This year's winter session of the two-year-old negotiations ends on 29 March making
the overall time-table quite restricted. US President Clinton had urged a "draft pact" to
be submitted in June to this year's 51st UN General Assembly. Thus, the treaty should
be open for signature in September. Outgoing Conference chairman U Aye of Burma
said he had been unable to resolve the stand-off in back-stage discussions, but
diplomats said contacts would continue in an effort to find a solution in the coming
weeks.
News on the Fissile Talks
Also at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, a global ban on the production of
fissile material is to be negotiated. in March 1995, the Conference established a
committee with the mandate to negotiate a "cut-off' in fissile material production, i.e.
plutonium and highly-enriched uranium (HEU). But the work is apparently deadlocked.
So far, the committee did even not succeed in electing a chairperson. Now, against
the background of the position of the 21 non-aligned countries to urge for nuclear
disarmament talks, Western countries are trying to put the blame on lndia and
Pakistan seen as being eager to continue their production of fissile material. US
ambassador Ledogar made the point by assuming that the deadlock was created
because "some states" are linking both the CTBT and the fissile talks to reach nuclear
disarmament negotiations.
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
START-2
On 26 January, the US Senate approved START-2 which had been signed in Moscow
in January 1993. The Treaty requires the USA and Russia to reduce their strategic
arsenals to between 3,000 and 3,500 nuclear weapons each by 2003. This cuts the
number of Russian and US nuclear warheads on long-range missiles and bombers to
about one-third the number deployed in 1990. It bans all land-based multiple-warhead
missiles and limits warheads deployed on submarines. Unlike START-1, which limited
both sides to 6,000 warheads deployed on 1,600 delivery vehicles, the new pact
would count all warheads deployed on heavy bombers. To date, the number of
warheads affected by START-2 is 7,000 for Russia and 9,000 for the USA.
The overwhelming 87-4 voting - the Treaty provides forˇapproval by a two-thirds
majority - was only opposed by the Republican Senators John Ashcroft, Jesse Helms,
James Inhofe, and Bob Smith. Now it is up to the Russian Federation to ratify the
Treaty, as well. But there is some concem that the ratification by Russian legislation
could be caught up in the Russian elections. Russia should ratify START-2 by mid-
April. Without ratification the US will not be legally bound by the Treaty, according to
US - Senate Majority leader Bob Dole. Also, ratification could be more difficult if it is
not done before Boris Yeltsin's term expires in June. Reportedly, influential Russian
parliamentarians are linking the ratification of START-2 and NATOs intention to
expand to Eastem Europe. They were quoting as arguing that NATO expansion
means "changing the strategical environment" in so far as, in the longer run, a
stationing of NATO nuclear weapons is considered possible on the territories of
erstwhile Warsaw pact states on the boarders to Russia. Hence, Russia has to revise
its nuclear strategy. According to members of the Duma, all decisions regarding
START-2 should be postponed until elections are over. The Vice-President of
Parliament, Sergei Babourin, was quoted as saying that without considerable changes,
the Treaty would not correspond to today's national interests of Russia. General
Nikolai Besborodov, a vice-chair of Duma's Defence Committee, demanded a new
analysis of the Treaty with particular regard to the geo-political situation of Russia and
its economic capabilities.
START-3:
A possibie START-3 negotiating should, at least, concentrate on the following:
- further reduction to 1,000 wameads each for the USA and Russia would be a solid
basis for the inclusion of the smaller weapon states; negotiated limits on the
remaining tactical nuclear weapons should be envisioned; the smaller nuclear powers
should join negotiations
Nuclear politics
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