Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U,S. 825, 836-39 (1983), Defendants contend that plaintiffs have failed to bring their § 1985(3) conspiracy claim within that statutes limited scope. Plaintiffs urge, in opposition, that although much of the complaint charges defendants with "animus to squelch [plaintiffs'] free expression," Plaintiffs' Opposition at 10, it also contains "ample" allegations that "at least some defendants have also been motivated by religious animus." Id. Plaintiffs invoke Ward v. Connox, 657 F.2d 45, 47-48 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom, Mandelkorn v, Ward, 455 U.S. 907 (1982), in which injured members of the Unification Church were permitted to sue under the civil rights conspiracy provision because "religious discriminatfon, being akin to invidious racial bias, falls within the ambit of § 1985(c) [sic]." Id. at 48; see also Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d at 21 (citing cases in other circuits that extend § 1985(3) to protect political and religious classes). Plaintiffs, as a group, thus appear to rely most heavily on a characterization of themselves as a religious rather than a political "class" -- and, accordingly, on a characterization of the alleged torts against them as being rmotivated by religious rather than political animus -- for the purpose of their § 1985(3) claims.
religious class remains undecided in this Circuit. Indeed, in dismissing five criminal informations, several of which involved individual plaintfffs in the present action and arose out of the same expressive activities at issue here, the district court assumed that appellees' anti-nuclear vigil in Lafayette Park was the product of sincerely held religious beliefs. United States v. Galindez, Cr. No. 87-60, slip op. (D.D.C, Apr. 23, 1987), rev'd bnd remanded on other arounds, Nos. 87-0060, 87-0061, 87-0062, 87-0063, & 87-0064 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 22, 1987).
Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F,2d at 29. Plaintiffs' failure to satisfy this criterion extends as well to their claim that the Times conspired with members of the YAF to plan and execute a "raid" on plaintiffs in Lafayette Park with the intent violently to interfere with plaintiffs' exerrcise of their First Amendment rights, The camplaint does not allege,
with sufficient specificfty, that the Times defendants acted in concert with the YAF out of racial or religious bias or out of any invidious, class-based animus recognized under § 1985(3).
Again, in paragraph 79, plaintiffs claim injury to their "religious practice" but imply that one defendant's motivation may be inferred irom his "supervisory respons ability for a smear campaign against those opposed to Reverend Moon's suicidal economic interests." Id. at ¶ 79 (emphasis supplied). Paragraph 89 does expressly allege that defendants were motivated by religious animus; however, that same paragraph charges also that they were motivated by "personal prejudice ... or cultural animus." Plaintiffs fail to specify any evidence that would support any of these allegations. Id. at ¶ 89. Paragraph 90 alleges only that "[d]efendants opposed plaintiffs' message in their official (political) capacities, and/or in their personal (religious, social) capacities." Id. at ¶ 90, Paragraph 91 makes no mention of defendants' motivation at all. It alleges merely that they disagree with plaintiffs on religious issues. Id. at ¶ 91. Finally, paragraph 93, while alleging that defendants acted "with willful, malicious, and reckless disregard to disrupt the practice of plaintiffs' chosen profesion and religion," does not allege that any such action was motivated by invidious animus based on plaintiffs' membership in a particular religious class, at ¶ 93; see Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d at 258. Even if the complaint were construed to allege conspfracy motivated by invidious, class-based animus, the claims under §§ 1983 and 1985(3) could not withstand the
Times defendants' motion to dismiss. It is well established that a plaintiff suing under these statutes must allege and prove four basic elements: 1) a conspiracy; 2) for the purpase of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws; and 3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; 4) whereby a person is either injured in his or her person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a United States citiien. Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d at t58, quoting Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d at 14.
to conspire against plaintiffs. Id. [5] Both exhibits are copies of editorials critical of plaintiffs that were published by The Washinston Times and discussed extensively above, Plaintiffs infer from the editorials that "for years these defendants have been opposed to plaintiffs' high- profile, 24-hour, year-around, anti-nuclear vigil[.]" Id. Yet, while plaintiffs, by means of these exhibits, describe a specific attitude that defendants may have held towards plaintiffs' expressive activity, plaintiffs fail to allege sufficiently particular facts that would support an inference that such an attitude ever ripened into an intent to conspire
with federal officials illegally to infringe plaintiffs' constitutional rights in violation of federal civil rights laws.