'WHAT HAD BEEN LEARNED WAS THAT THE RADICAL GROUP COULD DELIVER'
Sunday, February 8, 1987
; Page A23
THE VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH MR. NIR -- 7/29/86 07:35-08:05
PARTICIPANTS. The Vice President, Mr. {Amiram} Nir, Craig Fuller DATE/TIME:
7/29/86 07:35-08:05 LOCATION: Vice President's suite/King David Hotel,
Jerusalem
1. SUMMARY. Mr. Nir indicated that he had briefed Prime Minister {Shimon}
Peres and had been asked to brief the VP by his White House contacts. He
described the details of the efforts from last year through the current period
to gain the release of the U.S. hostages. He reviewed what had been learned
which was essentially that the radical group was the group that could deliver.
He reviewed the issues to be considered -- namely that there needed to be a
decision as to whether the items requested would be delivered in separate
shipments or whether we would continue to press for the release of the
hostages prior to delivering the items in an amount agreed to previously.
2. The VP's 25-minute meeting was arranged after Mr. Nir called Craig
Fuller and requested the meeting and after it was discussed with the VP by
Fuller and North. Only Fuller was aware of the meeting and no other member of
the VP's staff or traveling party has been advised about the meeting. No
cables were generated nor was there other reporting except a brief phone call
between Fuller and North to advise that "no requests were made."
3. Nir began by indicating that Peres had asked him to brief the VP. In
addition, Nir's White House contacts with whom he had recent discussions asked
him to brief the VP.
4. Nir began by providing an historical perspective from his vantage point.
He stated that the effort began last summer. This early phase he said "didn't
work well." There were more discussions in November and in January "we thought
we had a better approach with the Iranian side," said Nir. He said,
"Poindexter accepted the decision."
5. He characterized the decision as "having two layers -- tactical and
strategic." The tactical layer was described as an effort "to get the hostages
out." The strategic layer was designed "to build better contact with Iran and
to insure we are better prepared when a change {in leadership} occurs. Working
through our Iranian contact, we used the hostage problem and efforts there as
a test," suggested Nir. He seemed to suggest the test was to determine how
best to establish relationships that worked with various Iranian factions.
6. Nir described Israel's role in the effort by saying, "We activated the
channel; we gave a front to the operation, provided a physical base, provided
aircraft." All this to "make sure the U.S. will not be involved in logistical
aspects." Nir indicated that in the early phase they "began moving things over
there."
7. Before a second phase, a meeting was desired. Nir indicated a February
meeting took place with "the prime minister on the other side." Nir did not
make it clear who else attended the meeting. He said the meeting was "dramatic
and interesting." He said "an agreement was made on 4,000 units -- 1,000 first
and then 3,000. The agreement was made on the basis that we would get the
group," Nir said. "The whole package for a fixed price," he said.
8. Although there was agreement, the other side changed their minds and
"then they asked for the other items," according to Nir. "We were pleased
because these were defensive items and we got to work with the military," said
Nir. He continued, "There were 240 items on the list we were provided and we
agreed to it."
9. A meeting was organized for mid-May in Tehran to finalize the operation.
The VP asked Nir if he attended the meeting and Nir indicated he did attend.
Nir said, "Two mistakes were made during this phase. Two people were to be
sent to prepare for the meeting but the U.S. had concerns about McFarlane,"
according to Nir. He described the meetings as "more difficult -- total
frustration because we didn't prepare." And he said, "Their top level was not
prepared adequately." During the meeting in Tehran, the other side kept
reminding the group that "in 1982 there was a meeting which leaked and the
prime minister was thrown out of office." Nir said that at the end of the May
meeting, "they began to see the light. McFarlane was making it clear that we
wanted all hostages released," Nir reported and, "at the last moment the other
side suggested two would be released if those at the meeting stayed six more
hours." According to Nir, "The deputy prime minister delivered the request {to
delay departure} and when the group said 'no,' they all departed without
anything."
10. According to Nir, "The reason for delay is to squeeze as much as
possible as long as they have assets. They don't believe that we want overall
strategic cooperation to be better in the future. If they believed us they
would have not bothered so much with the price right now." Further, according
to Nir, "there are serious struggles now within the Iran power groups. Three
leaders share the view that we should go ahead but each wants to prove his own
toughness."
11. Turning to what Nir said was the final or most recent phase, he
reported, "We felt things would just die if we didn't push forward to see what
could be delivered. They asked for four sequences, but we said no to talks
until they showed something."
12. According to Nir, he told them about 10 days ago he would cancel the
deal. Then nine days ago their prime minister called saying that they were
taking steps to release one -- the priest. The second one to be released would
be Jacobsen. The prime minister also said that one would be released and then
"we should give some equipment." Nir indicated to the VP that the bottom line
on the items to be delivered was understood to be the same or even less but it
was not the way the deal was originally made. The items involved spares for
Hawks and TOWs. No denial or approval was given according to Nir. Nir said he
made it clear that no deal would be discussed unless evidence is seen of a
release.
13. On Tuesday or Wednesday, a message was intercepted between Tehran and
the guards according to Nir. On Friday, three hostages were taken out and on
Saturday Jenco was taken out, put into a trunk and driven to a village in the
Bekaa Valley. Nir then described what Jenco reported with regard to the
conditions under which he was held and what he knew of the other hostages
including Buckley. (I assume we have detailed briefing already.) The VP asked
Nir if he had briefed Peres on all of this and he indicated that he had.
14. Nir described some of the lessons learned: "We are dealing with the
most radical elements. The deputy prime minister is an emissary. They can
deliver . . . that's for sure. They were called yesterday and thanked and
today more phone calls. This is good because we've learned they can deliver
and the moderates can't. We should think about diversity and establish other
contacts with other factions. We have started to establish contact with some
success and now more success is expected since if these groups feel if the
extremes are in contact with us then it is less risky for the other groups --
nothing operational is being done . . . this is contact only."
15. Nir described some of the problems and choices: "Should we accept
sequencing? What are alternatives to sequencing? They fear if they give all
hostages they won't get anything from us. If we do want to move along these
lines we'd have to move quickly. It would be a matter still of several weeks
not several days, in part because they have to move the hostages every time
one is released."
16. Nir concluded with the following points: "The bottom line is that we
won't give them more than previously agreed to. It is important that we have
assets there 2 to 3 years out when change occurs. We have no real choice than
to proceed."
17. The VP made no commitments nor did he give any direction to Nir. The VP
expressed his appreciation for the briefing and thanked Nir for having pursued
this effort despite doubts and reservations throughout the process.
BY: CRAIG L. FULLER
Articles appear as they were originally printed in The Washington
Post and may not include subsequent corrections.
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