UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

          v.                     CRIM. NO. 87-61, -62, -63
                                 JUDGE RICHEY
WILLIAM THOMAS,
STEPHEN SEMPLE aka SUNRISE,
ELLEN THOMAS.

GOVERNMENT'S OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER

The United States of America, through its attorney, the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, respectfully opposes defendants' Motion to Reconsider. In support of this opposition, the government submits

1) Defendants make two arguments in support of their request for the Court to reconsider its guilty verdict. First, defendants have presented the Court with a "Public Gathering Permit." Without addressing the dubious posture by which this permit is before the Court */, there is ample basis to disregard its significance. Defendants
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*/ There are numerous reasons why this court should summarily reject evaluation of this "evidence." One, the record is closed. Defendants should move to reopen the taking of evidence. Two, if the record is closed, the Permit constitutes "newly discovered evidence" and should he argued on that basis. Three, there is no authentication For the document. We do not know who considered the application for the permit or the nature of the review process. Four, there is little temporal relevance between the Permit, issued December 1987, and the events of the instant case taking place in December of 1986. Although we understand why this Court would show tolerance towards a pleading from a defendant who insists on representing himself (it is clear that William Thomas prepared this pleading on behalf of himself and others), we question just how long the defendant should be indulged in his "practice" of law at the standard of skill reflected in his pleading. It is unlikely that a licensed member of the bar would be successful, on the basis of the pleading filed, to have the court address the merits of the defendants' arguments. The defendants, having rejected appointed counsel in this pleading, should not be permitted to exploit their unrepresented status before the court to accomplish the sort of review they could not have obtained through appointed counsel.

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argue that if they are permitted to do the activities set forth in his permit application, then they are entitled to do the activities for which they were convicted. This argument fails for two reasons. First, defendants' statement that "it is self-evident that the activity and items [allowed by by the Permitl are precisely the activities, and with fewer itmes, for which this Court convicted these defendants" is simply not accurate. We read the Permit quite differently. The fact that the the defendants were allowed to possess possess personal effects, including an "insulated bag," during a demonstration, does not equate with the conclusion that they were permitted to use the park for living accomodation purposes. The application says nothing about sleeping or laying down bedding materials for purposes of sleeping. This is the core of the behavior for which this Court convicted the defendants.

3) Second, as this Court made clear at the trial, the statements of employees of the Department of Interior or National Park Service do not constitute binding interpretations of the regulations. This Court held that it would permit evidence as to employees' interpretations of the regulations, but that it would grant this evidence

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whatever weight was deemed appropriate. In this regard, as mentioned in the footnote on page one, we do not know who reviewed the application, what his position was in the agency, what this review entailed, or whether the application was merely "rubber-stamped." Even were this Court to resolve every "authentication" inference in favor of the defendant and assume: l) that the review occurred at truly significant policy levels within the Department of Interior, and 2) that the reviewing personnel concluded that the activities contemplated in the application were akin to the activities for which the defendants were convicted, the Permit reflects nothing more than a non-binding legal opinion which the Court should reject.

4) Defendants further argue that because they may have fallen asleep inadvertently, they did not intend to violate the statute. In this regard, the defendants persist in making arguments that the regulation is unclear, where the regulation could not be more precise. The regulation goes out of its way to define what is meant by the phrase "living accomodation purposes," namely, "sleeping activities, or making preparations to sleep (including the laying down of bedding for purposes of sleeping)." 47 C.F.R. 7.96(i). The evidence amply supported this Court's finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants willfully intended to commit the acts which the regulation proscribes. Defendants advanced numerous variations of this argument at trial; these were uniformly rejected. Defendants advance nothing new in this pleading.

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WHEREFORE, we request defendant's Motion for Reconsideration be Denied.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

//s// Joseph E. diGenova
JOSEPH E. DIGENOVA
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

//s// mark h. dubester
BY: MARK H. DUBESTER
ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of this pleading was served by mail upon William Thomas, 1440 N. Street, N.W., Apt. 41O, Washington, D.C., 20005; upon Ellen Thomas at the same address; and upon "Sunrise," also known as Stephen Semple, at P.O. Box 27217, Washington D.C., this 12th day of January, 1988.

MARK H. DUBESTER