THOMAS v. REAGAN
USDC Cr. No. 84-3552
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
WILLIAM THOMAS, et al
Plaintiff Pro Se
versus CA 84-3552
Judge Louis Oberdorfer
UNITED STATES, et al Magistrate Arthur Burnett
Defendants
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST ERRATA
TO RESTATEMENT OF CLAIM FILED JULY 21, 1986
"... To save time and energy for all parties, rather than
charging all official participants for their part in depriving
plaintiff of his civil rights, plaintiff is allowing them to be
impeached herein by their own actions and words, and is laying
those actions and words at the feet of the agencies with which the
individual employees named herein are employed as non-defendant
official representatives. These unfortunates may continue, at
whatever risk to their immortal souls, as unindicted pawns
implementing the treasonous dictates of defendants, under color of
regulation and/or tradtions, customs, rituals, or simply to 'pick
up a paycheck.' (See Neuremberg Trial Decisions, paraphrased:
'Just following orders does not excuse moral irresponsibility.')"
(Complaint filed November 21, 1984, page 6, para. 16; list of
defendants and cast of unindicted pawns pages 7-8.)
"This action seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against
the manner in which the Government promulgated or enforces against
plaintiff the amendments to 36 CFR Sections 50.27 and 36 CFR
50.19(e)(9)(l0) ("the regulations") issued by defendant Watt and
official Arnett on June 4, 1982 and June 17, 1983 respectively, and
enforced by all defendants. Plaintiff has been arrested nineteen
(19) times under color of 36 CFR 50.27 (prior to June 4, 1982,
known as '50.5') and 36 CFR 50.19, and four (4) times under color
of District of Columbia Code ('DCC') regulations, with the intent
to restrict his rights to demonstrate on the public sidewalk in
front of the White House. By promulgating and/or enforcing the
regulations and arresting plaintiff, defendants have violated
plaintiff's First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendment rights, 42
USC Sections 1983 and 1985(3), and the Administrative Procedure
Act." (Complaint, filed November 21, 1984, p. 9, para. 18.)
"Defendant Captain Canfield, both by reason of office with the
District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department and personally,
has been involved in deprivation of plaintiff's civil liberties, in
violation of 42 USC 1983, 42 USC 1985, and 18 USC 2381. While
Captain Canfield is the person being charged for these violations,
plaintiff wishes to stress that the responsibility for his official
actions is shared by all his superior officers, the rules and
regulations they enforce, and the entire infrastructure of the
police state. (See paragraphs 14, 59, 63, 64, 66.)" (Complaint p.
114-115, para. 151.)
"Prohibiting plaintiff from reaching his audience, the public,
on the sidewalk was both a combination prior/post restraint (Near
v. Minnesota, 283 US 697 (l931)), and an abridgement of his right
to communicate with others through the written, spoken, and/or
symbolic word (Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 US 141 (1943);
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 US 444 (1938)). Since most persons on the
sidwalk and in the park are content with a society which values
money above the communication of individual opinion, plaintiff's
reproacheful presence and signs critical of genocidal weapons
expressed an individualopinion in a manner that left potential
recipients free to accept, investigate, or ignore during the course
of their thoroughfare of a public park. Deprivation of plaintiff's
First Amendment Right to communicate in a nonviolent, effective,
and unobtrusive manner constitutes irreparable injury. (Elrod v.
Burns, 427 F2d, 347, 373 (1976); A Quaker Action Group v. Hickel,
421 F2d 1111, 1116 (DCCir 1969).)" (Complaint page 118-119, para.
161.)
"That the actions of the defendants deprived plaintiff's
rights is beyond dispute. How can an official sworn to uphold the
Constitution rely on force of arms to prevent an individual from
having signs larger than 'hand held' when no such regulatory
prohibition exists? How can one sign stand in a public park,
protected by the First Amendment, every day for one entire winter,
and without explanation suddenly become a 'structure' and, thereby,
a component of criminal activity? Defendants' unreasonable
interference with plaintiff's rights is not founded on a legitimate
restriction of the manner, place, or time of expression but rather
reveals a wholesale attack on traditional and time-honored rights
secured in the Constitution and Bill of Rights, and designed to
protect against despotic government." (Complaint page 119, para.
162.)
"Accordance of Constitutional permissibility to regulations
born of the desire to restrict the expressive behavior of social
criticism is blasphemy against the "self-evident truths" of the
Declaration of Independence and the most fundamental principles of
the Constitution, if not treason." (Complaint para. 163.)
"Having forced plaintiff, under color of regulations,
nonexistent 'regulations,' tradition, customs, ritual, and force of
arms off the White House sidewalk and into the untenable and
perfectly unreasonable position of choosing to move his signs out
of the District of Columbia or going to jail, defendants and/or
official representatives on March 11, 1983, arrested plaintiff on
a charge of 'arson.' Regardless of whether plaintiff (who wanted
the sign on the sidewalk), defendant and/or official
representative(s) (who wanted the sign off the sidewalk), or
spontaneous combustion was responsible for igniting the sign, to
arrest plaintiff constituted an illegal arrest, by virtue of the
fact that other demonstrators, 'under the gaze of U.S. Park Police
officials, including supervisory personnel' (ERA v. Watt, Judge
Bryant Memorandum Opinion June 1984), have burnt effigies on the
White House sidewalk without being subject to arrest. (See also
USA v. Thomas May 1983 Officer Jones transcript.)" (Complaint
para. 164.)
"The 'arson' arrest, in illustration of the entire chain of
events, was at best a classic example of selective enforcement or,
at worst, part of a concerted effort to bring false criminal
charges against plaintiff, in either case violating plaintiff's
First, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendment rights." (Complaint,
para. 166.)
"The commission of the actions by defendant(s) Canfield, ...
Merillat, and other official representatives as depicted on March
11, l983 (see Complaint paragraphs 60-66) represents a much larger
concerted action, involving numerous Government officials, over a
period spanning three years and five months. The promulgation of
36 CFR 50.27 and 50.19(e)(9)(10) through defendants together with
'White House Counse,' Ass.Sols Bangert and Robbins (DOI), and other
official representatives, and reflected in the creation of the Ad
Hoc White House Liaison Committee on President's Park Signs, had
the obvious intent of coloring plaintiff's Consitutionally
protected behavior as 'criminal activity.'" (Complaint para. 168.)
"...(T)he incident of October 10, 1984 (see Complaint
paragraph 117) is an undisputable violation of his Fourth Amendment
right in that it ... resulted in loss to plaintiff of a vehicle
(under permit from the National Park Service) used to mount a
public address system, through unlawful seizure and criminal
destruction, and indicates that the defendants show no sign of
relenting in their totalitarian tactics to mute plaintiff's voice."
(Complaint para. 169.)
"The thrust of plaintiff's (first) three years and five months
of living constantly exposed, (in front of the White House), to the
elements of nature, a largely hostile public, mehcanistic
bureaucracy, and ruthless police agencies, has been to illustrate
a life of moral integrity at the expense of the accommodations
which the defendant Government provides to those individuals
willing to submit themselves to its objects. Defendant Government
has employed its regulation writers to mute plaintiff's message by
the expedient of defining his demonstration of life without
accommodations as 'living accommodations,' and by defining his
signs as 'structures.' (See USA v. Abney.)"
Respectfully submitted this _____ day of July, 1986.
____________________________________
William Thomas, Plaintiff Pro Se
1440 N Street NW, #410
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 462-3542
Case Listing --- Proposition One ---- Peace Park