UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       Appellant,

       versus             (D.C. App. No. 87-3041)

SCOTT M. GALINDEZ                               Appellee,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA                        Appellant,

       versus             (D.C. App. No. 87-3042)

STEPHEN SEMPLE,                                 Appellee,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       Appellant,

       versus             (D.C. App. No. 87-3043)

WILLIAM THOMAS,                                 Appellee,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       Appellant,

       versus             (D.C. App. No. 87-3044)

PHILLIP JOSEPH,                                 Appellee,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       Appellant,

       versus             (D.C. App. No. 87-3045)

ELLEN THOMAS,                                   Appellee,



Appellant, through Assistant United States Attorney John D. Bates, has moved this Court for summary reversal of District Court Judge Charles Richey's Order of April 23, 1987, dismissing camping charges against the appellees in this case.

Appellee William Thomas, pro se, and in forma pauperis in the Court below, comes before this Court to oppose the Government's Motion For Summary Reversal.

"(A) party who seeks summary disposition of an


appeal must demonstrate that the merits of his claim are so clear as to justify expedited action." Walker v. Washington, 627 F.2d 545.

Through sophistry, if not misrepresentations, and by ignoring the relevant precedents Mr. Bates would attempt to defeat Judge Richey's soundly reasoned decisions. SEE Judge Richey's Order of April 23, 1987, Appellant's Exhibits 1, and Opinion of May 26, 1987, Appellant's Exhibits 2. Appellee believes that the record of this case shows Judge Richey acted correctly in dismissing the charges, that appellant has failed to demonstrate any clear claim to the contrary, and therefore appellant's Motion For Summary Reversal should be denied.

Appellant complains that the Motion To Dismiss By Reason Of An Act Of God was not received by AUSA Chapman until she "was on her way to the hearing" on April 23, 1987. Motion For Summary Reversal, pages 8, 9, see also Transcript of April 23, 1987 hearing (hereinafter Tr.), page 43. In fact the Motion was filed on April 21, 1987. What's more, fully twenty-four hours prior to the hearing, I telephoned Ms. Chapman and inquired whether she had received the Motion. Perhaps Ms. Chapman actually did not read her copy "until just shortly before the hearing," but, it must appear, that was her own fault.

The Court specifically asked if the Government was prepared to argue the motion. Ms. Chapman, who could have asked for more time, waived that option by responding: "I'll do the best I can." Tr. page 47, 48.

Indeed, to her advocatorial credit, Ms. Chapman did do "the best" anyone could have done under the circumstances:

"Your Honor, I would just briefly object to any of these defendants being allowed to prefer (sic) their


religious beliefs, again however sincere they may be, as a defense at this time, because I don't think it is appropriate." Tr. 48 and 49.

Unfortunately she was opposing the principles of freedom of belief and the freedom to express belief within a jurisprudential system theoretically designed to protect those freedoms. With wisdom and accuracy Judge Richey judiciously noted:

"When it has been shown that an individual has acted contrary to law out of a 'sincerely held religious belief,' it is the Government's responsibility to show that it has a compelling interest in the law at issue and that it has enforced the law with the least restrictive means with respect to that religious belief. SEE Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); see also Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law section 14-10. The Government did not offer a scintilla of evidence to that effect. Nor did it proffer a single reason sufficient in law to support a claim of compelling interest." Order of Judge Richey, April 23, 1987, page 3.

The Court inquired of the Government whether it had any objection to the Court's deciding the question raised in the Motion To Dismiss By Reason Of An Act Of God. The Government stated that it had no objection. Tr. peg 47.

Judge Richey admonished the Government of its legal right to examine the defendants. Tr. page 49. The Government waived that right first affirmatively, then passively. Tr., page 49, 51, 52.

More than once he allowed the Government an opportunity to specify any compelling interest that it might have had in enforcing the regulations against the defendants. The Government stipulated that its only interest in this matter was merely "to enforce the regulations...." Tr., page 49.

Appellant's Motion For Summary Reversal merely repeats that facially draconian "interest," and pointlessly observes that "the regulations were designed to protect park lands." Motion For


Summary Reversal, page 9, see also Tr. 49.


I do not contest the governmental interest in maintaining the parks, but the Government has not and cannot show that the exercise of my religion through my ritual six-plus-year-old vigil has impacted the area in any unsustainable manner. SEE, Motion To Dismiss By Reason Of An Act Of God, page 2, pare. 5.

"The regulations prohibiting camping are not intended to stifle First Amendment expression, but rather to protect undesignated areas from activities for which they are unsuited, or the impacts of which they cannot sustain. Short term casual sleep which does not occur in the context of using an area for living accommodation purposes will not be affected by these regulations." Federal Register, June 4, 1982, page 24301.

As Judge Richey humanely divined, "a mere statement that the Government has an interest in enforcing the regulation at issue is not a showing that the Government has a compelling interest in the regulation or that its means of enforcing the regulation were the least restrictive possible." April 23, 1987 Order, page 2.

"The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 US 215 (1972).

Mr. Bates cites part of the camping regulation:

"The use of park land for living accommodation purposes such as sleeping activities, or making preparations to sleep (including the laying down of bedding for the purpose of sleeping), or storing personal belongings, or making any fire, preparing food or using any tents or shelter or other structure or vehicle for sleeping or doing any digging or earth breaking. The above listed activities constitute camping WHEN IT REASONABLY APPEARS, IN LIGHT OF ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THAT THE PARTICIPANTS, IN CONDUCTING THESE ACTIVITIES ARE IN FACT USING THE AREA _ A LIVING ACCOMMODATION ****" Motion For Summary Reversal, pages 3 and 4 (EMPHASIS ADDED) NOTE: "activities" is in the plural.

There is no indication from Mr. Bates' "Statement Of The


Case (Motion For Summary Reversal, pages 2, 3)," 1/ or anywhere else in the record, that any of the appellees used any shelter, stored any property, made any fires, did any digging, prepared food, or engaged in any combination of activities which might reasonably constitute "living accommodations."

Mr. Bates tries to make something from nothing through the specious claim that "(b)y the District Court's reasoning other facilitative conduct that might assist appellees in conducting their vigil, such as cooking meals, erecting shelters, or digging latrines would also be protected as a free exercise of religion." Motion For Summary Reversal, page 23.

Ms. Chapman admitted that the Government had "no interest per se in preventing any of these defendants from sleeping in the park." Tr., page 49. Mr. Bates adds nothing to alter that admission, and the record gives not the slightest corroboration to the fantastic notion that the District Court would condone "digging latrines," "erecting shelters," or any other " impacts which the area could not sustain."

Stare Decisis in this District has noted my relationship with the Government as regards the issue of my vigil and my continuing efforts to conform my ritual behavior to the ever shifting regulatory burdens levied against it. 2/

1/ For the record I dispute the factual accuracy of the representations made in Mr. Bates' "Statement Of the Case."

2/ "(H)asn't it been one of those things where he gets arrested today for doing 'X' conduct, and then he goes back out and he does 'X minus Y' conduct, right? And he gets arrested. And then he goes back out and does 'X minus Y minus Z.' In other words, wherever you folks draw the line, he wants to stay on that line, wherever you want to draw the line." Judge Bryant USA v. Thomas CR 83-358, July 5, 1983, transcript p. 6-7.


Thomas v. USA, USDC C.A. 84-3552 is an action presently pending before U.S. District Court Judge Louis Oberdorfer which seeks relief from, among other claims, Government interference with appellee's "right(s) to believe as (his) fundamental religious tenet that it is better to suffer harm than to inflict harm on others, strive to embody this fundamental religious tenet in (his) li(fe), refuse (his) services to any government, corporation, organization, policy, theology, ideology, or genocidal scheme which threatens the property of (his) Creator, live as (a) penniless peace activist, exercise the option of devoting (his) li(fe) to the service of Truth, Justice, and Freedom, (and) harmlessly remain in a public park as long as they please." SEE, Defendant's Exhibit 20, paragraphs (c), (d), (f), (g), (h), and (i). Defendant's Exhibit 20 is a Proposed Writ of Mandamus originally filed on October 19, 1985, in conjunction with the Amended Complaint in Thomas v. USA, USDC CA 84-3552, and attached to Defendant's Response To The Government's Motion To Reconsider, filed in this matter on May 12, 1987.

Another of Mr. Bates' more egregious remarks is that "(f)or Thomas now to assert that he violated the anti-camping regulation because of an 'Act Of God' that occurred in 1974, strains credulity." Motion For Summary Reversal, page 16, footnote 12. 3/

Since Mr. Bates had been the attorney of record in Thomas v. USA for eleven months when the proposed Writ of Mandamus was

3/ Government counsel points out that I have been convicted of "camping" on several (3) occasions. However he neglects to mention that, on far more numerous occasions (10), "camping" charges against me have been dropped, or resulted in acquittals.


filed on October 19, 1985, and he continued in that position for at least six months after that document was filed, unless he is utterly incompetent, or suffering from amnesia, it is perfectly incredible to imagine that appellee's assertion of religious motivation should suddenly strain Mr. Bates' personal credulity.

There is not even an indication in the record of this case that I was sleeping, and I deny that I was. However even if I were sleeping, that would not "reasonably" be enough to constitute "living accommodations." Mr. Bates relies heavily on Clark v. CCNV, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). e.g. Motion For Summary Reversal, pages 12, 13, 22, 23, 24, 26. I believe his reliance on that case is obviously misplaced. In CCNV this Court noted that:

"In the unusual circumstances of an individual protector's round-the-clock vigil in Lafayette Park, unavoidable sleeping 'must be taken to be sufficiently expressive in nature to implicate First Amendment scrutiny in the first instance." CCNV v. Watt, USDC App. No. 82-2445, decided March 9, 1983, page 5, quoting United States v. Abney, 534 F.2d 985.

Moreover the Supreme Court held:

"We need not disagree with the view of the Court of Appeals that sleeping in the context of a demonstration is expressive activity which is protected to some extent by the First Amendment." Clark v. CCNV, Slip Opinion, filed June 26, 1984, page 3.

With respect to sleeping this Circuit has discerned that:

"The *** apparent distinction between the sleeping in the veterans' demonstration and the sleeping proposed by CCNV is that the veterans slept on the ground, without any shelter. According to the Park Service's interpretation of the new regulations, one's participation in a demonstration as a sleeper becomes impermissible 'camping' when it is done within any temporary structure erected as part of the demonstration." CCNV v. Watt, USDC App. No. 82-2445, decided March 9, 1983, page 5.

There is not a whisper of evidence anywhere which would


support an allegation that I ever slept in any structure, temporary or otherwise, during the course of my better than six-year--old vigil.

Mr. Bates ignores the fact that on December 22, 1986 the temperature in Lafayette Park was below freezing, yet presumes:

"(s)leeping in the park might be more convenient for appellees, but the First Amendment does not require the public to furnish demonstrators with facilities and support services designed to maximize the effectiveness of their protest." Motion For Summary Reversal, page 22.

There is absolutely no indication anywhere in the record that I have asked for, or that the public has furnished me or any of the other appellees, with facilities or support services. Mr. Bates gives absolutely no indication as to what "sleeping in the park might be more convenient" than, but I can assure the Court that remaining in the Park during the course of a round-the-clock vigil such as mine is uncomfortable, torturous, demanding, a matter of considerable self-sacrifice, and much less enjoyable than many other things which I am perfectly capable of doing were I to turn my back on my religious practices and principles, and devote my life to the pursuit of "convenience."

The Government is cognizant of the facts that:

"the regulations specifically authorize holding 'demonstrations,' 'vigils,' 'religious services,' or other 'forms of conduct which involve the communication or expression of views or grievances engaged in by one or more persons *** in Lafayette Park. 36 CFR Section 7.96 (g). A permit is not required if twenty-five persons or less are involved. 36 CFR Section 7.96 (g)(2)(i). Lafayette Park is not closed at night, and the regulations interpose no bar to an around-the-clock demonstration." Motion For Summary Reversal, page 4.

On the one hand it seems Mr. Bates is bent on creating the illusion that "camping, according to Thomas, is 'expressive action' related to his vigil." Motion For Summary Reversal, page 6.


Mounted on this illusion Mr. Bates utters the factually accurate, albeit wholly inappropriate non-sequiter: "appellees have not claimed that camping in the park is part of their religion." Motion For Summary Reversal, page 19.

Thomas has made a clear distinction between "camping" (i.e. using an area for living accommodation purposes), which he is not doing, and a "vigil," which he is doing as part of a materially inoffensive, socially beneficial religious practice or ritual. SEE, Thomas' Motion To Dismiss By Reason Of An Act Of God, page 2, pare. 5. Clearly Mr. Bates relies on semantics.

"(T)he terrible one is brought to nought, and the scorner is consumed, and all that watch for iniquity are cut off; that make a man an offender for a word, and lay a snare for him that reproveth in the gate, and turn aside the just for a thing of nought." Isaiah 29: 20, 21.

Quite reasonably and practically Judge Richey stated that he could "conceive of no way in which defendants could remain in Lafayette Park for long-term vigils without sleeping." Opinion of Charles R. Richey, filed May 26, 1987, page 5, Appellant's Exhibit 2.

On the other hand counsel for appellants correctly concedes that "the act of sleeping outdoors might in conjunction with a religiously dictated vow of poverty, have some conceivable religious connotation ..." Motion For Summary Reversal, page 19. Mr. Bates goes on to incorrectly conclude that "no such showing has been made here." (Ibid.) The record proves otherwise. COMPARE Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In Support Of Defendant Thomas' Motion To Proffer Evidence In Support Of A Defense Of Necessity, page 4, pare. 18, see also, Tr., page 41.

To me it seems indisputable that Judge Richey acted


rationally, responsibly, and in consonance with the entire record of the case.

"You have filed a series of motions, and I have to consider each and every word you have put forth, *** the Court does not take this matter lightly, any of these matters lightly." Tr., page 22.

Regrettably I do not believe that the same may be said for the Government or its various counsel. If Mr. Bates' representa-tion that "appellees' beliefs, as best they can be gleaned from an inadequate record, appear to be fundamentally political" (Mo-tion For Summary Reversal, page 18) is not to be taken as an example of outright deception then it would seem that he hasn't taken this matter seriously enough to read the record carefully.

"Thomas says there's only one reason he bothers to talk to other people; to provoke them into thinking about the existence of God, 'because if they believe there is no justice beyond what we can see in one lifetime, then the rule of the earth will continue to be Might is Right -and it isn't'." Boston Globe, August 27, 1981. Filed April 15, 1987 as Defendant's Exhibit 6.

I am not and never have been associated with any political party or ideology. On the other hand I have long been a follower of Jesus Christ and other prophets. While it is true that I devote a great deal of my time to discussion of nuclear weapons that discussion focuses on religious ("thou shalt not kill," "do unto others as you would have others do unto you," "love your enemies," etc.) rather than political issues.

"As the society around (Thomas) has become more populous, urban, industrialized, (militarized) and complex, particularly in this century, government regulation of human affairs has correspondingly become more detailed and pervasive. (Thomas') mode of life has thus come into - conflict increasingly with requirements of contemporary society exerting a hydraulic insistence on conformity to the majoritarian standards.... As the record so strongly shows, the values and programs of the modern (military/industrial complex) are in sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of


life mandated by (Thomas') religion." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 217 (1971), (parenthesis added).

Also citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, Mr. Bates pretends that my actions in maintaining a vigil are, in some unspecified manner, similar to Thoreau's isolation at Walden Pond. Nothing could be further from reality. Even though, to further my own pleasure, comfort, and convenience, I might like to isolate myself from society it is absurd to suggest that I have done so. The very fact that I have not done so, and have instead chosen to proselytize to a culture which seems to me rather uncivilized, bespeaks my devotion to a Higher Power. Again, if I were pursuing convenience, enjoyment or "philosophical and personal rather than religious" ends, I would not be sacrificing my life on a ritual twenty-four hour basis to the practice of conveying a message which I sincerely believe God has directed me to communicate.

"Plainly a community may not suppress ... the dissemination of views because they are unpopular, annoying or distasteful. If that device were ever sanctioned, there would have been forged a ready instrument for the suppression of the faith which any minority cherishes, but which does not happen to be in favor. This would be a complete repudiation of the philosophy of the Bill of Rights." Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 US 105, 117 (1943).

Less like Thoreau, my own situation is more analogous to that of Jonah who, believing the Ninevites to be beyond redemption, had no personal desire to go to Ninevah. SEE Second Declaration Of Defendant William Thomas, filed April 21, 1987, pare. 9-16. However once he found himself in Ninevah against his will Jonah proceeded to do as God had commanded by urging the people to repentance. SEE Jonah, chapter 3; see also Eziekel, 2:3-8; 3:14-21.

Another Biblical precedent is found in the story of


Shadrack, Meshack, and Abednego. SEE Daniel, chapter 3.

"(N)ot only is it apparent that (defendant's prosecution and potential punishment) derive solely from the practice of (his) religion, but the pressure upon (him) to forego that practice is unmistakable." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 US at 404 (parentheses substituting).

"In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may seem the rankest of error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of view the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are prominent in church or state.... But the people of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy." Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 310 (1939).

There are other historical examples for precedents which highlight the religious nature of my motives and actions, e.g.:

"At last I began to understand the justice of God as *** 'the just man shall live by faith'." SEE, New Encyclopedia Britannica, 1987, volume 23, page 366, Martin Luther. COMPARE, Second Declaration Of Defendant William Thomas, pare. 9-11.

Like myself Luther was a protestant, and his protest began on an individual level. Although the technological setting of today has changed considerably from that with which Luther dealt in the 16th century, I believe that I am addressing the same principles which Luther confronted in the form of Indulgences.

"Indulgences were the commutation for money of part of the temporal penalty due for sin," and have been "called a theolog-ical weakness of the age." New Encyclopedia Britannica, 1987, volume 23, page 366. Likewise, I believe, nuclear weapons betray the most pressing "theological weakness" of the present age. On the false theory that such murderous purchases are necessary to "protect freedom of religion," and avoid the "temporal penalty" of competing economic theories (e.g. "communism") "for money,"


citizens of the United States purchase demonic devices which could conceivably murder every human being on the face of the planet. (SEE, Motion Of Defendant Thomas to Proffer Evidence In Support Of A Defense Of Necessity, page 4, pare. 15.)

"Luther drew up the Ninety-five Theses, 'for the purpose of eliciting truth,' and fastened them on the door of All Saints Church, Wittenberg, on October 31, 1517 **** These were tentative opinions, about some of which Luther himself was not committed **** But they did stress the spiritual, inward character of the Christian religion, and the first thesis, which claimed that repentance involved the whole life of the Christian man *** showed the author's intention. The closing section attacked the false peace, that 'security,' which as a young lecturer Luther had so often attacked, of those who thought of divine grace as something cheaply acquired and who refused to recognize that to be a Christian involved embracing the cross and entering heaven through tribulation." Encyclopedia Britannica, vol. 23, page 367. (COMPARE, Defendant's Exhibit 10, Statement of William Thomas, December 25, 1987, filed April 15, 1987.)
"Luther deplored the use of violence, for the Word of God must be the agent of reform. He believed that revolt could not take place without destruction and the shedding of innocent blood; that the real idols are in the hearts **** Moreover, the pace of reform must take into account the unconverted, weaker brethren. From that time onward Luther fought a war on two fronts, against the Catholics, and against those whom he lumped together as 'fanatic 'fanatics'."'.. Ibid, page 369.

The "war" I fight today, sitting passively in Lafayette Park, is on one front against the electronic evangelicals, who refuse to "take into account the unconverted. weaker brethren," but would prefer to blast them into eternity so that they themselves need not "embrace the cross and enter heaven through tribulation," and secondly against the "peace through strength" fanatics, who are unwilling to "live by faith," but who are willing and preparing for wholesale "destruction and the shedding of innocent blood" on an unprecedented scale.

The Government professes an ardent interest in:

"maintaining the parks in the heart of our Capital in an attractive and intact condition, readily available to the


millions of people who wish to see and enjoy them by their presence." Motion For Summary Reversal, page 24.

There is not a jot of evidence that the exercise of my sincere religious belief through my continuous presence has in any way detracted from the attractive or intact condition of any parks in the heart of the Capital, at least not to any greater degree than would the presence of any other human who was present in one of those parks. Also there is nothing to indicate that I should be any less privileged than the other millions of people who wish to see and enjoy the parks by their presence.

"(I)t must be noted that petitioner's presence was unquestionably lawful. It was a public facility, open to the public **** But there is another and sharper answer which is called for. We are here dealing with an aspect of a basic Constitutional right -- the right under the First and Fourteenth Amendments guaranteeing freedom of speech and of assembly and freedom to petition the Government for a redress of grievances **** As this Court has repeatedly stated, these rights are not confined to verbal expression. They embrace appropriate types of action which certainly include the right in a peaceable and orderly manner to protest by silent and reproachful presence in a place where the protestant has every right to be." Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1961).

Appellant concedes that my vigil would be "entitled to protection as an exercise of speech." Motion For Summary Reversal, page 21. While it may be true that "'religiously motivated' speech, as opposed to 'politically motivated' speech, is not entitled to any extra First Amendment protection" (ibid, page 25), the issue here is not merely one of speech, but additionally one of religious practice which threatens no legitimate Government interest.

"(T)he referee held that Thomas 'quit due to his religious convictions.' ***
"The Indiana Supreme court apparently took a different view of the record. It concluded that 'although the claimant's reasons for quitting were described as religious, it was unclear what his belief was' **** In that court's


view, Thomas had made a merely 'personal philosophical choice rather than a religious choice'." Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 714 (1981).

"In reaching its conclusion, the Indiana court seems to have placed considerable reliance on the facts that Thomas was 'struggling' with his beliefs and that he was not able to 'articulate' his belief precisely.***" Ibid, page 715.
"We see, therefore, that Thomas drew a line, and it is not for us to say that the line he drew was an unreasonable one. Courts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs because the believer admits that he is 'struggling' with his position or because his beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and precision that a more sophisticated person might employ.
"The Indiana court also appears to have given significant weight to the fact that another Jehovah's Witness had no scruples about working on tank turrets; for that other Witness at least, such work was 'scripturally' acceptable. Intrafaith differences of that kind are not uncommon among followers of a particular creed, and the judicial process is singularly ill equipped to resolve such differences in relation to the Religion Clauses.***" Ibid.
"In a variety of ways we have said that '[a} regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion. Wisconsin _ Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220, Cf. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)." Thomas v. Review Board, page 717.

There is no reason for this Court to second guess the "sin-cerity of my religious beliefs," nor, in the plain absence of any showing from the Government, should this Court second guess a non-existent "compelling governmental interest."

Therefore appellee Thomas humbly submits that this Court is bound by reason, the principles of justice, stare decisis, and the clarity of the merits of appellee's claim to deny appellant's Motion For Summary Reversal, and grant appellee's Motion For Summary Affirmance.

Respectfully submitted,

(signed W. Thomas)
William Thomas, appellee, pro se
1440 N Street NW #410
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 462-0757



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       Appellant,

       versus             (D.C. App. No. 87-3041)

SCOTT M. GALINDEZ                               Appellee,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA                        Appellant,

       versus             (D.C. App. No. 87-3042)

STEPHEN SEMPLE,                                 Appellee,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       Appellant,

       versus             (D.C. App. No. 87-3043)

WILLIAM THOMAS,                                 Appellee,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       Appellant,

       versus             (D.C. App. No. 87-3044)

PHILLIP JOSEPH,                                 Appellee,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       Appellant,

       versus             (D.C. App. No. 87-3045)

ELLEN THOMAS,                                   Appellee,


I, William Thomas, hereby certify that, this 3rd day of August, 1987, I served a copy of the foregoing OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY REVERSAL AND APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE by hand delivering it to the Office of the Clerk of the U.S. District Court and requesting that it be placed in the U.S. Attorney's box for Mr. John D. Bates.

(signed W.Thomas)