The plaintiffs have the burden of demonstrating that the
defendants violated a constitutional right that was clearly
established at the time of defendants' action. (see, Mitchell v
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528).  The Supreme Court recently provided
courts with guidance in determining whether the law was clearly
sstablished at the time of an alledged constitutional violation:

      "The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates
that right.  This is not to say that an official action is
protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question
has previously been held unolawful, but it is to say that in the
light of preexisting law the unlawfulness must be apparent." 
Anderson v. Creighton, __ U.S. __, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3039, 87 L.Ed.
523 (1987).

     Perhaps, from time to time, certain judicial interpretations
may have twisted them from their original intent, however the words
of the First Amendment has not changed in lamost two hundred years. 
Plaintiffs are able to appreciate the concept of fluidity in law,
and understand that law is not something hewn in stone, but may
change at the whim of a few or with the passions of the many. 
Lacking a Congressional statute to the effect "The bureacuracy
shall pass such regulations as it deems necessary to suppress such
establishments or religion, religious practice, speech, press or
assmebly as it deems proper for public decorum,"  taking plaintiffs
allegations as true, it is obvious that in passing and enforcing a
regulation intended to deprive plaintiffs of the right to large and
effective signs defendants violated the First Amendment.    

     Unless we are mistaken, your Honor is making in the vicinity
of $95,000.00 per annum.  Of course that is not too much for an
honorable judge, and we appreciate the fact that this case may
present some politically sensitive points, yet both the destiny and
duty of a judge demand that he find facts and decide legal
questions.

 "For liabiluity under section 1983, direct participation by a
defendnat is not necessary.  Any official who `causes` a citizen to
be deprived of her constitutional rights can also be held liable. 
The requisite causal connection is satisfied if the defendant set
in motion a series of events that the defendant knew or should
reasonably have known would cause others to deprive the plaintiff
of the constitutional rights.  Tidwell v Schweiker, 677 F.2d 560,
569 (7th Cir.) Cert denied, 461 U.S. 905, further cites omitted,
Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F2.d 740, 743-744 (7th Cir.)"  Conner v.
Reinhard, 847 F.2d at 397.

      "(T)here is a factual dispute as to whether Conner was
defying legitimate instructions by her supervisor, or was merely
asserting her first amendment right to speak out on matters of
public concern. The district court acknowledged the dispute, but
nevertheless did `not believe that the difference in interpretation
amount[ed] to a genuine issue of material fact.'  We disagree; the
interpretation that the court accepts could determine whether or
not Reinhard was justified in discharging Conner.  This is indeed
a genuine issue of material fact that we must leave to the
fact-finding expertise of a jury."  Conner v. Reinhard, 847 F.2d at
393, 394.

  "If there are issues of disputed fact upon which the question of
immunity turns, or is it is clear that the defendant's conduct did
violate clearly established norms, the case must proceed to trial. 
Green v. Carlson, 826 F.2d 647, 652 (7th Cir. 1987)"  Conner v.
Reinhard, 847 F.2d at 388.