The case for retaining nuclear weapons as instruments of
national power continues to be very influential - people
of great experience and authority remain unconvinced about the
wisdom of elimination. Accordingly, the following rebuttal
deals at some length with the arguments for retention.
"Nuclear Weapons Have Prevented and Will Continue to be Needed
to Prevent War Between the Major Powers"
Perhaps the most important role claimed for nuclear weapons -
beyond deterring the use of other nuclear weapons - is
that they discourage recourse to war among the major powers
and are thus a force for stability. The empirical evidence
appears strong. The period 1870-1945 saw two world wars and
several more brief, confined but full-scale clashes between
major states such as France and Germany in 1870, China and
Japan in 1894-95, and Japan and Russia in 1904-5. Since 1945
there has been no direct clash between the recognised major
powers (although China and the Soviet Union fought a brief
border war in 1969). Many therefore contend that, for better
or worse, it has taken the unique sobering capacity of nuclear
weapons to break the entrenched cycle of war between the
world's most powerful states. This broad historical
correlation between nuclear weapons and the absence of war
between the major powers is seen as being decisively
reinforced by the belief of some that nuclear weapons played
a vital part in deterring the Soviet Union from pushing the
Iron Curtain in Europe further to the West. The experience in
Europe in 1945-90 in fact lies at the heart of the view that
nuclear weapons have, on balance, played a positive role.
While it must be accepted the beliefs were deeply held that
the Soviet Union aspired to invade and occupy Western Europe,
and that nuclear weapons deterred it from doing so, the
evidence for those beliefs is now unclear. First, it is not
clear that the Soviet Union, even in the company of its Warsaw
Pact allies, had the capacity to do so, nor more particularly,
that it believed its national or wider political and strategic
interests would be advanced by doing so. The Soviet Union, at
that time, was a powerful, ruthless totalitarian state and
these facts were a source of gravest concern. But, as American
records from the immediate post World War II period are
declassified and, even more important, as the end of the Cold
War permits the first authoritative investigations into the
assessments and judgements made by the Soviet leadership at
the relevant times, it is clear that the view that Soviet
policy rested on a systemic urge to aggression and that its
actions were driven by this rather than by a concrete
calculation of its capabilities and interests, is open to
question.
Second, the idea that only the threat of suffering its own
Hiroshimas and Nagasakis deterred the Soviet Union from
invading Western Europe is contrary to the unfolding
historical record. That record, rather than suggesting that
the Soviet Union was uniquely different in the way it framed
its interests and assessed its options to advance them,
instead suggests that World War II had reaffirmed for the
Soviet Union, as for other powers, that major war between them
was not a rational instrument of policy and should be avoided
at almost any cost. The new danger of escalation to nuclear
war merely underlined this central point.
Whatever conclusions may eventually be drawn from the
historical record, Europe's experience of nuclear deterrence
after World War II should not be extended into a general
principle. A number of relevant aspects do, however, emerge
from that experience.
It was in Europe that the strategic utility of nuclear weapons
was most thoroughly explored and their limitations most
clearly displayed. The first authoritative endeavour in the
United States to accommodate nuclear weapons in a national
security strategy - the policy memorandum NSC-68 of 1950
- recommended that the United States make the fullest use
of its advantage in atomic weaponry. In the NATO context,
facing very strong Soviet conventional forces, the decision
was taken to enlist nuclear weapons as a substitute for
conventional forces. Declaratory statements stressed that, if
attacked, NATO intended to respond promptly with nuclear
weapons "by means and at places of our own choosing". This
strategy, known as 'massive retaliation', was the beginning of
a determined search to extract utility from nuclear weapons as
a balance against superior conventional forces, namely
deterring major aggression against any member of the Atlantic
alliance.
This policy of extended nuclear deterrence, as it came to be
known, proved to be a most demanding one. It is noteworthy
that doubts about the credibility of nuclear threats were
apparent from the outset: NSC-68 also recommended that the
post-war rundown of conventional forces be reversed to create
the largest possible firebreak between conventional war and
nuclear war. The United States and its allies had as a common
interest a threat to resort to nuclear weapons that was, if
not utterly credible, at least not blatantly incredible. But
the United States, for all the sincerity of its political
undertakings, had a compelling interest in not being drawn
automatically into full-scale intercontinental nuclear war as
a result of any instance of aggression against its European
allies. The European allies, seeking the strongest possible
deterrent to war, spoke publicly as though they wanted to see
a direct linkage between Soviet conventional attack and a
response by US strategic nuclear forces. Privately, however,
many Europeans thought otherwise. And in the 1970s and 1980s
scepticism about the military utility of nuclear weapons began
to be expressed publicly by former service leaders and
officials on both sides of the Atlantic:
* In 1978 General Johannes Steinhoff, the former Luftwaffe
Chief of Staff, wrote: "I am in favour of retaining nuclear
weapons as potential tools, but not permitting them to become
battlefield weapons. I am not opposed to the strategic
employment of these weapons; however, I am firmly opposed to
their tactical use on our soil."
* By 1982, some retired Chiefs of the British Defence Staff,
including Lord Louis Mountbatten, reportedly expressed their
belief that initiating the use of nuclear weapons, in
accordance with NATO policy, would lead to disaster. Field
Marshal Lord Carver, Chief of the Defence Staff from 1973 to
1976 and a member of the Canberra Commission, wrote in the
London Sunday Times: At the theatre or tactical level any
nuclear exchange, however limited it might be, is bound to
leave NATO worse off in comparison to the Warsaw Pact, in
terms both of military and civilian casualties and
destruction...The only exception would be if the Soviet Union
were to respond to NATO's use of nuclear weapons either with
a much more limited response or none at all. To initiate use
of nuclear weapons on that assumption seems to me to be
criminally irresponsible.
* Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's National Security Adviser
and Secretary of State, speaking in Brussels in 1979, made
quite clear he believed the United States would never initiate
a nuclear strike against the Soviet Union to protect its
allies, no matter what the provocation. "Our European allies,"
he said, "should not keep asking us to multiply strategic
assurances that we cannot possibly mean or, if we do mean, we
should not execute because if we execute we risk the
destruction of civilisation."
* Admiral Noel Gayler, former commander in chief of US air,
ground and sea forces in the Pacific, remarked in 1981: "There
is no sensible military use of any of our nuclear forces. The
only reasonable use is to deter our opponent from using his
nuclear forces."
* Melvin Laird, President Nixon's first Secretary of Defense,
was reported in April 1982 as saying: "A worldwide zero
nuclear option with adequate verification should now be our
goal....These weapons...are useless for military purposes."
* In 1983, Robert S. McNamara, former US Secretary of Defense,
and another member of the Canberra Commission, wrote that in
the early 1960s he had recommended, first to President Kennedy
and then to President Johnson, that they should never, under
any circumstance, initiate the use of nuclear weapons. He
believed they accepted his recommendations.
* Former West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt stated in a
1987 BBC interview: "Flexible response is nonsense. Not out of
date, but nonsense.....The Western idea, which was created in
the 1950s, that we should be willing to use nuclear weapons
first, in order to make up for our so-called conventional
deficiency, has never convinced me." The history of extended
deterrence which included the progressive acquisition
by the Soviet Union of a comparably large and diversified
nuclear arsenal is an anguished one. For Europe the
concern was sometimes that developments in Soviet nuclear
capabilities had weakened Washington's commitment to its
defence, or else that Washington might convince itself that
any conflict could be confined to Europe and for that reason
be rather more adventurous than Europeans might wish. Concern
mounted in the early 1960s when the United States, confronted
with a rapidly developing Soviet nuclear force both strategic
and tactical, proposed to abandon 'massive retaliation' in
favour of a more cautious and nuanced strategy
'flexible response' which pushed the nuclear threshold
up behind a new resolve to strengthen NATO's conventional
defence capabilities. Flexible response and extended
deterrence both came under challenge in the late 1970s when
the Soviet Union deployed new generations of
surface-to-surface ballistic missiles (notably the SS-20) and
was thus seen to be acquiring the ability to wage strategic
nuclear war against Western Europe with a weapon that was
sub-strategic in the superpower context. Some believed that to
negate or respond to the use or threat of use of these weapons
the United States would have had to leapfrog from its tactical
nuclear weapons in Europe to its US-based strategic nuclear
forces. There was thought to be a missing rung in the ladder
of escalation which was seen as further 'de-coupling' the
United States from the defence of Europe, that is, putting at
risk the direct linkage between aggression against NATO and
the threat of US strategic nuclear strikes against the Soviet
Union. The British and French nuclear forces were deemed, as
always, to be essentially irrelevant to this gap in the
escalatory ladder. The solution adopted by NATO was to deploy
new American missiles capable of posing from European soil the
same risk to Soviet targets that the SS-20 posed to Western
Europe, and accompany this with an offer to negotiate mutual
reductions in this class of weapon.
In all of this there was little discussion, even in broad
terms, of how the strategic weapons in the United States and
the broad array of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe would
actually be used. Deterrence, after all, requires that threats
be credible to the opponent: this, in turn, requires evidence
that using nuclear weapons could produce outcomes preferable
to non-use. But it has proven impossible to conceive of 'war
plans' for the use of nuclear forces against a comparably
equipped foe which did not leave the initiator worse off as a
result of the action. Discussion of this problem was muted for
two main reasons. First, the extraordinary destructiveness
even of tactical nuclear weapons in the relatively confined
spaces of northern Europe came graphically to the fore.
Occasional references deriving from exercises, based on
favourable assumptions such as the constrained use of tactical
nuclear weapons against military targets, invariably involved
casualty figures which provoked public alarm. Adding to the
alarm of casualty figures in the millions was nervousness
relating to the decision to cross the nuclear threshold as a
crisis unfolded, including the prospect that authority to
release nuclear weapons might be delegated down the chain of
command. The second constraint on discussion is perhaps even
more important. As the Soviet nuclear arsenal grew and
diversified - broadly matching that of the United States
in terms of flexibility, survivability and destructiveness
- the crucial feature of flexible response, namely the
presumption of a more credible capacity to threaten to move up
the escalatory ladder, became untenable. In effect NATO was
trying to build a credible deterrent based on an incredible
action.
A degree of 'existential deterrence' existed. But the prospect
of the damage which would surely have been incurred in a
conventional war must have weighed heavily in the minds of
leaders on both sides. Notwithstanding doctrine and
declaratory positions, the absolute imperative for the United
States and its NATO partners was considered to be the non-use
of nuclear weapons.
The foregoing is a brief account of the attempts by the West,
and essentially the United States, to exploit nuclear weapons
to enhance security. This bias is appropriate because the
United States was unique in overtly tasking its nuclear forces
to do more than deter nuclear attack against itself. The
Soviet Union, of course, also took nuclear weapons very
seriously and invested heavily in them. Although there is no
evidence that NATO ever entertained the possibility of
dislodging the Soviet Union from Central Europe by force, the
Soviet Union undoubtedly felt that its nuclear forces
deterred, particularly perhaps at times of popular uprisings
(1953, 1956 and 1968) when it would have appeared that NATO
was under considerable pressure to intervene.
"Nuclear Weapons Protect the Credibility of Security
Assurances to Allies"
It is argued that the credibility of
security assurances extended to third parties requires the
continued existence of nuclear weapons. Extended deterrence
was formulated in the first instance to address circumstances
in Western Europe, as a means of transposing United States
power and negating the proximity and ready reinforcement
capability of the Soviet Union's larger conventional forces.
The gravity of the United States' political commitment to
defend its allies in Europe and also in Asia and the Pacific
lay in its declared preparedness to expose its own territory
to nuclear attack. One consideration, never formally declared
but not disguised with any vigour, was to dampen incentives in
Germany and Japan to become nuclear weapon states themselves.
Extended deterrence has always encompassed tensions. On the
one hand, the United States has had to balance the credibility
of its security commitments to allies against its natural
instinct to build firebreaks between those commitments and
nuclear attack against its own home territory. On the other,
allies who craved that commitment have also dreaded becoming
a superpower nuclear battleground. More importantly, the
circumstances in Europe which originally gave rise to extended
deterrence no longer obtain. Partly through the Conventional
Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), but more emphatically as a
result of the break-up of the Soviet Union and the dramatic
diminution in the military capability of its constituent
parts, including Russia, the prospect of an overwhelming
conventional threat against US allies on the periphery of the
former Soviet Union has simply vanished. Nor is there any
prospect of a new threat arising comparable in magnitude to
that posed by the Soviet Union in the past now that Russian
forces have been withdrawn from Germany and the rest of
Central Europe.
The Canberra Commission does not propose that any nuclear
weapon state should eliminate its nuclear forces unilaterally.
Moreover, extended deterrence assurances in the form of
collective defence arrangements will remain as part of stable
security arrangements. Extended nuclear deterrence, however,
cannot be used as a justification for maintaining nuclear
arsenals in perpetuity, and the security and non-proliferation
function of extended nuclear deterrence in any case will no
longer apply in a nuclear weapon free world. Allies of the
United States have lent their strong support to the NPT's
stated objective of nuclear disarmament. Their interest in
collective security arrangements based on conventional forces
is sure to continue after nuclear weapons have been
eliminated.
"Nuclear Weapons Deter the Use of Other Weapons of Mass
Destruction"
Weapons of mass destruction embrace chemical and
biological as well as nuclear weapons. The claim is still
sometimes made that nuclear weapons are an effective deterrent
against them all and constitute the only guarantee of national
security against threats posed by such weapons.
All the nuclear weapon states have formulated negative
security assurances, statements that set out the circumstances
in which they would not use nuclear weapons. The United States
declared in 1982 that it would "not use nuclear weapons
against any non-nuclear weapon state ... except in the case of
an attack on the United States, its territories or armed
forces, or its allies, by such a state allied to or associated
with a nuclear weapon state in carrying out or sustaining the
attack". The clear inference that can be drawn from this
statement - which, together with that of the United
Kingdom, is the most conditional negative assurance offered by
a nuclear weapon state - is that a non-aligned
non-nuclear weapon state acting on its own but using
biological weapons or chemical weapons against the United
States should not fear retaliation with nuclear weapons. In
other words, the US and the other nuclear weapon states
signalled through these security assurances that the only
circumstances in which it would be appropriate to use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons was when nuclear weapons were
present, directly or indirectly, on the opposing side.
The United States has not failed to capitalise on the fact
that it has nuclear weapons and that a non-nuclear adversary
might doubt its ordinances of self-denial. In 1990 the United
States did not discourage Iraq from the view that it might be
subject to nuclear retaliation if it used chemical weapons to
protect its occupation of Kuwait. Iraq's Foreign Minister
subsequently asserted that the nuclear capability of the
coalition forces cast a shadow over the means the regime
determined it could sensibly employ to resist eviction from
Kuwait. But the United States had means other than veiled
nuclear retaliation to deter Iraq from using weapons of mass
destruction - for example, the prospect of Iraq's utter
devastation through massive conventional bombings or changing
the main objective of the war from liberating Kuwait to
toppling the Iraqi Government. Furthermore, the United States
would have been aware that, if Iraq had raised the stakes and
used chemical weapons, the consequences of nuclear retaliation
by the United States might have been even more far reaching
than the threat it was seeking to deter.
Canberra Commission Report Continued
Proposition One