Memorandum in support of Motion for Sanctions

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA


     William Thomas, et. al.       |          C.A. No. 94-2742
           Plaintiffs pro se,      |          Judge Charles R. Richey
                                   |
               v.                  |
                                   |
     The United States, et. al.    |
           Defendants.             |

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS THIRD MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS

INTRODUCTION

For the sake of entertaining the baseless claims contained in Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider Denial of the TRO ("Opp TRO") [1] we assume, without conceding,[2] Randolph Meyers actually wrote the January 20, 1995 letter that bears his name, [3] with maybe a little work-product assistance from Defendant Robbins, [4] and that it was intended for Thomas.

[1 "In applying for a temporary restraining order, plaintiff bears the burden of providing evidence demonstrating: (1) that he is likely to prevail on the merits; (2) that he will suffer 'immediate [irreparable] harm within the next ten days unless injunctive relief is granted'; (3) that the issuance of an injunction will not substantially harm the other parties; and (4) that the issuance of the injunction will not be adverse to the public interest. Optic-Electronic Corp. v. United States, 683 F.Supp. 269, 270 (D. D.C. 1987), (emphasis in original), citing Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission v. Holiday Tours. Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1977)." Opp. TRO. pg. 3, no argument, 13 lines. NOTE: number of lines included to facilitate collation and analyzation of arguments.]

[2 See. Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Randy Meyers' Letter of January 25, 1995, filed February 6, 1995.]

[3 For indications of encouragement or help from the U.S. Attorney, who may or may not be seeking an improper legal advantage, see Motion to Strike.]

[4 This very situation itself presents a prodigiously prejudicial problem for plaintiffs who alleged,
"(D)efendant Robbins and other defendants in supervisory capacity (i.e., Mr.
Meyers, who was not named in the complaint, but should have been) have placed
freedom of thought and expression, plaintiffs, the general public, and Marcelino
Cornel in particular, in danger by failing to properly oversee a well-armed
police force, although they knew, or should have known, of extra-legal conflicts by
their subordinates toward demonstrators and others in the Park." Complaint
Count, 6. SECOND PRONG OF TRO.

It is not entirely inconceivable, that the letter was written in concert with
defendant Robbins, who the letter is supposedly written "on behalf of," for
the joint purpose of attempting to hide shared culpability. Infra, 12-25.]

1

Plaintiffs submit that Defendants' Opposition is founded squarely on argument so poorly tethered to factual reality and existing law that the interests of truth, justice, freedom, and reasonable process combine to merit the imposition of Rule 11 Sanctions.

"(S)anctions may be imposed, if a reasonable inquiry discloses the ... motion ... is
(1) not well grounded in fact,
(2) not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument ... or
(3) interposed for any improper purpose...." Westmoreland v. CBS, 770 F.2d 1168, 1174.

Plaintiffs believe, as discussed below, that Defendants' Opposition raises enough questions to merit a hearing to determine whether sanctions are appropriate.