In finding that NTEU properly could assert its claims
against the President in that case, however, the Court of Appeals
explained that, if an alternative defendant had been available,
the President should have been dismissed as a defendant:
It bears repeating that if the defendant were
any one other than the President of the
United States, there is little question but
that NTEU would be entitled to have a writ of
mandamus issue in this case. There is also
little doubt that if it were possible for
NTEU to enforce its rights by naming a
defendant additional to or in substitution of
the President, this Court would exercise its
discretion not to answer the question of
whether the President is subject to mandamus
by a federal court to perform a purely
ministerial duty.
492 F.2d at 606. [2]
[2 The Court nevertheless declined to issue a writ of mandamus
against the President, although it did issue a declaratory
judgment.]
5
A similar point had been made a year earlier in MinneSota
Chippewa Tribe v. Carlucci, 358 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1973), where
the Court determined that it should depart from the general rule
barring suit against the President. There, the Court found that
a section of the Indian Education Act required the President to
make appointments to the National Advisory Council on Indian
Education, and that the President neither had made those appoint-
ments nor had delegated his power to do so. Suit therefore was
permitted against the President, although the Court noted that
joinder of the President generally is unnecessary because complete
relief usually can be afforded against a subordinate government
official. 358 F. Supp. at 976.
The general rule, then, continues to be that the President of
the United States is subjected to jurisdiction as a civil defendant
only if complete relief can not be obtained by suing other parties.
"In other words, it is only when the President is uniquely able
to carry out the relief sought in the complaint that he must be
joined as a defendant." Native America Rights Fund v. President
Ronald Reagan, supra, slip op. at 2. Here, that general rule is
fully applicable, because the entirety of the declaratory and
injunctive relief sought by plaintiff, even if it were warranted,
can be obtained from the other defendants in this action.
Plaintiff simply seeks equitable relief declaring certain
federal regulations unconstitutional, overturning his various
convictions for violations of those laws, and enjoining the Park
Police, the Secret Service and the Metropolitan Police from any
further efforts to enforce such laws against him. All that relief
6
can be obtained against the other defendants, who include senior
Department of the Interior, National Park Service, United States
Park Police, United States Secret Service and District of Columbia
Metropolitan Police officials. President Reagan is simply not a
necessary defendant because he is not "uniquely able to carry out
the relief sought" in plaintiff's complaint. Accordingly, he
should be dismissed as a defendant in his official capacity. [3]
II. The President Is Absolutely Immune From Any
Claim Against Him In His Individual Capacity
Plaintiff also seeks money damages from all defendants
including President Reagan. As President of United States,
however, Mr. Reagan is absolutely immune from any suit against
him in his individual capacity for money damages or other relief.
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982). On that basis alone,
therefore, plaintiff's completely unsubstantiated, and indeed
frivolous, claim for money damages against President Reagan must
be dismissed at the outset. [4]
[3 One of plaintiff's claims is that President Reagan has
committed treason in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2381, a claim as to
which plaintiff seeks unspecified relief. We will not dignify
that absurd contention any more than to say that plaintiff has no
private right of action with respect to that criminal statute. A
private right of action may be implied under a criminal statute
only in the unique circumstance were there is a specific statutory
basis for inferring that a civil cause of action of some kind
lies in favor of someone. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,
316 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 79-80 (1975). There is; no
such basis in section 2381 or elsewhere in Title 18.]
[4 Moreover, and equally clearly, plaintiff fails to state a claim
for damages against President Reagan for alleged constitutional or
civil rights violations. Far more than the few general, elliptical
references in the complaint is necessary to state such a claim
under well-established pleading requirements. See, e.g., Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S, 800, 808, 817-18 (1982); Baker v. McCollan,
443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507-08
(1978); Lombard v. United States, 690 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1982).]
7
Conclusion
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, this motion should
be granted and the action against President Reagan in both his
official and individual capacities should be dismissed with
prejudice.
Respectfully submitted,
JOSEPH E. DIGENOVA
United States Attorney
ROYCE C. LAMBERTH
Assistant United States Attorney
JOHN D. BATES
Assistant United States Attorney
Case Listing --- Proposition One ---- Peace Park