Qualified immunity is limited in scope to civil suit damages and is
inapplicable to claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. Harlow v.
FitzqeraId, 457 U.S. 800, 819 n.34 (1982) (qualified immunity applies "only to
suits for civil damases") (emphasis in original); Walker v. Jones, 733 F.2d
923, 933 n.15 (D.C. Cir.) (qualified immunity not a bar to claims for
injunctive relief), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984); Charles v. Kelly, 790
F. Supp. 344, 349 (D.D.C. 1992) (same). Similarly, the heightened
6
pleading standard that allegedly governs this suit applies only to the
Plaintiffs' claims for damages. See Smith v. Nixon, 807 F.2d 197, 200 (D.C.
Cir. 1986); Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 29-31 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985),
Thus, the Court finds that the Defendants' assertion in their Motion that
all claims against the three individual Defendants must be dismissed if the
Defendants prevail upon the arguments raised in their Motion is incorrect. If
the Court finds the Defendants' positions persuasive, the Defendants Richard
Robbins, Stephen O'Neill, and Andrew Keness will be relieved from liability
for damages, but cannot be dismissed as Defendants with respect to the
Plaintiffs' claims for declaratory and injunctive action by this Court.
II. BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM
AGAINST DEFENDANT "X" AND DEFENDANT ROBBINS WITH THE
SPECIFICITY REOUIRED BY LAW, ANY DAMAGE CLAIMS AGAINST
THOSE DEFENDANTS MUST BE DISMISSED.
This Circuit holds complaints alleging claims for damages based on
constitutional torts to a heightened standard of specificity. Hobson, 737 F.2d
at 29-31. Allegations that a defendant committed an unconstitutional tort need
not be extensive, but they must be ~sufficiently precise to put defendants on
notice of the nature of the claim." Id. at 29. Courts must dismiss vague,
conclusory, or general allegations as a matter of law. Id. at 30-31. The
policies underlying the heightened pleading standard are most compelling in
cases where, as here, the
7
claim is brought against public officials. Martin v. Malhovt, 830 F.2d 237,
257 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Thomas v. United States, 696 F. Supp. 702, 704 (D.D.C.
1988).
A. The Plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of
action against Defendant "X".
In the present action, the Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that an
unidentified Officer "X" in some way violated the Plaintiffs' constitutional
rights. The Court finds, however, that the Plaintiffs have failed to specify
in any way how Defendant "X" committed wrongdoing.
The Plaintiffs' only allegation in this regard is that Defendant "X"
"shot Marcelino Corniel on the White House sidewalk, December 20, 1994."
Amended Complaint, p. 2. The Court notes, however, that Mr. Corniel is not a
party to the present suit. The complaint only names William Thomas, Ellen
Thomas, and Concepcion Picciotto as Plaintiffs in the present case. Even
assuming arguendo that the Plaintiffs have standing to assert claims on behalf
of Mr. Corneil, the Plaintiffs have not indicated how Defendant "X" violated
Mr. Corniel's constitutional rights by shooting him. Indeed, the Plaintiffs
concede in their Complaint that Mr. Corniel "threatened Officer O'Neill with a
large knife" and that Officer O'Neill then called for backup officers
including Defendant "X". Amended Complaint, p. 5. These facts, however, may
suggest that Officer "X" acted with probable cause in responding to Mr.
Corneil, see Tennessee v. Crarner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)
8
(holding that it is reasonable for an officer to use deadly force when he or
she "has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious
physical harm, either to the officer or others"), but in any event do not
substantiate the Plaintiffs' assertion that Defendant "X" violated Mr.
Corneil's constitutional rights.
The Plaintiffs' failure to substantiate their claim that Mr. Corneil's
constitutional rights were abridged by Officer "X" precludes this Court from
considering claims against this Defendant. Hobson, 737 F.2d at 31. The Court
therefore finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to meet the heightened
pleading standard for their Bivens claim against Defendant "X~', and the suit
for damages against Defendant "X" must therefore be dismissed. In addition,
because Defendant "X" is not a party to the present suit, and because the
Plaintiffs have failed to assert a legal basis for presenting claims on Mr.
Corneil's behalf, the Court finds that any other claims against Defendant "X"
must also be dismissed.
B. The Plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of
action for damaqes against Defendant Richard
Robbins.
The Plaintiffs also claim that Defendant Richard Robbins committed
supervisory negligence [2] by failing to "properly oversee
[2 The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs actually seek to hold
Defendant Robbins liable based upon the theory of respondeat superior -- a
theory of liability which is not cognizable in this Circuit. See Haynesworth
v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Court finds, however,
that the Defendants have...cont.]
9
a well-armed police force, although [he] knew, or should have known, of
extra-legal conflicts by Chis] subordinates toward demonstrators and others in
the Park." Amended Complaint, p. 7.
To prevail upon a claim of supervisory negligence, the Plaintiffs must
ultimately show that the Defendant was responsible for supervising the
wrongdoer; that a duty to instruct the subordinate to prevent a substantial
threat of constitutional harm arose from the surrounding circumstances; and
that, as a result of the official's gross negligence in failing to instruct
the subordinate emp loyees , the Plaintiff was harmed in the manner alleged.
Havnesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
After considering in detail the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, the Court
finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to state with sufficient specificity a
cause of action for damages against Defendant Robbins. First, the Plaintiffs
have failed to indicate with sufficient specificity to what extent Defendant
Robbins was
[Cont... inaccurately characterized the Plaintiffs' claim. As this Circuit noted in
Havnesworth, the theory of respondeat superior applies where a plaintiff seeks
to hold an official liable simply "by virtue of (his or her] dominant role in
the employment relationship." Id. at 1259. In contrast, a claim of supervisory
negligence alleges specific negligent acts by the supervisory emp loyee, such
as a failure to properly oversee or train his subordinates. Id.
The Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendant Richard Robbins is
vicariously liable simply because he is employed in a superior position to the
Officers who allegedly violated the Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights.
Rather, the Plaintiffs assert that the Defendant "failed to properly oversee"
the Officers and that he should have known that allegedly unlawful acts were
committed by the Officers. In view of the Plaintiffs' allegations, the Court
finds that the Plaintiffs claim is more accurately characterized as a claim of
supervisory negligence than one of respondeat superior.
10
responsible for supervising the alleged wrongdoers. The Plaintiffs only
statement in this regard is that "Robbins is an Assistant Solicitor with the
Department of Fish and Wildlife , . . [whose~official duties [include]
advis[ingl the Park Police on the enforcement of regulations in 36 C.F.R. [~]
7 et ses.~ Amended Complaint, p. 2. The Complaint does not charge that Robbins
was responsible for training or overseeing Officers O'Neill and Keness.
Second, the Plaintiffs have failed to plead with specificity how
Defendant Robbins acted with gross negligence. Havnesworth, 820 F.2d at 1260;
accord Havs v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869, 872 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S, 833 (1982). [3] The Plaintiffs have not specified in any way how
Defendant Robbins' alleged "failure to oversee" the Park Police Officers led
to a high likelihood of constitutional deprivation. The Court therefore holds
that the cause of action for damages against Defendant Richard Robbins must be
dismissed for failure to state a claim. The brief, cryptic description of
Defendant Robbins' alleged wrongdoing hardly suffices to surpass Hobson's
heightened pleading standard for claims of this type.
[3 In Havnesworth, the court found that holding supervisory officials
liable for negligence that leads to foreseeable constitutional violations by
subordinate employees would place "an excessive burden on supervisors and
hamper performance of official duties." Haynesworth, 820 F.2d at 1261. Thus,
plaintiffs must assert more than mere negligence by the defendant. Plaintiffs
must show that the defendant was grossly negligent, e.q., that he created a
high likelihood of harm. Id.]