and vice versa. The emergence of any new nuclear weapon state during the elimination process would seriously jeopardise the process of eliminating nuclear weapons. It would not, of course, rule out forever the possibility of elimination, although it would probably retard it.

Action is therefore needed to ensure effective non-proliferation controls on civil and military nuclear activities, and to press for universal acceptance of non-proliferation obligations.

At the level of national action, states have the fundamental obligation, under a variety of treaties and in moral terms, to ensure that sensitive nuclear material, equipment and technology under their jurisdiction and control do not find their way into the hands of those who would misuse them. A breakdown in national nuclear controls could lead to nuclear material coming into the possession of would-be proliferator states or sub-state groups, including terrorists. States must have competent systems of nuclear materials accountancy to keep track of nuclear material. Nuclear establishments and the transport of nuclear material need appropriate physical protection and states need to have effective procedures to control what leaves their territory, know where it is going and for what purpose. All member states of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the future Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation should ensure that they meet in full their financial obligations so these bodies can properly perform their functions.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remains the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is the legal and political means by which almost all states give effect to their decisions to renounce nuclear weapons. Because of the near universality of the non-proliferation regime those states operating significant nuclear programs without comprehensive safeguards stand exposed to the international community as being of possible proliferation concern. Application of IAEA NPT or equivalent fullscope safeguards in non-nuclear weapon states promotes national, regional and global security and stability by providing a high level of assurance that nuclear material remains in peaceful, non-explosive use.

A small number of states continue to refuse to join the NPT or accept equivalent non-proliferation commitments. Bringing these states into the non-proliferation regime through acceptance of internationally verifiable, legally binding non-proliferation obligations will be an essential step in the process of eliminating nuclear weapons. The NPT Review and Extension Conference identified universal adherence to the NPT as an urgent priority and called upon all states not yet party to the treaty to accede to it at the earliest date, particularly those states that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. This process would be enhanced by the unequivocal commitment of the nuclear weapon states to the elimination of nuclear weapons and concrete movement towards that goal.

Proliferation pressures in South Asia, the Middle East and the Korean peninsula may prejudice the prospects for eliminating nuclear weapons. Determined efforts, particularly on the part of the states in these regions and the nuclear weapon states, are urgently needed to address the long- standing differences that fuel proliferation in these regions. Just as the nuclear weapon states need to be convinced that giving up nuclear weapons will not harm their security so too will the undeclared weapon states and threshold states need to be convinced that ending their nuclear ambiguity will not damage their interests.

Past experience points to a variety of ways in which such situations can be resolved. Unilateral action is possible, as in the case of South Africa's unilateral dismantlement of its nuclear weapons. In this case, close attention was needed by the IAEA to ensure completeness of initial inventories preparatory to the application of fullscope safeguards to South Africa's remaining nuclear activities.

Bilateral negotiations can also be successful as in the case of Argentina and Brazil. After decades of nuclear competition and uncertainty about the direction of their nuclear programs these states took joint action. Both now accept comprehensive IAEA safeguards and have established a bilateral nuclear inspection agency, the Argentina-Brazil Accounting and Control Commission. Both have ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco and Argentina has joined the NPT. Of particular note is that safeguards are applied bilaterally and by the IAEA. Each state thereby has direct access to information about the other's nuclear program, providing high transparency and confidence.

A combination of bilateral and multilateral approaches is also possible. The Denuclearisation Declaration between the ROK and the DPRK coupled with the US-DPRK Agreed Framework and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) is an example of how dialogue, encouragement, assistance, some security guarantees (in this case negative nuclear security assurances) and give and take on both sides can help to wind back nuclear weapon ambitions on the part of an insecure state.

In situations of regional tension - such as India and Pakistan in South Asia and Israel and its neighbours - the security needs of all parties involved have to be identified, acknowledged and addressed systematically to find solutions. Action should be taken as a matter of urgency, and if necessary discretely, to prevent a regional dispute acquiring a nuclear dimension. This points to a multilateral approach involving relevant regional and possibly neighbouring powers. Bilateral or regional involvement could be employed as a means of providing additional assurance and confidence building above and beyond international inspections. The overall security environment, including conventional armaments and other weapons of mass destruction, would be highly relevant to a negotiated solution. There could be a role in this regard for assistance and assurances from outside powers, particularly the nuclear weapon states, covering such matters as security assistance, positive and negative nuclear security assurances, assurances about access to imported technologies and agreed restraint in arms exports to the region.

Developing Verification Arrangements for a Nuclear Weapon Free World

Effective verification is critical to the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear weapon free world. Before states agree to eliminate nuclear weapons they will require a high level of confidence that verification arrangements would detect promptly any attempt to cheat the disarmament process whether through retention or acquisition of clandestine weapons, weapon components, means of weapons production or undeclared stocks of fissile material. Formal legal undertakings should be accompanied by corresponding legal arrangements for verification. To maintain security in a post-nuclear weapon world the verification system must provide a high level of assurance as to the continued peaceful, non-explosive use of a state's civil nuclear activity.

To be adequate, the verification regime must provide a high probability that cheating of proliferation significance would be detected promptly. This is essential to provide confidence that nuclear weapons have been eliminated and to discourage potential violators.

A political judgement will be needed on whether the level of assurance possible from the verification regime is sufficient. All existing arms control and disarmament agreements have required judgements of this nature because no verification system can provide absolute certainty. The likelihood that the verification regime for a nuclear weapon free world will involve a small probability that attempted breakout might go undetected does not alter the fact that a nuclear weapon free world would be, fundamentally, a safer place. Development and implementation of the verification arrangements needed for each step toward elimination will provide immediate benefit through reducing the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear proliferation including nuclear terrorism.

Verification is likely to involve bilateral US/Russian measures, verification among the nuclear weapon states and multilateral verification during various stages of the dismantlement and elimination of nuclear weapons. Bilateral or regional involvement in inspections on nuclear facilities and in monitoring the dismantlement of any nuclear weapons could be employed as a means of providing additional assurance and confidence building above and beyond international inspections particularly during the early stages of disarmament while states develop confidence that multilateral verification is operating effectively. The verification regime will take many years to develop. To ensure that movement toward a nuclear weapon free world is not held up by lack of adequate verification, higher priority should be given to the development of the verification techniques that will be needed.

The following are some of the main components of a possible verification regime. These and other verification issues are discussed further in .

* Effective, cost-efficient non-proliferation controls on the civil nuclear industry in all states
* Detection of undeclared nuclear activity
* Ceasing production of fissile material for nuclear weapons
* Nuclear warheads dismantlement and elimination
* Disposition of warhead uranium and plutonium
* Controls on nuclear weapons components other than nuclear material
* Dismantlement of nuclear weapons infrastructure.

A key element of non-proliferation arrangements for a nuclear weapon free world will be a highly developed capacity to detect undeclared nuclear activity at both declared and undeclared sites.

Progressive extension of safeguards to nuclear activity in the nuclear weapon states, the undeclared weapon states and the threshold states will be needed with the end point being universal application of safeguards in all states. Few facilities in the nuclear weapon states are safeguarded at present and a number of other states operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The first stage of extending safeguards in these states is likely to be verification of facilities and material covered by a convention to end fissile material production for weapons.

Systems will be needed to verify that nuclear warheads are dismantled and destroyed and their fissile material content safeguarded to provide maximum confidence that such material cannot be reintroduced to weapons use. Controls on important components of nuclear weapons other than fissile material such as tritium and non-nuclear components will need to be considered. To ensure that a nuclear force of strategic significance cannot be reconstituted quickly a staged process for verified destruction of the nuclear weapons infrastructure is likely to be considered necessary.

Even allowing for future developments it seems unlikely that technical verification alone can provide the levels of assurance needed for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Supplementing technical verification by other measures such as transparency in nuclear activity, relevant information obtained by national technical means and passed to verification bodies, exchange of information between verification bodies and application of effective export controls can increase the levels of assurance from technical measures. Societal verification or citizen's reporting may prove to be an additional means of supporting the verification system for a nuclear weapon free world.

The political commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons must be matched by a willingness to make available the resources needed for nuclear disarmament including effective verification. The amounts involved are likely to be considerable, especially for the dismantlement of weapons and disposition of their fissile material content, but very much less than developing, maintaining and upgrading nuclear arsenals. In addition, the costs of the verification system should be weighed against the substantial contribution to global, regional and national security that effective verification of a nuclear weapon free world would make. Consideration should be given to creating an international fund for this purpose.

As the verification regime is developed it will be necessary to ensure that institutional arrangements are appropriate. Some probable institutional elements such as the IAEA and the CTBT verification organisation are existing or soon will be. Other institutional requirements should be considered as the disarmament process develops. Elaboration of technical aspects of verification should be initiated without delay within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament.

States must also be confident that any violations detected will be acted upon. In this context, the Security Council should continue its consideration of how it might address, consistent with specific mandates given to it and consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, violations of nuclear disarmament obligations which might be drawn to its attention. This should demonstrate that the collective security system enshrined in the Charter will operate effectively in this field.

Cessation of the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Explosive Purposes

Ending the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (cut-off) would require the dismantlement or placement under international safeguards of all enrichment and reprocessing plants in the nuclear weapon states and in undeclared weapon states and threshold states. A cut-off convention would contribute to nuclear disarmament by capping the amount of nuclear material available for nuclear weapons use and by extending safeguards coverage over currently unsafeguarded sensitive nuclear facilities. The Conference on Disarmament has agreed a mandate for negotiation of a production cut-off convention and the negotiations should proceed as a matter of urgency.

Final Steps

Final steps towards elimination will require a negotiating process involving all nuclear weapon states and any remaining undeclared weapons states and threshold states. The detail of how this might be achieved will principally be a matter for the states involved at the time, but some general comments can be offered. Steps suggested are:

Other Nuclear Weapon States Joining the Process

Further START agreements and nuclear confidence building measures should establish a receptive international climate for negotiations on global reduction of nuclear arms. Following the achievement by the United States and Russia of appropriate force levels, the next step might be to reduce the levels of all nuclear weapon states to 100 warheads each. The United Kingdom, France and China have given undertakings that they will join nuclear arms reductions when the arsenals of the United States and Russia are reduced sufficiently. These undertakings would need to be given concrete form and acted upon.

Preparations for negotiations involving all nuclear weapon states need not await the achievement by the United States and Russia of the appropriate force levels. The United States and Russia could commence a process for bringing the United Kingdom, France and China into the nuclear disarmament process. For example, early exploration of a comprehensive exchange of information on each state's nuclear arsenal and stocks of fissile material will be needed to establish baseline data for nuclear weapon state negotiations. Further early steps could be for the United States and Russia to prepare the ground for verification of nuclear weapon state reductions including by sharing information and expertise on START verification, on weapons dismantlement and on verification and control of fissile material from dismantled weapons. US/Russian experience on nuclear confidence building should be extended to the other nuclear weapon states, and new measures developed which involve them.

With respect to reductions involving all nuclear weapon states, as their arsenals are substantially reduced, the levels of warheads or warheads components thought to be held by any remaining undeclared nuclear weapon states and threshold states will become a more serious concern. It is therefore essential that states with a presumed nuclear weapons potential take early action and enter into international legal constraints as they will have to resolve their ambiguous nuclear status before the nuclear weapon states will finally move to zero nuclear weapons. As part of the process, it will be necessary for these states to acknowledge the progress made toward nuclear disarmament and to demonstrate their own intentions in this regard including through cessation of production of fissile material until production facilities are subject to international monitoring.

During the early part of nuclear weapon state reductions there are likely to be asymmetries in the arsenals which would reflect the different starting points of the participants. Progressive reductions in these asymmetries could be expected, leaving all nuclear weapon states with similar residual stocks of weapons as they approach the elimination stage.

For nuclear disarmament to be genuine and stable it should not be easily or unevenly reversible. There must be confidence that any attempt by a state to reverse disarmament would be a drawn out, highly visible, resource-intensive exercise. As nuclear disarmament extends beyond US/Russian bilateral reductions, so too must arrangements to provide a high degree of assurance that it would not be reversible. These arrangements include verified dismantlement and destruction of warheads and ending fissile material production for weapons purposes.

Getting to Zero

Each successive phase toward elimination of nuclear weapons will provide a guide to possible legal arrangements for a nuclear weapon free world. These measures could include further US/Russian bilateral agreements, a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a cut-off convention and any no-first-use treaty that may have been negotiated. Further new treaties will be needed at the global or regional level and existing instruments may have to be modified or replaced.

Separate but mutually reinforcing instruments could be one way to give legal effect to nuclear disarmament. As nuclear disarmament nears the elimination stage, consideration should be given to whether the legal obligations to sustain a nuclear weapon free world would be best given effect by the incremental approach of a number of separate instruments or through a comprehensive approach which would combine all relevant instruments into a single legal instrument - a nuclear weapons convention. A comprehensive treaty would be a fresh start, removed from acrimonious debate, such as that over the NPT. It may also be possible to include in a new treaty provisions which would minimise any danger to the NPT such as a requirement that the new treaty would enter into force only after it had been ratified by all states party to the NPT. These questions and other legal considerations are discussed in further detail at Annex B.

In any reflection on the legal regime required as a basic part of the architecture for a nuclear weapon free world, it is fundamental to recognise that the legal regime supports but cannot itself bring about such a world. The prospective components of the nuclear weapon free world legal regime will play an important role in the political negotiations through which a nuclear weapon free world will be established. But it is these political negotiations and the determination to make them effective which are central to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The maintenance of a nuclear weapon free world will require an enduring legal framework, linked to the Charter of the United Nations, possibly in the form of a convention on nuclear weapons.

Building the Environment for a Nuclear Weapon Free World

A world ready to eliminate nuclear weapons would be very different from today's world. The absence of nuclear weapons and related activity would become an internationally accepted norm, obviously including in all five declared nuclear weapon states. National arguments that nuclear weapons are needed because others have them would not apply. States' commitment to a nuclear weapon free future would be codified in international legal documents. Nuclear weapons would by then have to be seen as having no part to play in assuring any state's national sovereignty and independence. The world would have to live in the knowledge that cheating could spark the return of a nuclear armed world and the threat of a nuclear war, but the basic changes which would have occurred would buttress, substantially, the technical barriers against breakout and collective interest in maintaining them.

Concurrent with the central disarmament process, there will be a need for activity supported by all states, but particularly the nuclear weapon states, to build an environment conducive to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Progress in each track will influence the other. It is essential that the international nuclear and security agenda should move forward on a broad front in ways supportive of nuclear disarmament so that the process does not lose momentum.

Canberra Commission Report Continued

Proposition One