UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Mary Huddle, et. al., :
plaintiffs, :
:
versus, : C.A. 88-3130-JHG
:
Ronald Reagan, et. al. :
defendants. :
_________________________:
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO
THE FEDERAL DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS OR OTHER DISCIPLINARY ACTION
On February 17, 1989, federal defendants' counsel, Assistant
United States Attorney ("AUSA") Michael L. Martinez, filed an
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions or Other Discipli-
nary Action ("Deft's Opp."), suggesting plaintiffs' request for
disciplinary action should be denied as frivolous. [1]
Is it not self-evident that freedom of thought/belief is not
frivolous? Does the complaint not clearly allege a dispute
centering on thought/belief? Is it not a matter of record that
plaintiffs have been imprisoned; that one is presently sentenced
to thirty days in the custody of the U.S. Attorney (Cr. No.
87-235), and thirty days "in the woods"? Cr. No. 87-194. Are
there not unanswered allegations of a broad assortment of Consti-
tutional ills? Counsel seems unlikely to argue that access to
the judicial system is frivolous. Plaintiffs wonder, how can a
petition for relief from a careless claim (infra, p. 4 - 7) which
might foreclose access to civil remedy, be considered frivolous?
See, Marbury v. Madison ___ U.S. ____ (1803).
[1 Counsel addresses seven "points" (Deft's Reply, pgs. 2 - 7),
six of which he dispatches in short, single paragraphs. Then he
devotes two full pages - four times the amount of discussion
devoted to any other single issue - to religion. Regardless of
whatever else he may say, here is a clear indication that he
perceives some import in the issue of religion.]
1
Plaintiffs' experience gives them reason to infer something
is wrong, and grounds to allege that the problem is regulations,
promulgated under false pretenses, intentionally applied without
good cause, against the exercise of their religiously-motivated
actions, resulting in various Constitutional injuries. Evidence,
rather than counsel's perhaps well-intended suppositions, should
be allowed to determine whether plaintiffs' religious beliefs are
"sincere" or some type of "newly found" sham, and whether their
claim is "vast" or "frivolous." See generally, Adickes v. Kress,
398 U.S. 144 (1970). [2]
FACTS IN DISPUTE
1. Plaintiffs respectfully maintain that the question of
whether their "religion is ... newly found" is substantial.
Indeed, the gravity of the issue is reflected in counsel's pre-
tention that "(b)ecause plaintiffs have ... made no connection
between their beliefs ... and their activities in Lafayette Park,
this Court should reject plaintiffs' assertion that they have
stated a claim under 42 USC 1985(3)." Federal Defendants' Reply
to Plaintiffs' Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss and All of
Plaintiffs' Other Submissions (hereinafter "Deft's Reply") filed
January 28, 1989, p. 5.
2. Plaintiffs agree that, prior to March 4th, defendants'
counsel of record had been AUSA John Bates. While AUSA Martinez
did not file a formal entry of "appearance in the first Thomas
[ If plaintiffs are wrong, they might certainly have a problem.
That is not, however, the only consideration. Plaintiffs have
brought this Complaint representing the People of the United
States. If plaintiffs are "right," theoretically, it would be the
People's problem, and plaintiffs would only be trying to help.]
2
case (until) March 4, 1986" (Deft's Opp. p. 4, footnote 2), it is
indisputable that he "was involved in that case" since at least
[3] as early as February 21, 1986. SEE, Exhibit 1, hereto.
3. Mr. Martinez insists "(p)laintiffs know full well that
religion was not the focus of the earlier Thomas cases" (Deft's
Opp. pg. 3), yet defendants' own pleadings disagree. E.g.:
"(Plaintiff) claims a general conspiracy to suppress
his expression and the freedom of his religious beliefs in
Counts One, Two, Nine and Nineteen. Am. Cmplt. pp. 45-48,
55-56, 63." Thomas v. United States, C.A. 84-3552, Federal
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for a More Definite
Statement, filed December 4, 1985, page 8. SEE, Exhibit 2,
hereto. [4]
4. Nor, as counsel suggests, need plaintiffs rely on "two
isolated 1985 quotations mentioning religion" to "undermine the
federal defendants' assertion (that) (r)eligion was simply never
an issue." Religion was repeatedly put at issue. Once, and not
the earliest or most artful of many possible examples, was
shortly after Mr. Martinez admits to having become "involved" in
the first Thomas case, fully a year before he insists that
religion first became an issue. See, Exhibit 3, hereto, filed
April 22, 1986.
[3 It appears that by his signature AUSA John D. Bates
also certifies Mr. Martinez's instant pleadings. Compare, Exhibit 2.
Plaintiffs have been unable to locate certain documents, but do not
preclude the possibility that Mr. Martinez was actively, albeit
perhaps informally, "involved" with Mr. Bates in the first Thomas
case as early as October, 1985. Compare, Exhibit 2.] [4 Exhibit 2, as attached hereto, consists of only pages 1, 8,
and 21 of Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and for More
Definite Statement. Plaintiffs believe that the document con-
tains numerous inaccuracies which 1) cannot justify the paper
necessary to photocopy it, and 2) would require the inclusion of
plaintiffs' Opposition to Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
and plaintiffs' More Definite Statement, both filed in the first
Thomas case on January 17, 1986, needlessly complicating an
already complicated matter.]
DISCUSSION
"Why does the rule require the attorney to certify
that he has read the paper? The purpose plainly is not to
penalize a lawyer for failing to read it but to eliminate
ignorance as an excuse. There is no room for a pure heart
empty head defense under Rule 11." Sanctions Under The New
Federal Rule 11, A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 186, 187. (1985).
Even if Mr. Martinez did not become "involved" in the first
Thomas case until March 4, 1986 -- and particularly since he has
presently been involved in the matter for nearly three years --
it might be assumed that, when he filed the paper at issue here,
he should have known what the first Thomas case was about, even
if it did contain "thousands of pages."
Rule 11 "mandates reasonable prefiling inquiry with
respect to the facts ... on which (the) paper is based." Id.
p. 185.
Understandably, perhaps, but erroneously nonetheless, Mr.
Martinez thinks his representation that "plaintiffs' reliance
on religion in this case is `newly found'" has provoked "particu-
larly ... Mr. Thomas' ire." Deft's Opp. p. 2, compare, Exhibits
4 - 7, hereto. In fact what concerned Mr. Thomas' most were
representations preceding defendants' footnote 3. For example,
"(plaintiffs) have offered nothing in this case other than con-
clusory and self-serving affidavits to demonstrate that their
beliefs are in fact religious in nature." Deft's Reply p. 5.
Plaintiffs have hand-delivered "affidavits to demonstrate
that their beliefs are in fact religious in nature" to Mr.
Martinez for years. Plaintiffs assert that -- in addition to
being sanctionable -- Deft's Reply, footnote 3 is the closest Mr.
Martinez has come to a factual inquiry of plaintiffs' ideas. Had
Mr. Martinez made this claim years ago, he might have seemed a
professional who valued truth, and a lot of litigation might have
been avoided. At this late date it just looks like a shabby job.
Moreover, plaintiffs submit, there is documentary evidence
in the record which, if properly linked with plaintiffs' affida-
vits, would bridge any seeming gap between plaintiffs' religious
exercise and their presence in Lafayette Park. Plaintiffs would
welcome the opportunity to span this understanding gap, and
believe that end can be accomplished through reason and logic/
questions and answers.
Assuming, as the Court should (e.g. Reuber v. United States,
737 F.2d at 1057), that plaintiffs are attempting to articulate
valid truth of broad public concern, it becomes readily appre-
hendable that this truth would be expansive, and expressing it
would be no simple task. Many people, and perhaps Mr. Martinez is
one, might not be expected to understand the truth immediately.
A lot of people didn't understand Jesus 5/, and, when he drove
the moneychangers out of the temple, or healed on the Sabbath,
Jesus probably didn't expect the scribes and pharisees to under-
stand that his actions were religiously motivated. But he tried
to explain it to them so that everyone might be saved. "Know the
truth and the truth shall set you free." John, chapter 8.
Mr. Martinez professes to see no "religious significance" in
the "communication of anti-nuclear views." Deft's Opp. p. 5.
This lack of vision is readily understandable in one of those
___________________________
5/ To forestall possible allegations of delusions of grandeur,
none of the plaintiffs claim to be perfect or even saintly. On
the contrary, plaintiffs are only attempting to determine the
truth (i.e., "Actual Reality".) SEE, USA v. Thomas, App. No.
3034, slip op. filed December 30, 1988, p. 8.
people who do not believe that the Creator manifests Itself in
humanity, or that "the earth is the Lord's and the fullness
thereof." "The law" gives Mr. Martinez every right to be such an
"unbeliever," and he may sincerely have difficulty comprehending
why any self-respecting Universal Creator would even bother to
condemn nuclear (or any) weapons, or instruct His/Her servants to
devote their lives to communicating against war and weapons.
But Mr. Martinez's possible failure in comprehension/belief
cannot, of itself, negate either the sincerity of plaintiffs'
beliefs, the possible existence of a Universal Creator, or the
possibility that the Universal Creator actually deems the preser-
vation of life on earth to be of greater "substantial interest"
than the purported "aesthetic" preferences of an unspecified
percentage of unidentified American citizens vis-a-vis seven
acres in downtown Washington, D.C.
Plaintiffs claim to know their own intents. They may not be
able to express those intents with exact precision on paper, but
the best Mr. Martinez can do is to guess at plaintiffs' intents.
"(C)rucial under (Rule 11) is ... whether ... the
attorney has acquired knowledge of facts sufficient to
enable him to certify that the paper is well grounded in
fact.... Suspicion, rumor or surmise will not do.
Sanctions Under The New Federal Rule 11, A Closer Look, p.
187, emphasis in original.
Perhaps plaintiffs are out of touch with reality, perhaps
they have only fabricated an ingenious ploy to vex Mr. Martinez
and his cohorts, and/or experience the joys of civil litigation,
or perhaps plaintiffs have valid information on issues of broad
public concern which they sincerely believe the Creator has
instructed them to communicate to humanity.
Perhaps the government (with thoughtful or thoughtless
assistance from Mr. Martinez and his cohorts) is either ignoring
plaintiffs' information, or, as experience seems to suggest, is
engaged in a scheme to strangle the exercise which plaintiffs
sincerely believe their Creator has instructed them to carry out.
In any event simple fairness and, it is thought, the Rules of
Civil Procedure would require more than an ipse dixit character-
ization on behalf of the U.S. Attorney's Office to establish that
plaintiffs' beliefs or affidavits are "self-serving."
Maybe someone is "right" about "religious beliefs" and maybe
someone is "wrong," yet can we honestly pretend to know "who" is
"which" until understanding is reached?
Plaintiffs allege Mr. Martinez's assertion that "plaintiffs'
religion is ... newly found" (Deft's Reply, p. 2, compare,
Exhibit 8, hereto) is flatly wrong. Yet, Mr. Martinez insists,
"(t)he federal defendants stand by that assertion." Deft's Opp.
p. 3.
"Resort to frivolous ... maintenance of baseless
defenses and harassment of one's opponent are practices that
judges and lawyers engaged in civil litigation encounter
regularly....
"These practices tend to impose unjustified burdens on
other parties, frustrate those who seek to vindicate their
rights in courts, obstruct the judicial process, and bring
the civil justice system into disrepute." Sanctions Under
The New Federal Rule 11, A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 182.
(1985).
CONCLUSION
It seems both logical and expeditious and just for the Court
to determine who is actually telling the truth on this point.
"The detection and punishment of (Rule 11) violation(s) ...
is part of the Court's responsibility for securing the system's
effective operation." Moore's Fed. Prac., Rules Pamphlet, Part
1, p. 105 (1984).
"Rule 11 ... along with Rules 16 and 26 ... (is)
intended to bring about greater judicial control of civil
cases from their earliest stages in order to narrow the
scope of the litigation and accelerate its disposition."
Sanctions Under The New Federal Rule 11, A Closer Look, 104
F.R.D. 183 (1985).
Wherefore plaintiffs renew their motion, pursuant to Rules
11, 16 and 26, that this Court secure the effective operation of
the system by determining whether Mr. Martinez's "knowledge
(and) information (supported) a belief formed after reasonable
inquiry ... grounded in fact ... and that it (was) not
interposed for any improper purpose."
Respectfully submitted,
___________________________
William Thomas
1440 N Street,N.W.Apt. 410
Washington, D.C. 20005
202-462-0757
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, William Thomas, certify that on the 4th day of March,
1989, God willing, I will hand deliver a copy of Plaintiffs'
Response to the Federal Defendants' Opposition To Plaintiffs'
Motion for Sanctions or Other Disciplinary Action to Michael
Martinez, 555 4th Street N.W., Washington, D.C., and Arthur
Burger, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, D.C.
/s/ William Thomas