The Requirements for Temporary Relief

Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, defendants have acted without probable cause on repeated occasions to suppress the exercise of plaintiffs' constitutionally protected rights.

In light of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the plaintiffs have met the familiar standards for temporary relief set forth in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. PPC, 259 F.2d 921 (DC Cir. 1958) and WMATA v. Holiday Tours, 559 F.2d 841 (DC Cir. (1977). First, there is a likelihood that the plaintiffs


will prevail on the merits of the Complaint.

Second, if relief is not granted, plaintiffs will be irreparably injured in their efforts to exercise their freedom of expression free from continuing random, capricious, unjustifiable regulatory re-interpretation and enforcement. Suppression of First Amendment exercise has been held to constitute "irreparable injury," Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976), and to constitute "substantial money damages." City of Watseka v. Illinois Public Action Council, 796 F.2d 1559, Summarily Affirmed by the Supreme Court, slip opinion 86-631, January 27, 1987.

Third, the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order will not harm the defendants. It will simply maintain the status quo by continuing to allow individuals the opportunity to target visiting dignitaries with Constitutionally-protected messages, a situation which has produced no substantial ill effects to the Government since at least as early as June 3, 1981.