In pertinent part 36 CFR 7.96 (g)(l) provides:

'"The term 'demonstrations' includes demonstrations, picketing, speechmaking, marching, holding vigils or religious services and all other like forms of conduct which involve the communication or expression of views ... which has the effect, intent or propensity to draw a crowd or onlookers."

36 CFR 7.96 (g)(2)(i) provides that:

"Demonstrations involving 25 persons or fewer may be held without a permit provided that the other conditions required for the issuance of a permit are met and provided further that the group is not merely an extension of another group already availing itself of the 25-person maximum under this provision or will not unreasonably interfere with other demonstrations or special events."

36 CFR 7.96 (i)(l) provides:

"Camping is defined as the use of park land for living accommodation purposes such as sleeping activities such as sleeping, or making preparations to sleep (including the laying down of bedding for the purpose of sleeping), or storing personal belongings, or making any fire, or doing any digging or earth breaking or carrying on cooking activities. The above-listed activities constitute camPing when it reasonably appears, in light of all the circumstances, that the participants in conducting these activities are in fact using the area as a living accommodation."

36 CFR 7.96 (i)(2) provides:

"Further information on administering these regulations can be found in policy statements published at 47 FR (ps. 24301- 24302, June 4, 1982).

The Federal Register, June 4, 1982, p. 24301 states:

"The regulations prohibiting camping are not intended to stifle First Amendment expression, but rather to Protect undesignated parks from activities for which they are unsuited, or the impacts of which they cannot sustain."

This Court further noted that "(t)he Park Service neither attempts to ban sleeping generally, nor ban it everywhere in the parks. CCNV, 468 U.S. at 295.

At its inception in 1982 the stated policy behind the "camping" regulation was "not to stifle First Amendment expression," but to "protect against impacts the area could not sustain." 47 FR June 4, 1982, p. 24301; Appendix.

"It is axiomatic that an agency is bound by its own rules and policies." Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, 284 U.S. 370,

"Indeed, in the prefatory statement accompanying the 1982 (camping) amendments, the Park Service indicated that it was 'amending!(the regulation) to forbid specifically the use of any such structures,including tents, for the purpose of conducting any living accommodation activity which was defined to include 'sleeping.'" CCNV v. Watt, 703 F.2d at 610. Emphasis added.

"I find it difficult to conceive of what 'camping' means, if it does not include pitching a tent and building a fire. Whether sleeping or cooking follows is irrelevant. With all its frailties the English language, as used in this country for several centuries, and as used in the Park Service regulations, could hardly be plainer in informing the public that camping in Lafayette Park was prohibited." CCNV at 300, C.J. Burger concurring, emphasis added.i

"there is no single activity that triggers the application of these sections... " CCNV v. Watt, 703 F.2d at 610, emphasis in original.

"This point is worth pausing to dwell on, because the regulation's clear statement of a contextual evaluation should indicate two things to a reasonable reader First, no one of the exemplary indicia (for example 'sleeping activities') can be considered in isolation, either from the others or from the actual circumstances in which the activity is conducted." Id. (parentheses in original) United States v. Thomas. 864 F.2d 188.

"The spirit and purpose of the (regulation) are not to be lost sight of in strict adherence to its letter." Felton v. United States, 96 U.S. at 702.

"The Park Service neither attempts to ban sleeping generally, nor ban it everywhere in the parks." CCNV at 295.

"I stress that the government's interest is not in preventing sleeping per se. but in preventing the adverse effects associated with camping." CCNV v. Watt 703 F.2d 604-

"(O)ne's participation in a demonstration as a sleeper becomes impermissible 'camping' when it is done within any temporary structure erected as part of the demonstration." CCNV v. Watt. 703 F.2d 589.

"(S)leeping is not, per se, illegal.... (T)he government's camping regulation ... allows for 'sleeping activities' that are not deemed to constitute use of the area for living accommodations." CCNV v. Watt. 703 F.2d 588, 589. Compare, infra, p. 17.

"There are obvious methods of preventing (impacts the park cannot sustain). Amongst these is the punishment of those who actually (impact the park in an unsustainable manner)." Schneider v.State. 308 U.S. 147, 162 (parentheses substituting).

"No doubt protecting undesignated parks from "impacts which they cannot sustain" (Appendix ) is a noble venture, but "a fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression." Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 508. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2541.

"(t)he regulation narrowly focuses on the government"s 'substantial interest in maintaining the parks in the heart of our Capitol in an attractive and intact condition...'." CCNV 468 U.S. 288, dissenting opinion at p. 295, 296, citing the majority opinion.

"This case may be one of these 'hard cases' that has high potential to produce bad law." CCNV. Watt, 730 F.2d 600, 601 J; Mikva, concurring opinion; see also, id 605, J. Ginsburg, concurring opinion

These questions can be traced to the regulatory background "The political dynamics likely to lead officials to a disproportionate sensitivity to regulatory as opposed to First Amendment interests can be discerned in the background of this case.... (T)here are facts in the record of this case that raise a substantial possibility that the impetus behind the revision may have derived Less from concerns about administrative difficulties and wear and tear on the park facilities, than From other, more 'political' concerns." Clark v. CCNV, 468 U.S. 315, (1984), J. Marshall, dissenting opinion Infra. p. 22, AS APPLIED THE REGULATION SERVES NO LEGITIMATE PURPOSE.

"(A Huddle co-plaintiff claimed that he had been repeatedly arrested, beaten, harassed and otherwise mistreated by the police in retaliation for his activities." Thomas v. United States, 557 A2d 1298 (D.C. App, 1989), citing id p. I2, n. _/ United States v. Thomas. 864 F.2d 188.

"The (government) might be pursuing either of two objectives,

motivated by two very different judgments. One objective might be the elimination of "visual clutter," attributable in whole or in part to signs.... A second objective might simply be the elimination of the messages typically carried by the signs... Yet, the (government) might try to mask the second objective by asserting the First (objective)... In short, we must resist unquestioned acceptance of the (government's) declaration of an aesthetic objective, lest we fail in our duty to prevent unlawful

trespasses upon First Amendment protection" City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent 466 U.S. 789, 823.

"Indeed were it not for the availability of the permit process to clarify the limits of the camping regulation, that regulation might well be unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant and other similarly situated. See Thomas v. United States, supra 696 F. Supp. at 709-711." Sunrise at 299.

"Over the course of their vigil plaintiffs and federal law enforcement officials have engaged in an on going confrontation arising from plaintiffs' exercise of First Amendment rights. Thomas v. United States, 696 F.Supp. 702, 704 (1988)." Sunrise at 297, see also 299.

From "time immemorial" "streets and parks" have been recognized as "public forums." Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 490

"(First amendment) rights ... certainly include the right in a peaceable and, orderly manner to protest by silent and reproachful presence...." Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131. As recently as March 5, 1986 the Park Service explicitly stated that it had no desire to "preclude continuous vigils." Federal Register, Vol.' 51, No. 43, page 7559. Appendix, ___

"Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious ... form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law ... thus the First Amendment embraces two concepts - freedom to believe and freedom to act." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 301, 303, see also Walz v. Tax Commission,. 397 US 664 1970; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 US at 404; Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 268 U.S. 534.

'To condition ... the perpetration of religious views or systems upon a license ... is to lay a forbidden burden upon the exercise of liberty protected by the Constitution." Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 303 (1939); see also Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147.

'This phrase is not an empty one and was not lightly used. It reflects the belief of the framers of the Constitution that exercise of the rights lies at the foundation of free government by free men." Schneider v State, 310 U.S. 147 at 161

"It is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that government remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected.... The right to speak freely and promote diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes." Tenniniello v. Chicago, 357 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); see also, Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1%5); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615; Hustler Magazine v. Falwell. 485 U.S. 46, 55-56.

"(T)he law ... is not so unreasonable as to attach culpability, and consequently to impose punishment, where there is no intention to evade its provisions and the usual means to comPly with them are adopted. All punitive legislation contemplates some relation between guilt and punishment. To inflict the latter where the former does not exist would shock the sense of justice of everyone." Felton v. United States, 96 U.S. 703.

'To subject defendants entirely free from moral blameworthiness to the possibility of prison sentences is revolting to the community sense of justice; and no law which violates this fundamental instinct can long endure." 33 Col. L. R. 72; United States v. Morisette. 342 U.S. 250 at 255.

In essence, the questions here presented ask whether a "law that punished a citizen for an innocent action ... is against all reason and justice." Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall) 386, 387-89 (1798).

Crime is generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-doing hand (action, actus) with an evil-meaning mind (purpose, element of intent, mens rea) This concept took early root in American soil. See, Reg. v. Sleep, 8 Cox C.C. 472; United States v. Morissette. 342 U.S. 250.

"Actus non facit reum nici mens sit rea - a crime is not committed if the mind of the person doing the act is innocent. 16 C.J. 74. United States v. Lovely, 77 F. Supp. 619, 621, see also, 1 Bish. Crim. Law Section 43, re Jacobi, 74 Ohio App. 147, 57 NE.2d 932, 934.

These United States grew from the agreement that:

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, all men are created equal, and endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, among these life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. It is to secure these rights that governments are instituted among men." Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776.

If the law of this nation still recognizes this agreement, then

"The hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions ... because they are right, right in the sense that the

law and the Constitution compel the result." Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2548, J. Kennedy.

"(T)here being one truth, one way to heaven, what hope is there that more men would be led into it if they had no rule but the religion of the court?" John Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration; See Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 231, Ftn. 1.