UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MARY HUDDLE and PHILIP JOSEPH, et. al., )
                                        )
          versus                        )  CA 88-3130-JHG
                                        )  Judge Joyce Hens Green
RONALD WILSON REAGAN, et. al.,          )
                   defendants           )
________________________________________)

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO EXPEDITE THE HEARING
ON PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Due to their indigency and inexperience, plaintiffs hereby move, pursuant to the provisions of 28 USC 1915 or such other statute or provision of law, for the Court's assistance in scheduling and expediting an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised by their Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, both filed this day.

The Court may assist in this regard by directing the U.S. Marshal's Service, or another appropriate government agent, to effect service of a subpoena upon the one witness whose testimony, plaintiffs believe, will prove their case.

This request is more fully explained in an accompanying Memorandum.

A proposed order is attached.

Respectfully submitted,

_____________________________
William Thomas
1440 N Street, N.W. Apt. 410
Washington, D.C. 20038
202-462-0757


MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO EXPEDITE THE HEARING
ON PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

In maintaining a straight and narrow course between anarchy and tyranny, the Court serves a function crucial to a healthily ordered society. Plaintiffs have brought this claim on the premise that to faithfully serve its sacred function the Court must hear and judge facts with the utmost objectivity possible.

Plaintiffs allege, among other things, that they have been assaulted, imprisoned, intimidated, and have had their communications materials seized and destroyed. As best we understand it, defendants probably contend they have just been doing their jobs.

Taking plaintiffs allegations as true (see, Reuber v. United States, 750 F.2d 1038, 1060, 1061, also Richland v. Harper, 302 F.2d 326), a dispute exists. 1/ Despite repeated attempts by plaintiffs to instigate a proper judicial hearing into the particulars of this dispute the underlying facts remain unexamined. 2/

Yet the dispute con-tinues to be played out in an allegedly uncivilized manner, on the streets, under cover of darkness.

Except in anarchy or tyranny the aggressor in this lopsided "confrontation" would be determined by a civilized trial of fact. As it stands, however, this one-sided contest has only been


1/ Defendants tacitly agree to the existence of a dispute. E.g., Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (filed December 21, 1988), p. 4.

2/ More authoritatively it has been noted that "(o)ver the course of their vigil plaintiffs and federal law enforcement officials have engaged in an ongoing confrontation arising from plaintiffs' exercise of First Amendment rights." United States v. Sunrise, 702 F. Supp. 295, 297, cf. Thomas v. United States 696 F. Supp. 702, 704. Of course, no factual determination has yet defined the parameters of that "ongoing confrontation," or whether it was initiated by plaintiffs or "federal ... officials."

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"argued" in the press (see, e.g., Clarification of Complaint, filed January 17, 1989, paras 80, 102, 110), a situation which does not enhance accurate understanding.

"'Connie's rendition ... is a pack of lies at the most,' said (Park P)olice Lt. HughIrwin. 'And it's because her world is so small sitting on the sidewalk, associating with the people she does." See, Exhibit A hereto, Associated Press wire story. 3/

On the Record the only real question appears to be, who is telling the truth? For various reasons (see, e.g., Plaintiffs' Opposition to Federal Defendants' Application for Protective Order and to Renew the Motion for Sanctions, filed November 20, 1989) questions of veracity have never been reached.

Plaintiffs appreciate that this Court is very busy, but they do not expect a hearing on the instant Application and Motion will require a great deal of time. 4/

Plaintiffs are confident that defendants will be unable to present testimony or evidence which would substantially alter the facts as set forth in the Declarations supporting their Application and Motion. 5/


3/ Lt. (now Capt.) Irwin figures prominently in this Complaint. E.g. Clarification of Compliant ("CoC"), paras. 133, 142.

4/ Certainly an evidentiary hearing will consume much less time than the last factual inquiry this Court conducted with respect to this "ongoing confrontation." See, United States v. Seven People in Lafayette Park, USDC Cr. 84-255, also CoC para. 105.

5/ Naturally, defendants have the option of eliciting their side of the story from the police agents implicated by plaintiffs' Application and Motion. Should defendants opt to take the stand, plaintiffs may or may not think it necessary to put on rebuttal witnesses. In the event that defendants choose to draw this matter out with factual disputations, plaintiffs would request, at a minimum (see, Motion to Compel Discovery), that they be provided, at least two days prior to the hearing, with all case incident and arrest reports generated in Lafayette Park between August, and November 10, 1989, and all radio runs relevant to the incidents at issue. Summarization of Complaint, paras. 32-42.

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Thus, plaintiffs believe, in order to make their case 6/, it will only be necessary for them to call defendant Richard Robbins. 7/ Dependent upon the accuracy of Mr. Robbins' testimony - and assuming that defendants do not avail themselves of their right to challenge the assertions made in plaintiffs' Declarations 8/ - the testimony of two or three rebuttal witnesses may or may not be required.

Assuming plaintiffs are telling the truth there are very
compelling reasons for the Court to intervene:

"The function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute.... It is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that government remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected.... The right to speak freely and promote diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes." Terminiello v. Chicago, 357 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); see also, Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965); Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. at 508-509, Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615; Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203; Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus, Law Week 4856; Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 US 352 (1983); Schneider v. State, 310 U.S. 147 (1939); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 US at 404; Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147; Smith v. Goguen, 415 US 566 (1974); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. at 411, et. seq.

6/ Plaintiffs expect to establish that 1) their "vigil" does not violate the "camping" (or any other) regulation, 2) their "vigil" is entitled to constitutional protection under the First Amendment, and 3) 36 CFR (g)(5)(x)(B)(2) was unnecessary.

7/ Mr. Robbins is readily available. As the Court may recall he was present at counsel table when there was last a hearing in this case on January 9, 1989.

8/ It is highly improbable that defendants might successfully demonstrate how plaintiffs' vigils have caused any harmful "impacts"

3

or other "legitimate government interest." Therefore defendants are unlikely to waste the Court's time pursuing that dead end.

Plaintiffs append hereto a subpoena for Mr. Robbins. The date and time have been left blank to facilitate the Court's discretion. See, Exhibit 2, hereto.

As an alternative to the U.S. Marshal's Service, and in the interests of economy and efficiency, the Court might think it appropriate to instruct Mr. Martinez to notify Mr. Robbins that his presence at the hearing is requested.

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray the Court to set a date to hear this matter as soon as possible, and to direct that a subpoena be served on Mr. Richard Robbins to insure that he will take part in the hearing.

Respectfully submitted,

_____________________________
William Thomas
1440 N Street, N.W. Apt. 410
Washington, D.C. 20038
202-462-0757


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I William Thomas, hereby state that, on this __th day of November, 1989 I caused true copies of the foregoing plaintiffs' Motion to Expedite the Hearing on Plaintiffs' Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and a Memorandum in Support thereof, to be hand-delivered to the offices of Assistant U.S. Attorney Michael Martinez at Judiciary Square, 555 4th Street N.W., Washington, D.C., and the Office of the Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia, 1350 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.

_____________________________
William Thomas

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MARY HUDDLE and PHILIP JOSEPH, et. al., )
                                        )
          versus                        )  CA 88-3130-JHG
                                        )  Judge Joyce Hens Green
RONALD WILSON REAGAN, et. al.,          )
                   defendants           )
________________________________________)

ORDER

Upon consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion to Expedite the Hearing on Plaintiffs' Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction, this ____ day of November, 1989 it is hereby

ORDERED that the United States Marshal's Service shall make service of a subpoena on Richard Robbins; it is further,

ORDERED that a hearing will be held in this matter on the ____ day of November, 1989.

____________________________________
Joyce Hens Green
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Copies to:

Assistant U.S. Attorney Michael Martinez
Judiciary Square, 555 4th Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001

Office of the Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia, 1350 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

William Thomas
1440 N Street, N.W. Apt. 410
Washington, D.C. 20005


Huddle, et. al.
CA. 88-3031-JHG

Reagan, et. al.

SUBPOENA

Richard Robbins
Solicitor's Office
Department of Interior
l8th and C Streets N.W.
Washington, D.C.

U.S. District Court
400 John Marshal Place
Washington, D.C.

Courtroom 18

6th floor