OCT 9, 1987


UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       Appellant,

       versus             (D.C. App. No. 87-3041)

SCOTT M. GALINDEZ                               Appellee,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA                        Appellant,

       versus             (D.C. App. No. 87-3042)

STEPHEN SEMPLE,                                 Appellee,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       Appellant,

       versus             (D.C. App. No. 87-3043)

WILLIAM THOMAS,                                 Appellee,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       Appellant,

       versus             (D.C. App. No. 87-3044)

PHILLIP JOSEPH,                                 Appellee,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       Appellant,

       versus             (D.C. App. No. 87-3045)

ELLEN THOMAS,                                   Appellee,


Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 40, appellee William Thomas, acting pro se, hereby moves this Court for rehearing of the per Curiam Order entered by Judges Edwards, Ruth B. Ginsburg, and Buckley on September 22, 1987.


I would respectfully submit that the Court has misapprehended: the "means of [my] religious worship" (Per Curiam Memorandum (hereinafter Memo [Appendix 1]), page 2), as well as the physiological nature of "sleep." Memo, page 2.


I also ask the Court to consider certain significant aspects of this case, reflected in the record, which set it starkly apart from both Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (i.e., compliance with regulations), and Clark v. Community For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (i.e. the legal nature of "sleep" vs. "camping" (Memo, page 2)). Consequently I ask the Court to consider whether it has not also misconstrued the precedents which should properly be applied to this case.


Barring an Act of God, or a thermo-nuclear holocaust, this Court's Order will invariably cause me to suffer imprisonment or other criminal sanction 1/ as a direct and proximate result of an action which was undisputedly "the product of sincerely held religious beliefs." Memo, page 1.


It was alleged in the District Court that I violated 36 CFR 7.96(i), prohibiting camping in Memorial-core area parks, and punishable under 16 USC Sec. 3. On April 21, 1987 I filed a MOTION TO DISMISS BY REASON OF AN ACT OF GOD. The other appellees joined in that motion, and on April 23, 1987 "(t)he district court dismissed all informations 'on the grounds that (appellees') actions were protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment."' Memo page 1.

On July 21 appellant (Government) moved for summary reversal, and on September 22, 1987 this Court granted that motion stating: "We hold only that the criminal informations involved

1/ e.g. United States v. Thomas, 87-341, J. Flannery, Trial date October 13, 1987, and United States v. Thomas, USDC Cr. No. 8760, J. Richey, barring reversal by this Court.


in this case should not have been dismissed for the reasons given by the district court." Memo, page 4.

It appears that the Court's rationale for its decision proceeds from a valid premise:

"(w)e assume, as did the district court, that appellees' anti-nuclear vigil in Lafayette Park was the product of sincerely held religious beliefs" (Memo, page 1);

through a misapprenhension of fact;

"(d)epending on which characterization of the facts is accepted, the restrictions at issue here pertain either to the manner in which appellants (sic) communicate (through their signs while sleeping) or to conduct which facilitates that communication in the place chosen by appellants (sic) for that purpose (sleep enables continuous vigil)" (Memo, page 2, ftn. 1);

to a conclusion that is unrelated to the facts of this case:

"Once camping is permitted for one or a few, it may not be denied to others who seek equal access. Clark, 468 U.S.

at 296-97." Memo, page 3.

The government's arguments have clouded the issue, and my own naivete and ineloquence have failed to dispel those clouds. Appellee respectfully submits that this Court's Memo and Order raise the questions of whether this Court has confused (a) the Free Exercise Clause with the Speech Clause, and (b) "sleeping" with "camping." Notwithstanding, the proper issue is pre-served with clarity on the record. 2/

2/ Appellee filed a number of motions, contained in the record below, which were denied by the District Court as moot (see Order, J. Richey, April 23, 1987, page 3, Appendix 2, and Order, J. Richey, May 26, 1987, page 6, Appendix 3). Some of the issues raised in those motions are germane to the instant petition, and must, in the interest of justice, be considered here. Accordingly a number of attachments (Defendant's Exhibits) to those motions are included in the Appendix which accompanies this Petition.




The "means of appellees' religious worship" is not "sleeping," or, as even more erroneously misapprehended, "camping."

"The purpose of my life is to acquire wisdom and attain moral perfection.
"I live as a penniless wanderer and a pilgrim ...
"I ... was compelled to enter the United States despite my vigorous objection....
"Given the option of living my life in decadent luxury at the expense of my fellow creatures, or voluntarily laying it down in the service of Truth, Justice and Freedom I would choose the latter. I entreat those who understand my words to confront the evils of the nation-state by gathering at the White House to pray for Reason, Sanity and an End to War in illustration of the ideals of non-violence." Appendix 4F.

So it is clearly seen on the record that I have been at the White House to pray for Reason, Sanity and an end to War. Although some may think that I have an obsessive preoccupation with Freedom of Speech, actually my primary impetus is prayer.

"Thomas says there's only one reason he bothers to talk to other people; to provoke them into thinking about the existence of God, 'because if they believe there is no justice beyond what we can see in one lifetime, then the rule of the earth will continue to be Might is Right - and it isn't."' Appendix 5.

Owing to my inexperience before the law, government counsel has been able to obscure the nature of my religious activity by focusing on arguments under the Speech Clause. 3/

"Religion is a way of life. My way of life is to treat others as I would like them to treat me. While my religion is simple it demands responsible action, and on occasion, self-sacrifices....

Due to my profound respect for the First Amendment, I have risen to the bait of attempting to defend it in toto, and, therefore, have become entangled in arguments relating to religious communication. During that process the matter of religious exercise seems to have been lost in the verbage.


"My personal experience has led me to conclude that the United States, in pursuit of its own pleasure and comfort, is actively engaged in the destruction of the planet on which I live, and which I hold to be the property of my Creator. To work within the system that comprises the United States, is for me to contribute to this destruction. On the basis of my religious principles I refuse to make this contribution; in effect, I refuse the beastly mark without which one may not buy, sell, or trade within this society. Because I cannot buy, sell, or trade I am forced to live on the streets, and subsist on what society throws away. So my very existence is a demonstration of the manner in which a truly moral person is compelled to live within an amoral society." Appendix 6.

My "religious exercise" is to do as my Creator teaches (e.g. Matt. 7: 16-20). The fact that a "fruit" of my "religious exercise" might reasonably be described as a "vigil" or a "demonstration" is ancillary to the fact of my "religious exercise." 4/ Initially and continuously I strive to work on my own salvation (remove the beam from my eye); enabling me to communicate to others the importance of their own actions in relation to their own eternal salvation (attempt to remove the mote from their eye). Matthew 7: 3-5.

In the MOTION TO DISMISS BY REASON OF AN ACT OF GOD, my contention was simply that my continuous "existence" -- apart from my communication -- is entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause. The matter at issue is solely my personal (per sona) continuous presence "at the White House to pray for Reason, Sanity, and an end to War." Hence the methods which might reasonably be described as "communicative" (signs, "vigil," whatever) is not the issue.

4/ "The term 'demonstrations' includes ... holding vigils, or religious services and all other like forms of conduct which involve the communication or expression of views or grievances, engaged in by one or more persons, the conduct of which has the effect, intent, or propensity to draw a crowd or onlookers." 36 CAR 9.76(g)(1)(i). Appendix 7.


Likewise it is not the fact that "sleep enables a continuous vigil" which goes to the Free Exercise Clause; rather, it is the fact that I have been personally mandated by my beliefs to remain at the White House in a state of continuous prayer and fasting.

"It must be noted that petitioner's presence was unquestionably lawful. [Lafayette Park] was a public facility, open to the public...." Brown v. Louisana, 383 US 131 (1961) [brackets substituting]. From a physiological standpoint sleeping is a spontaneous or involuntary act. Appendix 8. To impose criminal sanctions upon a person, who otherwise would have every right to be in the Park, merely because he happened to doze is tantamount to punishing a person for burping, blinking, breathing, or sneezing, hardly a mark of civilization.


II. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), is readily distinguishable from this case.

Perhaps "(b)ecause of the posture in which the case is presented to this Court" (Memo, page 4), the Court has failed to perceive two glaring distinctions between Cox and this case.

1. In Cox "(t)he march was a prearranged affair, and no permit was sought, although the defendants understood that was required." Id. 573.

Unlike petitioners in Cox, I have pursued vigorous good faith efforts to conduct my action within the regulations. 5/

"Since he was sentenced he ha[s] attempted to conduct his protest in accordance with the law. This has been demonstrated by his conscientious resort to a civil action as the forum for resolution of his continuing dispute with the government. Thomas v. United States, Civil Action No. 84-3552." United States v. Thomas, Cr. No. 83-186, Memorandum and Order, April 4, 1986, p. 1, J. Oberdorfer. Appendix 9.


Although this is not the first time that I have been charged with violating the "camping" regulation, that fact in itself cannot be construed as evidence of disrespect for the law. 6/

Thomas v, USA, USDC Cr. No. 84-3552, was filed on November 21, 1984, a full twenty-five months before the entry of the informations at issue here. An Amended Complaint was filed on October 19, 1985. Although Appellee's pro se filings may have been somewhat unprofessional, mayhaps even prolix, it is self-evident that the bedrock relief sought in the Amended Complaint is, simply and essentially, specific definitions of the words "camping" and "sleeping" 7/. Appendix 10.

2. There is no indication from the record that the parade in Cox was anything other than a one-time affair. In fact, the claim was that the parade was "one of their ways of worship."

In contrast, the length of my religious exercise, and the total dedication necessitated to conduct a six-plus-year, round-the-clock presence, are both material evidence of the totality of that exercise, which is not merely "one of my ways of worship," but is the entirety of my "means of worship."

"(H)asn't it been one of those things where he gets arrested today for doing 'X' conduct, and then he goes back out and he does 'X minus Y' conduct, right? And he gets arrested. And then he goes back out and does 'X minus Y minus Z.' In other words, wherever you folks draw the line, he wants to stay on that line, wherever you want to draw the line." Judge Bryant USA v. Thomas CR 83-358, July 5, 1983, transcript p. 6-7.

7/ "'Camping' does not mean 'casual sleep' (Federal Register, June 4, 1982, Vol. 47, No. 108, p. 24301)." Proposed Order, filed October 19, 1985, para. (2)(a).

"Casual sleep' means sleep which occurs without resulting in demonstrable damage to park lands, and shall not constitute probable cause under 36 CFR 7.96(i)." Ibid, para. (2)(b).


"We see, therefore, that Thomas drew a line, and it is not for us to say that the line he drew was an unreasonable one. Courts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs ...." Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), page 717.

For this Court to allow the sincerity of appellee's religious belief, while implying that the exercise of those beliefs is "frivolous," seems at odds with Thomas v. Review Board.

III. Clark v. CCNV, 104 S. Ct. 3065, 3073-3080 (1984) -"SLEEPING" IS NOT "CAMPING."

1) Appellee respectfully submits that this Court has omitted consideration of United States v. Abner, which remains the controlling precedent on "sleep," and was undisturbed by CCNV:

"In the unusual circumstances of an individual protester's round-the-clock vigil in Lafayette Park, unavoidable sleeping 'must be taken to be sufficiently expressive in nature to implicate First Amendment scrutiny in the first instance'." CCNV v. Watt, USDC App. No. 82-2445, decided March 9, 1983, page 5, quoting United States v. Abney, 534 F.2d 985 (1976). SEE ALSO Appendix 11.

"We need not disagree with the view of the Court of Appeals that sleeping in the context of a demonstration is expressive activity which is protected to some extent by the First Amendment." Clark, op. cit., 3068, 3069.

2) This case differs from CCNV in that the Court held:

"(A)lthough we have assumed for present purposes that the sleeping banned in this case would have an expressive element, it is evident that its major value to this demonstration would be facilitative. Without a permit to sleep, it would be difficult to get the poor and homeless to participate or to be present at all." Clark, page 3074.

In this case "sleeping" per se is not facilitative. The record reflects the symbolic nature of my exercise is to forego "pursuit of (my) own pleasure and comfort." That I have chosen, at the direction of my Creator, Lafayette Park as the site of my religious exercise cannot elevate "living without accommodations" to "living accommodation purposes." Appendix 12.


3) A readily apparent distinction between "sleeping" and "camping" has been articulated by the appellant.

"The *** apparent distinction between the sleeping in the veterans' demonstration and the sleeping proposed by CCNV is that the veterans slept on the ground, without any shelter. According to the Park Service's interpretation of the new regulations, one's participation in a demonstration as a sleeper becomes impermissible 'camping' when it is done within any temporary structure erected as part of the demonstration." CCNV v. Watt, USDC App. No. 82-2445, decided March 9, 1983, page 5; SEE ALSO Appendix 13.

A tent is facilitative to sleep; however, remaining in a public park on a continuous basis is not. Here sleeping is not facilitative of a continuous personal presence, but an integral, albeit uncomfortable, and humanly inescapable component of a continuous presence. Clark is factually distinguishable from the instant case in its most fundamental aspect. 8/

4) The regulation was not intended to ban "sleeping" 9/ in Lafayette Park, nor to stifle First Amendment expression. 10/

The distinction here is between being "alive" on a continuous basis (not proscribed by the regulation), and "living accommodation purposes" (proscribed by the regulation).

8/ "I find it difficult to conceive of what 'camping' means, if it does not include pitching a tent and building a fire. Whether sleeping or cooking follows is irrelevant. With all its frailities, the English language, as used in this country for several centuries, and as used in the Park Service regulations, could hardly be clearer in informing the public that camping in Lafayette Park was prohibited." Clark v. Community For Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct., 3072, C.J. Burger, concurring opinion.

9/ "(T)he Park Service neither attempts to ban sleeping generally nor to ban it everywhere in the Parks." Clark, p. 3065.

10/ "The regulations prohibiting camping are not intended to stifle First Amendment expression, but rather to protect undesignated areas from activities for which they are unsuited, or the impacts of which they cannot sustain. Short term casual sleep which does not occur in the context of using an area for living accommodation purposes will not be affected by these regulations." Federal Register, June 4, 1982, page 24301. Appendix 14.


To make the term "living accommodation purposes" synonymous with the word "alive" simply deprives words of meaning. 11/

5) The government merely alleges that "Park Police Officer Peter Ward noticed appellees lying on the ground, in or under sleeping bags or blankets, near the south sidewalk of Lafayette Park." Motion For Summary Reversal, page 2. There is not the slightest innuendo that appellee has ever slept in any structure, temporary or otherwise, within any Memorial Core Area Park, much less any hint that I was engaged in "activities for which the area was unsuited, or the area could not sustain." Supra ftn. 10.

(a) Importantly, appellant has acknowledged that:

"the Government has no interest per se in prohibiting any of these particular defendants from sleeping in the park." Transcript of the hearing, April 23, 1987, page 49.

b) Appellant concedes that "the act of sleeping outdoors might, in conjunction with a religiously dictated vow of poverty, have some conceivable religious connotation...," but incorrectly represents that "no such showing has been made here." (Motion For Summary Reversal, page 19.) The record proves otherwise 12/

11/ In pertinent part the regulation reads: "Temporary structures may not be used outside designated camping areas for LIVING ACCOMMODATION activities such as sleeping, or making preparations to sleep (including the laying down of bedding for the purpose of sleeping) or storing personal belongings, or making any fire, or doing any digging or earth breaking or carrying on cooking activities. The above-listed constitute camping when it REASONABLY appears, in light of all the circumstances, that the participants, in conducting these activities, are in fact using the area as a LIVING ACCOMMODATION...." 36 CFR(g)(5)(vii), EMPHASIS ADDED.

12/ "You have also filed a motion to proffer evidence in support of a defense of necessity. That motion is that, even assuming you violated the regulation, you did so because of your belief or beliefs, (and) a vow of poverty...." Judge Richey, Transcript, April 23, 1987 hearing, page 41. Appendix 15.


(c) Assuming, arquendo, that the body in which I live falls asleep at times, such sleep, given the nature of the human body, should be considered to be the Will of God, and entitled to the protection of the Free Exercise Clause. Further assuming that the Government might show that by closing my eyes or falling into a state of reduced responsiveness to external stimuli my person thereby reduces the availability or enjoyment of the Park for others; by employing the "least restrictive means" principle the police officer need only awaken my person thereby permitting my religious exercise, and sparing an already overworked judicial system additional burden of converting a "sleeper" to a "camper," and imprisoning him. SEE, Isaiah 29: 20, 21.

I believe that Judge Richey applied the correct standards to this matter:

"When it has been shown that an individual has acted contrary to law out of a 'sincerely held religious belief,' it is the Government's responsibility to show that it has a compelling interest in the law at issue and that it has enforced the law with the least restrictive means with respect to that religious belief. SEE Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); see also Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law section 14-10. The Government did not offer a scintilla of evidence to that effect. Nor did it proffer a single reason sufficient in law to support a claim of compelling interest." Order of Judge Richey, April 23, 1987, page 3.


Uncontestably appellee's practice is so rigorous and uncomfortable that very few would attempt it. With few exceptions those who have tried have not lasted long. In fact not even all five appellees are still involved in this means of worship.

Appellee's action is radically different from that of "20 tents to accommodate 50 people," as proposed in Clark (op. cit.


3068), and that difference explains, in part, why it is also incorrect to hypothecate that the ability to maintain a continuous presence, if "permitted for one or a few, ... may not be denied to others who seek equal access" (Memo, page 3). Without doubt such access could be limited or denied to others:

"A variety of circumstances already require government agencies to engage in the delicate task of inquiring into the sincerity of claimants asserting First Amendment rights. See e.g. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (9172), Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 343-344 (l970)." Clark, Id. 3076.

Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 148 U.S. App.D.C. 342, 356, dealt with a nearly identical factual situation involving a "continuous presence" on the White House sidewalk. There the court found a ready alternative to denying access to one or admitting access to all through the imposition of reasonable limitations on the number of persons (750) permitted to participate in a demonstration on the sidewalk. 36 CFR 7.96(g)(5)(i). Appendix 7.


In light of the foregoing observations in relation to both Cox and CCNV, I respectfully submit that this Court erred in applying "the time, place, and manner" criteria of the Free Speech Clause, and in failing to apply the "compelling interest/ least restrictive" means standard, required under the Free Exercise Clause.

In maintaining a continuous presence, your appellee is only doing precisely what I believe my Creator would have me do. If applied as it may appear this Court has defined it (i.e. "sleeping" is "camping"), the regulation would ban a continuous presence in all Federal Parks in the Memorial Core Area, which


was unintended. Appendix 16.

"As the society around (Thomas) has become more populous, urban, industrialized, (militarized) and complex, particularly in this century, government regulation of human affairs has correspondingly become more detailed and pervasive. (Thomas') mode of life has thus come into conflict increasingly with requirements of contemporary society exerting a hydraulic insistence on conformity to the majoritarian standards.... As the record so strongly shows, the values and programs of the modern (military/industrial complex) are in sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life mandated by (Thomas') religion." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 217 (1971), (parentheses substituting).


"I am sensitive, perhaps more sensitive than most, to the fact that if your country suppresses the kind of protest that you are engaged in, we would be jeopardizing the liberty of us all." U. S. v. Thomas, USDC Cr. No. 83-186, sentencing transcript, December 21, 1987, page 29. J. Oberdorfer.

At the most recent juncture in the litigation of Thomas v. USA, CA 84-3552, a prudent man recommended that the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment be denied, admitting:

"there remains an incredible number of incidents stemming from (arrests of Thomas') on which reasonable minds might well differ as to the arresting officers' subjective intent and whether their actions involved police misconduct." Magistrate Burnett's Memorandum Opinion, Report & Recommendation, Thomas v. USA, CA 84-3552, filed January 13, 1987, at page 9.

The Court may readily perceive that the question presented here falls within that category of harm "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Dombrowske v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 482 (1965). Appendix 17.

As Martin Luther is thought to have said: "here I stand for I can do no other." Meaning no disrespect for this Court, society, or even the regulations, I cannot abandon my present action even under threat of imprisonment, because it is the product of a sincere religious belief.


Should this Court's apparent decision that "sleeping" is "camping" be upheld, not only will that preclude individual demonstrations on a twenty-four-hour basis, but additionally it would subject me to criminal sanctions for merely performing what is an unchallenged exercise of religious belief, which has caused absolutely no demonstrable injury.

Because I fear failing to do the will of my Creator, I am, literally, a prisoner of conscience. I would prefer not to be punished for my act of conscience, but if this Court allows such punishment, even though the Court may tell itself this is only a mild form of martyrdom, I believe that, in principle, criminal sanction would be persecution nonetheless.

Therefore it should be apprehendable that this case is unlike Cox, supra, but is "like Yoder, supra, (and) Thomas, supra --where compliance with the law necessitated conduct in direct contravention of the complainant's religious beliefs." Furthermore, it should be obvious that the "compelling interest/least restrictive means" guideline best applies here.

At this point it seems there are only two possibilities: (1) this Court might reverse itself, and (should the hypothetical situation ever arise when a great number of people decide to initiate a continuous presence in Lafayette Park) allow the judicial system to fashion a compromise akin to that in Quaker Action Group, or (2) the Court may allow the government to circumvent civilized problem resolution by convicting me on a criminal charge, and sending me to jail rather than allowing my "continuing dispute with the government" (Supra ftn. 5) to be litigated in Thomas v. USA. SEE Appendix 1, Federal Defendant's Notice of


Filing. In the interests of civilization appellee humbly urges the Court adopt the former possibility.

WHEREFORE appellee prays that this Court will 1) reconsider and reverse its Order, issued September 22, 1987; 2) specify that the mere act of sleeping without any shelter does not constitute the offense of "camping"; or, alternatively, 3) direct the Court below to conduct a comprehensive pre-trial hearing for the purpose of determining a) whether it reasonably appears that the regulation has been applied to mask the objective of eliminating the message conveyed by appellee's method of communication, and b) whether appellee's "means of worship" is indeed frivolous; or 4) such other proceedings as the Court deems proper.

Respectfully submitted,

William Thomas, appellee, pro se
1440 N Street NW #410
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 462-0757


I, William Thomas, hereby certify that, this 9th day of October, 1987, I served a copy of the foregoing PETITION OF APPELLEE WILLIAM THOMAS FOR REHEARING by hand delivering it to the Office of the Clerk of the U.S. District Court and requesting
that it be placed in the U.S. Attorney's box for Mr. John D. Bates.




1. Per Curiam Order and Memorandum, USDC App., September 22, 1987, and Federal Defendant's Notice of Filing, September 30, 1987, Thomas v. USA, CA. No. 84-3552.

2. Order of District Court Judge Charles Richey, April 23, 1987.

3. Order of District Court Judge Charles Richey, May, 26, 1987.

4. Secret Service Report, June 6, 1981, and attachments, Manifesto of Independence. Defendant's Exhibit 4-f, Motion to Dismiss for Intentional Ex Post Facto Enforcement, filed April 15, 1987.

5. Boston Globe article, August 27, 1981, Defendant's Exhibit

6, Motion to Dismiss for Intentional Ex Post Facto Enforcement, filed April 15, 1987.

6. "Religion is a Way of Life," Defendant's Exhibit 10, Motion to Dismiss for Malicious Prosecution, filed April 15, 1987.

7. 36 CFR 7.96, October 17, 1986, Federal Register.

8. Encyclopedia Brittanica, "SLEEP", pages 876 thru 883.

9. Order of District Court Judge Louis Oberdorfer, filed April 4, 1986, USA v. Thomas, Cr. No. 83-186, Attachment 1 to Response of Defendant William Thomas to Motion of U.S. to Consolidate Cases for Trial, filed March 13, 1986.

10. Proposed Order, Thomas v. USA, Defendant's Exhibit 20, Motion for Judicial Notice, filed May 12, 1987 .

11. Transcript of CCNV v. Watt, Civ. No. 81-2844, November 25, 1981, Defendant's Exhibit 1, Response To Government's Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss For Lack of Offense, filed March _, 1987.

12. Second Declaration of Defendant William Thomas, Defendant's Exhibit 12, MOTION TO DISMISS BY REASON OF AN ACT OF GOD, filed April 21, 1987.

13. Transcript of CCNV v. Watt, Civ. No. 81-2844, November 24, 1981, Defendant's Exhibit 2, Response to Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss For Lack of Offense, filed March 13, 1987 .

14. Federal Register, June 4, 1982

15. Motion Of Defendant William Thomas To Proffer Evidence In Support Of A Defense Of Necessity, filed April 15, 1987.

16. Federal Register, March 5, 1986.

17. Motion To Empanel a Three Judge Court, Thomas v. USA, 843552, filed October 5, 1987.