Unless this complaint and (in Marcelino's case) human life are frivolous, some questions deserve sober thought: "Did or didn't Officer O'Neill assault Marcelino?" - "Was or wasn't Marcelino 'camping' in Lafayette Park on the morning he was killed?" As previously noted (Plaintiffs' First Motion for Sanctions, pgs. 13. 14), Mr. Robbins is the man to talk about with respect to enforcement of the "camping" regulation. Mr. Meyers' letter doesn't even mention "camping," so we can't even begin to pretend that the letter might substitute for testimony
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and cross examination. Camping aside, Mr. Meyers' letter also leaves big holes in the areas it tries to address.
In light of the position which defendants have placed us all in, they bear the taxing burden of having to come up with some well-established" (as applied to the instant matter) REGULATORY
"framework for analyzing a claim of qualified immunity by a federal official
'shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known'." Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, pg. 17,
citing, Hallow v. Fitzserald, 457 U.S. 800(1982).
Whether defendants' "conduct does (or does) not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights" is, in the case at bar, a question standing squarely upon a "well- established" framework for non-abusive enforcement of the perfectly valid REGULATIONS codified at 36 C.F.R 7.96(g) (5)(x)(B)(1)(2). For the Court's convenience a copy is attached.
The Court is urged not to forget it was alleged that defendants' intentions were malicious. E.g., Declaration of William Thomas in Support of the Complaint, para 18. [17] According to "the (same) law" which we are all "obliged to follow,"
"(A)n official would not receive qualified immunity if he 'knew or reasonably
should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official
responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff] or
if [the official] took the action with the malicious intention to cause a
deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury'." Hobson, id, 24, citing Wood
v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 at 322.
[17 Here plaintiffs meet the impermissible animus
requirement.]
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