March 4, 1999

Dear Colleague:

The Department of Energy's Stockpile Stewardship Program squanders billions of dollars on facilities and technology that can be used to research and design new nuclear warheads. In doing so, this program not only wastes taxpayers' money but also encourages other nations to build up their nuclear weapons programs, thus putting our real security at risk.

The Stockpile Stewardship Resolution urges DOE to redirect the program toward custodianship of the existing weapons stockpile in a program that is less costly, less provocative, and less likely to spend billions on facilities with little relevance to the safety of the arsenal. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which President Clinton signed in 1996, bans all nuclear explosions in order to promote nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation "by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons."

The treaty requires us to maintain the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons without explosive tests. It does not require us to spend, for example:

o $5.5 million for a new National Atomic Museum at the Anderson-Abruzzo International Balloon Museum.
o $466 million on fusion explosion experiments that could lead to hydrogen bombs that don't need uranium or plutonium, a nonproliferation nightmare,
o $198 million on underground "subcritical" nuclear tests and preparing for banned explosive tests at the Nevada Test Site,
o $60 million for new submarine warhead designs.

These projects are an expensive jobs program for nuclear scientists, in the guise of keeping unneeded weapons design, testing, and manufacturing capability. They are inconsistent with our commitment to nuclear disarmament in the Nonproliferation Treaty and with the purposes of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Faced with our massive investment in nuclear weapons research, other nations are slowing arms reductions and keeping their own nuclear weapons development programs. The safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile can be maintained with a more modest program of surveillance of the warheads and occasional remanufacturing when necessary. The Stockpile Stewardship Resolution expresses support for such a custodianship program that protects our national security without wasting money or providing cover for new nuclear weapons programs that will prolong the Cold War and undermine the unsteady international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

I urge you to cosponsor this resolution, which is printed (below), and help move towards a more sound nuclear policy. Please call Mr. Lowell Ungar or Mr. Jeff Duncan of my staff at 5-2836 if you have questions or if you would like to join as an original cosponsor this resolution. Sincerely,

Ed Markey
[U.S. Representative, D-Massachusetts]

Expressing the sense of the Congress regarding maintenance of the nuclear weapons stockpile.

Mr. MARKEY (for himself, Mr. BARRETT of Wisconsin, Ms. DEGETTE, Ms. ESHOO, Mr. GUTIERREZ, Ms. LEE, Mrs. LOWEY, Mrs. MALONEY of New York, Mr. MCGOVERN, Ms. MCKINNEY, Mr. MEEHAN, Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California, Mr. NADLER, Mr. OWENS, Mr. PALLONE, Mr. PAYNE, Mr. TIERNEY, and Ms. WOOLSEY) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services

Expressing the sense of the Congress regarding maintenance of the nuclear weapons stockpile.

Whereas it is in the best interests of the Nation and the world to ban nuclear explosive tests forever and to promote nuclear disarmament;

Whereas the priority of nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship should be the safety of the existing arsenal, and there is no need to design or develop new nuclear weapons or to modify the nuclear explosive package in existing weapons;

Whereas the United States has conducted more than 1000 explosive tests of its nuclear weapons arsenal, and the stockpile can be maintained reliably without further nuclear explosive testing;

Whereas an ongoing stockpile evaluation and maintenance program has ensured the safety and reliability of the arsenal for decades, and the Secretaries of Energy and Defense again certified its safety and reliability on December 11, 1998;

Whereas the new stockpile stewardship and management program, funded at $4,500,000,000 annually over ten years, is not needed to maintain the arsenal, and many of its programs and facilities are unnecessary and hence a waste of taxpayer dollars;

Whereas the Department of Energy and the nuclear weapons laboratories intend to use the stockpile stewardship program to maintain and significantly enhance scientific and technical capabilities for undertaking `development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons' (as stated in the United States Department of Energy Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, 1996);

Whereas maintaining and enhancing capabilities for nuclear weapon design and development is provocative to other nuclear-weapon states and to non-nuclear-weapon states, and runs counter to the obligations of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons `to pursue negotiations in good faith on ... cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and ... nuclear disarmament,' and counter to the purposes of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which include `constraining the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons'; and

Whereas there are less costly and more appropriate alternatives that can maintain the United States nuclear weapons stockpile while complying with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Now, therefore be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that--

(1) the priority of the nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship program should be the safety and security of the existing nuclear weapons stockpile, the program should also maintain sufficient weapon reliability to ensure the arsenal's deterrent effect, and the program should not attempt to develop new nuclear weapons;

(2) the nuclear weapons stockpile can be maintained with a program that is far smaller than the current program, is less expensive, and does not require facilities or experiments that are likely to be used for warhead design or development; and

(3) the Secretary of Energy should redirect the Department of Energy program for custodianship of the nuclear weapons arsenal toward less costly, less provocative methods that are consistent with United States treaty obligations.

Expressing the sense of the Congress that nuclear weapons should be taken off hair-trigger alert.

Mr. MARKEY submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations, and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

Expressing the sense of the Congress that nuclear weapons should be taken off hair-trigger alert.

Whereas accidental or mistaken launch of a nuclear missile could devastate a city, and launch of a nuclear force could wreak worldwide destruction;

Whereas the United States and Russia currently maintain thousands of nuclear weapons on `hair-trigger' alert, such that they can be fired within minutes;

Whereas in several incidents false signals of missile attacks have triggered a process in which national leaders had to decide in only a few minutes whether to fire nuclear weapons;

Whereas the failure of computers to recognize the year 2000 date change could infect command, control, communications, and intelligence systems, causing false signals or blank monitoring screens;

Whereas Russian monitoring and control systems are deteriorating;

Whereas a massive preemptive attack attempting to destroy the nuclear weapons capability of either Russia or the United States is extremely unlikely, and mutual measures to slow the firing of nuclear weapons would make a preemptive strike even more difficult;

Whereas much of the nuclear force of each country, including submarines at sea and mobile land-based missiles, is almost invulnerable and thus would preserve retaliatory ability through a nuclear attack, making immediate firing of weapons unnecessary;

Whereas President Bush in 1991 ordered a unilateral stand-down of United States strategic bombers and de-alerted some missiles, and Soviet President Gorbachev quickly reciprocated with similar actions, improving bilateral relations and national security;

Whereas removing further missiles from hair-trigger alert would help alleviate recent tensions between Russia and the United States; and

Whereas there are several ways that land and submarine based weapons could be temporarily disabled, with times ranging from minutes to weeks in order to reactivate them: Now, therefore be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that--

(1) the United States, Russia, and other nuclear powers should negotiate an agreement to take all of their nuclear weapons off of high-alert status in order to decrease the risk of accidental or mistaken firing of nuclear weapons;

(2) to further such an agreement, the United States should immediately take off of hair-trigger alert as many of its nuclear weapons as is feasible and consistent with national security, and should encourage Russia to reciprocate;

(3) the Department of Defense and the State Department should study methods to increase further the time needed to launch all nuclear missiles and study the effect these actions would have on nuclear deterrence, relations with other recognized nuclear powers, the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, and other aspects of national security; and

(4) the President should expedite the establishment of a United States-Russian joint early-warning center to ensure accurate detection of any missiles and effective communication in the event of a false alarm, computer malfunction, accident, or diplomatic crisis, as set forth in the `Joint Statement on the Exchange of Information on Missile Launches and Early Warning', agreed to in 1998, and should facilitate the establishment of a temporary center before the end of 1999 that could address any problems which might arise due to the failure of computers to recognize the year 2000 date change.