UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES            )
                         )
     versus              )           CRIMINAL NUMBER 87-62
                         )           Judge Charles Richey
WILLIAM THOMAS           )

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

Pursuant to the Fed. R. Cr.. P. defendant William Thomas respectfully moves this court to dismiss the Information in this case on the theory that defendant's prosecution in this
matter represents a malicious abuse of process and the judicial system for the purpose of causing defendant unwarranted injury, and disrupting or terminating the socially beneficial, symbolic expression of defendant's opinions.

This premise is more fully expounded in the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities.

Respectfully submitted this 15th day of April, 1987.

//s// w.thomas
William Thomas, Defendant, Pro Se
1440 N Street NW, #410,
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 462-0757



MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

BACKGOUND

1.Thomas incorporates by reference defendant ' s Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Offense, filed March 13, 1987; Defendant's Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, filed at the Motions hearing held before J. Richey on March 25, 1987; defendant Thomas' Motion to Dismiss For Intentional Post Facto Enforcement, and Defendant's Exhibits 4 thru 9, attached thereto, all filed this date; and further states:

FACTS

2. Thomas believes that the CFR citation which generated the Information and resulted in this prosecution is part of a continuing pattern of abuse of process and malicious prosecution carried on by various agents and agencies of the Government against himself and his associates, or those thought by the Government to be his associates, because of opposition to Thomas' message, or his method of conveying that message (SEE Defendants' Exhibit 10 hereto).

3. This citation is not even the latest link in a long, tortuous chain of police - communicator clashes which can clearly be traced back at-least as far as December 25, 1981 (SEE Defendants' Exhibit 11 hereto). Furthermore, since December 22, 1986 Thomas has received at least two additional citations charging "camping."

4. At an evidentiary hearing Thomas can present testimony and evidence to support his allegations of administrative opposi-


tion to the content of his message, official dislike for Thomas', method of communication, and that various agents of the Government have publicly voiced the desire to disrupt or punish this defendant because of his expressive activities, and have publicly and unjustifiably defamed and misrepresented this defendant's socially beneficial symbolic behavior.

5. Stare Decisis is not entirely silent in regard to Thomas' attempts to maintain a civilized manner of social intercourse e.g.:

THE COURT (Judge William B. Bryant): "Let me ask you this. . . hasn't it been one of those things where he gets arrested today for doing 'X' conduct, and then he goes back out and he does 'X minus Y' conduct, right? And he gets arrested. And then he goes back out and does 'X minus Y minus Z.' In other words, wherever you folks draw the line, he wants to stay on that line, wherever you want to draw the line." (Judge Bryant USA v. Thomas CR 83-358, July 5, 1983, transcript p. 6-7.)

6. Further, in granting defendant's MJOA, Federal District Court Judge Joyce Hans Green found that:

"Officer Haynes ... while he spoke with precision, and exactitude, and painstaking care, had selective memory ... and unable to remember even testimony that he clearly specifically had given in the court hours earlier, failed to remember making, on some occasions, earlier arrests of the defendants, contradicted representations of the manner in which he inventoried the property....
"Now, the Court's ruling today does not mean that ... it has ... become unnecessary ... to reach the several most significant constitutional questions that someday, someway, with perhaps other defendants, perhaps the same will be addressed.
"To continue with this trial would transform the trial from a prosecution into a persecution, and accordingly the respective motions for judgment of acquittal are as to each of the defendants granted." (USA v. Thomas, USDC 84-255, September 25, 1984 transcript at 1025).

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ARGUMENT

7. It is by no means inconceivable to believe that certain agents and agencies of the Government have joined in consort with the intent and for the purpose of causing defendant's imprisonment, under color of regulation, because of political opposition to the content of defendant's protected expressions of opinion on a topic of universal public concern, and/or official or personal animosity to the graphic method of defendant's expression.

8. "The decision to prosecute may not be 'deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification,' ... including the exercise of protected statutory and constitutional rights." Wayte v. United States, 105 US Se Ct. 1524, 1531 (1985), quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, (19783, quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).

9. Why was Thomas suddenly singled out for this questionable prosecution when the activity in which he had been engaged was precisely the same activity he had regularly practiced, without harm, for nearly six years? "(D)ifferential treatment, unless justified by some special characteristic ... suggests that the goal of the regulat(ory enforcement) is not unrelated to suppression of expression, and such a goal is presumptively unconstitutional." Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minn. Comer Of Rev., 103 S. Ct. 1365, 1372 (1983); see Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 520-21 (1981)._

10. Thomas can provide evidence of selective enforcement, and the discriminatory purpose behind it must be inferred from

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the actions taken against him. There is no reason other than an intent to discriminate that can account for the Government's arbitrary and capricious enforcement against Thomas.

11. A person "may be liable either for initiating or for continuing _ criminal prosecution without probable cause" (emphasis in original). See Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116 (1986) (harassment and uttering false reports actionable; Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213 (3rd Cir. 1977); Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 630 (7th Cir. 1979).

12. It is the duty of this Court to protect individuals within the legal jurisdiction of the Constitution of the United States of America for the manner of insidious conduct which, unchecked, would stifle individual freedom and personal excellence under color of totalitarian police state enforcement tactics.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests this Court to dismiss the Information on the ground that it appears that the regulation has been maliciously applied against Thomas without furthering any substantial Government interest, or redressing any personal or public damage.

Respectfully submitted this 15th day April, 1987.

//s// w.thomas
William Thomas, Pro Se
1440 N Street NW, #410,
Washington, DC 20005
202) 462-3542

 

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