Proposition One
HISTORY OF GENOCIDAL WEAPONS
This paper is in the formative stage. As we obtain further
published or otherwise verifiable information, we'll share it.
Our plan is to relay facts which have been published in
mainstream and peace press. Please send us photocopies of any
significant articles you think we should quote.
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On March 29, 1992, a significant editorial appeared in the
Washington Post by Arjun Makhijani (Institute for Energy and
Environmental Research in Takoma Park) and Katherine Yih
(International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War,
Cambridge, MA), entitled: "What to Do at Doomsday's End - How
the World Can Step Back from Nuclear Brinkmanship":
"The end of the Cold War has brought an abrupt end to the
logic of nuclear deterrence in which the nuclear superpowers
built vast strategic arsenals to deter their adversaries from
risking total destruction by launching a first strike.
"Today, possessing 'deterrent' weapons when there is no threat
only encourages other governments to seek their own 'deterrent'
capability in turn.
"Such proliferation increases the danger of nuclear war--and
leads to the inevitable conclusion that in the post-Cold War
world, achieving stable, long-term nuclear nonproliferation
requires a commitment to universal nuclear disarmament.
"Up to now, much of the international effort to combat the
spread of nuclear weapons has centered on the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), signed by most nuclear or nuclear-capable nations.
But some are non-signatories because they regard the NPT as
inequitable, and three of them--Israel, India and Pakistan--are
today de facto nuclear weapons states.
"The NPT has proven inadequate--even among the countries that
have signed it--because, among other things, the treaty
ENCOURAGES the transfer of civilian nuclear technology. This has
enabled numerous countries, including Iraq, to acquire expertise
for making nuclear weapons....
"We cannot make plutonium and other nuclear weapons materials
disappear overnight. They are long-lived and dangerous to
process. Yet in the near future we can eliminate the risk of
accidental nuclear war, demonstrate a commitment to nuclear
disarmament and make genuine progress towards
nonproliferation....
"We propose that the next step in the process started by
mutual U.S.-Soviet unilateral weapons reductions be THE REMOVAL
OF ALL NUCLEAR WARHEADS from all countries' delivery systems.
Warheads would be removed from missiles, ships and airplanes,
stored in containers designed to prevent an accidental nuclear
criticality and shielded from stray electrical signals.
"Warhead repositories, under international safeguards and
inspection, would become a key element in ushering in the new
nonnuclear age. Once in storage, it would take weeks to put the
weapons back into their delivery vehicles--perhaps even months
for some submarine-based weapons. Such a delay would have been
considered unacceptable when deterrence was the principal
objective.
"While it would be physically possible to rearm, it would
become politically more and more difficult to do so....
"Putting all nuclear weapons into continuously monitored
facilities would virtually eliminate the risks of accidental
nuclear war and radioactive contamination, reduce the risks of
covert sale of fissile materials and attendant proliferation
risks. Finally, removing weapons from worldwide patrol would
reduce the threat that near-nuclear weapons states feel from the
nuclear weapons powers, which they use as justification for
pursuing their own nuclear weapons programs....
"The heart of our proposal is that it be multilateral and
implemented by all nuclear weapons states...."