UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES )
versus ) CRIMINAL NUMBER 87-62
) Judge Charles Richey
WILLIAM THOMAS )
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
Pursuant to the Fed. R. Cr.. P. defendant William Thomas
respectfully moves this court to dismiss the Information in this
case on the theory that defendant's prosecution in this
matter represents a malicious abuse of process and the judicial
system for the purpose of causing defendant unwarranted injury,
and disrupting or terminating the socially beneficial, symbolic
expression of defendant's opinions.
This premise is more fully expounded in the accompanying
Memorandum of Points and Authorities.
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of April, 1987.
William Thomas, Defendant, Pro Se
1440 N Street NW, #410,
Washington, DC 20005
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
1.Thomas incorporates by reference defendant ' s Motion
To Dismiss For Lack Of Offense, filed March 13, 1987; Defendant's
Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, filed at the Motions hearing held before
J. Richey on March 25, 1987; defendant Thomas' Motion to Dismiss
For Intentional Post Facto Enforcement, and Defendant's Exhibits
4 thru 9, attached thereto, all filed this date; and further states:
2. Thomas believes that the CFR citation which generated
the Information and resulted in this prosecution is part of a
continuing pattern of abuse of process and malicious prosecution
carried on by various agents and agencies of the Government against
himself and his associates, or those thought by the Government
to be his associates, because of opposition to Thomas' message,
or his method of conveying that message (SEE Defendants' Exhibit
3. This citation is not even the latest link in a long,
tortuous chain of police - communicator clashes which can clearly
be traced back at-least as far as December 25, 1981 (SEE Defendants'
Exhibit 11 hereto). Furthermore, since December 22, 1986 Thomas
has received at least two additional citations charging "camping."
4. At an evidentiary hearing Thomas can present testimony
and evidence to support his allegations of administrative opposi-
tion to the content of his message, official dislike for Thomas',
method of communication, and that various agents of the Government
have publicly voiced the desire to disrupt or punish this defendant
because of his expressive activities, and have publicly and unjustifiably
defamed and misrepresented this defendant's socially beneficial
5. Stare Decisis is not entirely silent in regard to Thomas'
attempts to maintain a civilized manner of social intercourse
THE COURT (Judge William B. Bryant): "Let me ask
you this. . . hasn't it been one of those things where he gets
arrested today for doing 'X' conduct, and then he goes back out
and he does 'X minus Y' conduct, right? And he gets arrested.
And then he goes back out and does 'X minus Y minus Z.' In other
words, wherever you folks draw the line, he wants to stay on
that line, wherever you want to draw the line." (Judge Bryant
USA v. Thomas CR 83-358, July 5, 1983, transcript p. 6-7.)
6. Further, in granting defendant's MJOA, Federal District
Court Judge Joyce Hans Green found that:
"Officer Haynes ... while he spoke with precision,
and exactitude, and painstaking care, had selective memory ...
and unable to remember even testimony that he clearly specifically
had given in the court hours earlier, failed to remember making,
on some occasions, earlier arrests of the defendants, contradicted
representations of the manner in which he inventoried the property....
"Now, the Court's ruling today does not mean that ...
it has ... become unnecessary ... to reach the several most significant
constitutional questions that someday, someway, with perhaps
other defendants, perhaps the same will be addressed.
"To continue with this trial would transform the trial
from a prosecution into a persecution, and accordingly the respective
motions for judgment of acquittal are as to each of the defendants
granted." (USA v. Thomas, USDC 84-255, September 25, 1984
transcript at 1025).
7. It is by no means inconceivable to believe that certain
agents and agencies of the Government have joined in consort with
the intent and for the purpose of causing defendant's imprisonment,
under color of regulation, because of political opposition to
the content of defendant's protected expressions of opinion on
a topic of universal public concern, and/or official or personal
animosity to the graphic method of defendant's expression.
8. "The decision to prosecute may not be 'deliberately
based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or
other arbitrary classification,' ... including the exercise of
protected statutory and constitutional rights." Wayte
v. United States, 105 US Se Ct. 1524, 1531 (1985), quoting
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, (19783, quoting
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
9. Why was Thomas suddenly singled out for this questionable
prosecution when the activity in which he had been engaged was
precisely the same activity he had regularly practiced, without
harm, for nearly six years? "(D)ifferential treatment, unless
justified by some special characteristic ... suggests that the
goal of the regulat(ory enforcement) is not unrelated to suppression
of expression, and such a goal is presumptively unconstitutional."
Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minn. Comer Of Rev.,
103 S. Ct. 1365, 1372 (1983); see Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego,
453 U.S. 490, 520-21 (1981)._
10. Thomas can provide evidence of selective enforcement,
and the discriminatory purpose behind it must be inferred from
the actions taken against him. There is no reason other than
an intent to discriminate that can account for the Government's
arbitrary and capricious enforcement against Thomas.
11. A person "may be liable either for initiating
or for continuing _ criminal prosecution without probable cause"
(emphasis in original). See Carter v. District of Columbia,
795 F.2d 116 (1986) (harassment and uttering false reports actionable;
Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213 (3rd Cir. 1977); Hampton
v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 630 (7th Cir. 1979).
12. It is the duty of this Court to protect individuals
within the legal jurisdiction of the Constitution of the United
States of America for the manner of insidious conduct which, unchecked,
would stifle individual freedom and personal excellence under
color of totalitarian police state enforcement tactics.
WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests this Court to
dismiss the Information on the ground that it appears that the
regulation has been maliciously applied against Thomas without
furthering any substantial Government interest, or redressing
any personal or public damage.
Respectfully submitted this 15th day April, 1987.
William Thomas, Pro Se
1440 N Street NW, #410,
Washington, DC 20005